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This thesis  is about  experimental  exhibition,  as both  concept  and practice.  It
asks what happens when experiments take place in public and  in what way
exhibitions might be said to be inventive formats.
An  exhibition  about  the  invention  of  electronic  music  in  London's  Science
Museum provides the empirical focus through which I explore these questions.
Called  Oramics,  the exhibition  is  focused  around  a  recently  'rediscovered'
optical-synthesiser called the Oramics Machine, designed in the 1960s by the
composer Daphne Oram. An exhibition about electronic music studios in which
engineers and musicians collaborated to  create new sounds,  in  Oramics we
find  styles  of  experimentation considerably  unlike those of  the  professional
sciences. Inviting us to consider the proposition that the experiment has a life
beyond the laboratory, the Oramics exhibition is also said to be experimental in
its curatorial procedures and in its formats of public display. In Oramics we find
an exhibition that assembles together both heterogeneous styles of electronic
music experiment and multiple modes of experimental practice. 
The  analysis  of  the  thesis  explores  how,  and  in  what  ways,  the  Oramics
exhibition might be understood as an experiment. I formulate and advance the
proposition that we can understand the Oramics exhibition as an experiment in
the  relations  between  science,  culture  and  the  public.  The  analysis  of  the
thesis  is  presented  thematically  and  organised  around  three  modes of
experiment  that  are  central  to  Oramics:  the  curatorial  experiment,  the
electronic  music  experiment  and  experimental  public  display.  Drawing  on
literatures from social  studies of science, I apply the concept of the “public
experiment” to the Oramics exhibition in order to give a materialist analysis of
how relations are made between these very different modes of experiment. In
concluding, I discuss some of the ways in which the Oramics exhibition might
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Oramics1 is an exhibition about the invention of electronic music held in a small
gallery  in London's Science Museum.  Its  displays  showcase the diversity of
electronic music's  genre  styles,  amateur inventions  and assortment  creative
practices  of  using  machines  to  make  music:  'home-made'  electronic  noise
devices  take centre-stage in  the  gallery,  and  hip-hop and acid-house artists
are pictured alongside engineers and computer programmers. In other parts of
the  gallery the  changing  sound  world is  explored  by  anonymous  “women
writers”2 and an 11-minute documentary about a group of musicians involved in
curating the exhibition is shown in a small cinema. It's fair to say that Oramics
is not a conventional science exhibition.  Many of  the displays  that we find in
Oramics wouldn't appear out of place in an art museum: idiosyncratic artefacts,
playful  experimentation  and  sub-cultural  style  are central  to the  exhibition's
presentation of electronic music.  Oramics  is an exhibition of many  contrasts
with the displays of industrial history, technological progress and sleek 'hands-
on'  interactive  science  galleries  that  surround  it  and for  which  the  Science
Museum is best known. And yet, as I finish writing up my study of Oramics, I
hear that this 'temporary' exhibition, originally scheduled to close in 2012, has
for the second time been extended; its eclectic displays of electronic music will
stay open to visitors of the Science Museum until the end of 2014. This thesis
is about why an exhibition like Oramics is valued by a contemporary science
museum:  the following study asks  what  the  displays  of  Oramics can  tell  us
about experimental practice and the public appreciation of invention, and how
exhibitions might be said to intervene in and shape relations between science
and culture.
Before  arriving at the  gallery displays of  Oramics,  on the second floor of the
Science Museum, visitors are first invited to navigate a series of exhibitions in
galleries en route. Following the visitor from their entrance through the austere
and functional front door of the Science Museum, past the receptionists who
1 The full title of the exhibition is Oramics to Electronica: Revealing Histories of Electronic 
Music but throughout this thesis I refer to it simply as Oramics.
2 A group simply named “women writers” are participants in the Oramics exhibition. The 
gender, written contributions of the group are discussed at length in Chapter Five.
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press for donations, to the noisy main concourse filled with school children and
young families we find the Oramics exhibition situated in a particular setting of
public  display.  As we move through these various galleries in  the  Science
Museum  from  displays  of  industrial  revolution,  to  our  knowledge  of  the
universe,  to  contemporary  interactive  displays  about  environmental  politics,
arriving at the  Oramics  exhibition it  might feel like we're leaving  the Science
Museum altogether.  At  this  point  it  wouldn't  be  unreasonable  to  ask  what
electronic  musicians  can  tell  us  about  science  and  technology  that  isn't
accounted for in these other exhibitions, or to contest the notion that “women
writers”  can tell  us  about  processes of  invention,  or  to  propose  that  these
displays  simply  provide a bit of 'light relief' from the serious concerns of the
surrounding galleries. Indeed, in what follows I discuss some such objections,
contestations  and  criticisms  made  of  Oramics; an  exhibition  that  certainly
agitates  the  science  warriors,  the  positivists  and  historicists  for  whom  the
Science Museum is a defender of  truth,  progressive Enlightenment and  the
sanctity  of  technical  expertise  against  the  irrational  whims  of  the  masses.
Following a visitor's trail to the Oramics gallery, then, we are going to gain an
appreciation of the very particular setting of the Science Museum in which this
exhibition is staged. 
The  central  concourse  of  the  Science  Museum where  visitors  enter  is an
exhibition space  known as  the  Energy  Hall;  a  display that demonstrates the
great  power  of  the  steam  revolution. Walking  into  the  Science  Museum,
visitors are dwarfed by the steam engines surrounding them: the Energy Hall is
a  display  in  which  objects tower  over  their  visiting subjects, impressing on
them the material impact and scale of the industrial revolution. At the heart of
the gallery an enormous mill  engine3,  which has been repurposed for display,
is staged in motion: its inner mechanics do not rest lifelessly but are shown in
action,  demonstrating  the  power  of  steam to  turn  the  engine's  enormous
flywheel.  Explaining how harnessing steam power revolutionised “our world”4,
the Hall's displays tell visitors that the steam engine was not only the “driving
force”  behind  300  years  of  British  trade  and  industry  but  is  also  at the
foundation  of  their own everyday  life;  steam turbines,  they are told, provide
75% of the electricity  that is  consumed in homes and at work.  Electricity, the
foundation  for the conduct of contemporary  public life, is demonstrated as  a
3 The mill engine on display was built by Burnley Ironworks Company in 1903 and 
repurposed by the Science Museum for display.
4 The notion that the steam engine revolutionised “our world” is promoted in a sub-branch of 
the Energy Hall which focuses specifically on James Watt, called James Watt and Our 
World. This exhibition is discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.
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triumph of ingenious  science and technological  advance.  Alongside the mill
engine an explainer from the Science Museum interacts with visitors describing
to them the history of the steam engine and the basic principles through which
it functions. The explainer reassures us that though technological development
is  revolutionary, the steam engine does not  drives us but  rather  we are in
control  of  it.  The explainer tells us that steam power was just  the practical
application  of  one  man's  very  simple  ideas.  A display  about  the  steam
revolutionary James Watt and his workshop sit next to the mill engine: in Watt's
workshop we see the heroic scientist who works in isolation. The steam power
that  transformed “our  world”  came from the work  of  a  lone intellect.  In  its
explanation the 'power' of the steam engine switches from object to subject,
and the visitor is invited into a Science Museum dialectic between progressive
history and liberal education5.
Next to this impressive display of  steam power, are two other features which
can be encountered in virtually all contemporary science museums, and which
demonstrate quite a different form of power: the museum shop, and a two floor
cafe.  In  these  parts  of  the  Science  Museum,  the  visitor  is  the  sovereign
consumer  who  has  the  economic  power  to  choose  between  the  diverse
products on display. In the shop visitors are engaged not by 'explainers' but by
retail staff who demonstrate the education toys and shiny gadgets on display.
In the cafe, visitors can choose between lavish displays of various European
cuisines, including artisanal-looking pastries and a specialised coffee counter.
Though the Science Museum staff make a functional distinction between the
practices of retail and the curating of exhibitions, we might wonder whether the
visitor's experience of these commercial  features of the Science Museum are
not  always  so  easy  to  separate  from  their  experiences  of  the  science
exhibitions (MacDonald, 2002; Slater, 1997)6. Visitors often appear to take their
time  admiring  the  elaborate  displays  and  explanations  in  both,  pausing  to
clarify or absorb some information about the artefacts in front of them. When
they 'consume', visitors' experience in the science shop and cafe is  in some
respects  remarkably  similar  to  their  experience  in  the  Science  Museum
galleries: diners in  the  cafe  appreciate  the  sophistication of European  style
while  customers  of  the  shop  try  to  better  themselves  by  purchasing
educational  toys. Indeed,  the slogan  “The  Science  of  Shopping”  adorned
5 For a curatorial discussion of dialectics in the Science Museum see (Boon, 2010). 
6 The relations between the consumer and other versions of the public has long been a topic 
of sociological interests, particularly in museum studies. A discussion of the role of the 
consumer in science and technology exhibitions is developed in Chapters 3 and 4 of this 
thesis.
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above  the  shop's entrance  is  all-too-knowing  in  its  conflation  of  these
functionally separated logics of public display.
At  the shop's entrance,  visitors  are  reminded of  why they should  invest  in
science, via an inspirational quotation from the Greek philosopher Socrates:
“Man must rise above the Earth – to the top of the atmosphere and 
beyond – for only thus will he fully understand the world in which he 
lives”
The quotation set against a glittering background of stars, the timeless wisdom
of  Socrates  is  here  enlisted  in  publicising the  transcendental  promise  of
science.  But  the  capacity  of science  to transcend the Earth  is not simply a
philosophical ideal or a publicity gimmick, but is rather shown to be a practical
reality in the adjacent gallery, called Space Exploration.  In this gallery visitors
navigate  through a  dimly  lit  space  which  is  punctuated  by  brightly  spotlit
displays; in a very literal sense, the exhibition demonstrates how  the human
quest  for  universal  knowledge  brings light  to  the  darkness  of  space.  The
representation of  the  planets  and  the  solar  system  in  images,  models  and
dioramas are complemented by two real, retired space rockets that hang from
the ceiling,  occupying the length of the gallery.  Have these rockets  not only
accomplished Socrates vision but also transformed 'our world'  by extending it
into the darkness of space? In this exhibition, visitors see how science not only
allows us to 'understand' the earth but also changes it  and liberates humans
from the whims and vicissitudes of an earthly existence7.
In  another  gallery  dealing  with  Energy,  the  power  relation  is  reversed:  the
visitor is here not simply a spectator of industrial 'power' but is empowered to
experiment  with energy production  themselves.  On the second floor,  next to
the  Oramics  gallery, the interactive  Energy  exhibition engages visitors in  the
politics of  energy provision.  Unlike  the industrial  spectacle  we found  on the
entrance concourse of the Museum, this Energy gallery is filled with sleek and
shiny push-button and other 'hands on' exhibits  through  which  unruly  school
children  are  engaged with  future  energy  scenarios.  In one  interactive  video
game called World Energy: You Are In Charge,  players  are given the role of
7 Hannah Arendt (1958) famously describes the space missions as characteristic of Man's 
perennial attempts to escape his Earthly-nature; a course of action that Arendt 
characterises as the quintessence of the human condition. 
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Energy  Minister of “Lectraland”  and  invited to  experiment with  the politics of
energy provision:  if  the player ensures the population gets  continuous  power
the  Energy  Minister is re-elected,  if not the  'lights go out' and the  Minister is
fired from the government. This is a game in which the success of the Energy
Minister  depends  on science  and  politics  coming together  to  address  the
energy challenge. However, they can also fail to co-operate and if they do the
blame sits squarely with politics: it is the Energy Minister, not the scientists or
engineers,  who  is  ousted  from  post.  But  does  politics,  the  corrupter  of
knowledge and  appropriator  of  technical  practice, also  hold the promise of
delivering  'good  decisions'?  The  game  suggests  that  if  politicians  can  be
liberated from the short-term populism, power struggles and local issues they
can deliver the 25-year energy strategy we need. The game, then, is clear: if
politicians fail address the long-term technical challenge of energy production
they  will leave  themselves and  their  population 'powerless',  in both scientific
and political  senses.  In  this  interactive  Energy  gallery's displays  of  political
power,  the  visitor  becomes  a  politician  burdened  with  the  weight  of
responsibility for directing technical development and the repercussions for its
failures.
Arriving at the Oramics exhibition, the visitor has been educated about steam
power  machines, they have  enjoyed the  sophistication of European style at
lunch, witnessed the objective reality of science's universal promise, and have
experienced  the  political  responsibility of technical governance.  What can an
exhibition of  experimental  electronic  music offer this  visitor  who has so far
either  been  deeply  impressed  by  the  objective  power  of  science  and
technology  or  has  subjectively  exercised power  in  consumer  choices and
interactive participation? 
One of the first things the visitor might notice is that though in Oramics we find
many displays of experimental practice, these forms of experiment are both
distinctly removed from the mainstream styles, concerns and settings of 'pure'
science.  Foregrounding the collaborations that took place between musicians
and  engineers  in  early  electronic  music  studios,  these  electronic  music
experiments appear distinctly more playful, artful and amateur than the various
laboratory  experiments  that  we  find  on  public  display  across  the  Science
Museum.  The  Oramics exhibition  centres  on an  experimental  musical
instrument called the  Oramics Machine,  a  synthesiser  designed  in the early
1960s by the electronic music composer Daphne Oram. A 'one-off' and 'home-
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made'  instrument,  the  Oramics  Machine  is  very  noticeably  amateur  in  its
construction:  the  frame  is  assembled  from  repurposed metal  shelving,  a
multitude of wires of disparate sizes and colours hang off at various  places
without  connection  or  explanation,  a  roughly  cut  board  hosts  several
unconnected switches (one of which is labelled “do not switch”), and a broom
handle is jammed in one side of the Machine. The 'home-made' appearance of
the  Oramics  Machine  is  further  accentuated in  accompanying  gallery
explanations that describe how Oram conceived and built the Machine with an
engineer at her “Oramics” studio. On one wall of the Oramics Machine's case
display, a large stencil graphic shows Daphne Oram working with the Machine,
drawing  shapes  onto  lines  of  35mm  film  running  across  its  body;  as
iconography of an inventor at work this image appears distinctly unlike many
others we encounter in the Science Museum. Behind the Machine's case are a
row of photos of Oram, elaborating the exhibition's heterodox iconography of
invention.  A particularly striking image, on which many friends I  took to the
exhibition commented, shows Oram from behind performing  on stage  for a
concert hall  audience: surrounded by conspicuous  machines,  Oram wears a
long evening dress,  and behind her we see an audience of men and women
staring at the spectacle, quite likely puzzled by this collision of two contrasting
aesthetics of femininity  and  technology.  Other images show Oram studiously
at work in the BBC Radiophonic Workshop, the famous British electronic music
studio that she founded in 1958 and which she left shortly after to set up her
own Oramics studio in the oast house in the Kent countryside. In the displays
we  are  told  about  “Daphne's”8 early  life  –  a  computer  display  elaborates
Oram's upbringing accompanied by an image of the composer aged seven in a
white dress – in which she turned down the opportunity to study at the Royal
College of  Music  and instead became a junior  programme  engineer  at  the
BBC.  We  are  told  that  Oram  developed  her  own  unique  approach  to
composition known as “drawn-sound” in which the composer sought to control
all parameters of sound through graphical techniques. But more than only a
musical  invention,  we  are  shown how “drawn-sound”  informed the  electro-
mechanical design of the Oramics Machine, we are told how Oram attempted
to develop a studio in her home to realise this approach to composition and,
furthermore,  how Oram developed  drawn-sound  into  a  broader  philosophy
about the 'vibrational universe'.  A display  which emphasises  the centrality of
personal  style,  amateur  interest,  artistic  practice  in  early  electronic  music
experiments, this  exhibition about  Daphne Oram and the Oramics Machine
8 The gallery texts consistently use only Daphne Oram's first name, in wide contrast with the 
surname formalism of other gallery displays: for instance, nowhere in the Energy Hall is 
James Watt referred to solely as “James”.
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might  at  first  seem antithetical  to concerns of professional  science and the
laboratory  experiments  that  we  find  in  other  exhibitions  in  the  Science
Museum.
Similar themes of experimental practice appear in the gallery's displays about
two early British electronic music studios,  the BBC's Radiophonic Workshop
which was founded by Daphne Oram and Electronic Music Studios Ltd (EMS)
founded  by  the  Russian  aristocrat  Peter  Zinovieff. These  two  studios  are
credited in the exhibition with producing some of the well known inventions of
electronic music: the BBC Workshop produced music for radio and television
and is perhaps best known for the Dr Who soundtrack,  while EMS invented
synthesisers  used  by  rock-stars,  notably  the  VCS3 synthesiser  which  was
used by bands like Pink Floyd, Hawkwind and Kraftwerk. The case displays of
these two studios features objects chosen by their former members who are
named  as  “co-curators”  of  the  exhibition  and are  quoted  to  describe the
significance of these objects, in place of  a factual museum label.  The case
displays are deeply personal in their presentation of these two studios. In the
BBC Workshop's case an old metal lampshade painted green is hung from the
roof of a case accompanied by quotation from the composer Delia Derbyshire
who used  the  lampshade  to  produce  music  in  the  Workshop.  Though  the
composer died in 2001, a quotation taken from an interview with  Derbyshire
describes how she used the lampshade for “natural sounds”: the lampshade is
here  not displayed for its qualities as an  industrially mass-produced artefact
but  because of  Derbyshire's  practical  misuse  of it in  musical  composition.  In
the  EMS  case,  a  trophy  for  “second  place”  in  the  1968  Congress  of  the
International  Federation for Information Processing  is on display amongst a
jumble of the Studio's  less well  recognised  inventions  chosen by its former
members.  A quotation  from  the  EMS  computer  programmer  Alan  Sutcliff
elaborates the particular significance that the trophy holds for the members of
EMS, beyond being merely a 'consolation prize', Sutcliff describes the musical
composition ZASP – which involved the composition of music on one computer
which  was  then  realised  on another  computer  –  for  which  the  trophy  was
awarded, which was beaten in the competition by an entry from the electronic
music composer and architect  Iannis Xenakis.  Unlike many Science Museum
exhibitions,  these  objects on  display  would seem to tell  us  more about the
personalities, idiosyncratic practices and misuses of technology that animated
these  early  electronic  music  studios  than  they  do  about  technological
innovation or industrial history.
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Opposite  the  BBC  Workshop  and  EMS  cases,  stand  three  thematically
arranged cases curated by contemporary electronic musicians and titled: Make
Do and Mend, Democratising Electronic  Music,  and Sonic Frontiers.  These
cases  add  a  contemporary  twist  to  the  displays  of  electronic  music,
showcasing a variety of genre styles and sub-cultural practices alongside more
recognisable machines of electronic music history. In one case, a recent Wired
magazine featuring the  pop star Bjork  is  on  display. Publicising  Bjork's  latest
album  Biophilia, released as  an interactive application for smart phones  and
which  features  the  naturalist-broadcaster  David  Attenborough,  the  display
offers  at  once a  seemingly banal,  everyday  item,  the magazine,  while  also
hosting  a more spectacular  meeting between the  cyber-culture,  electro pop
and nature. Also in this case, we find the 1996 composition Generative Music,
produced on 'floppy disk',  by Brian Eno, the pop star best known perhaps as
the synth player in  the  art-pop group Roxy Music.  Shown in a box featuring
Eno's  face  against  a  black-background,  the  display  suggests  that  the
intellectual  practices  of  algorithmic  music  are  not  as  divorced  from  the
practices of rock stars  as computer science and music criticism have often
presented them. And indeed, intellectuals  are  shown engaged in seemingly
mundane practices: an instrument  functionally  named “Egg Slicer  and Two
Contact Microphones” is displayed alongside an open tool-box belonging to its
maker, the composer  and academic  Hugh Davies,  best  known for publishing
the  first  written  anthology  of  electronic  music.  The  disorganised  display  of
multi-coloured wires and hand tools spilling out of Davies' open tool box forms
a stark contrast with the  austere  industrially-produced egg-slicer which they
have been used to modify. Mass-produced domestic technology and DIY hand-
craft  techniques  are  not  divorced  from  one  another  or  antithetical  to  the
practices of  academics like Davies  but  rather,  like many of  the displays in
Oramics, seemed to get mixed up in electronic music experiments. 
But,  if  Oramics  is  seemingly  closer  to  an  art  exhibition  than  to  science  it
nonetheless  appears  to  depart  somewhat  from  the  'high  culture'  we  find
described in Western art history books and displayed in many of Britain's art
museums.  An  image  gallery situates Daphne  Oram  alongside  musical
innovators  from  fields  as  diverse  as  Western  art-music,  electro-pop,  acid
house, and hip-hop. An image of Karlheinz Stockhausen, for instance, reminds
us of the importance of  high modernist approaches of  Elektronische  Musik.
Stockhausen's application  of  serialist  composing  techniques,  using  aleatoric
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and statistical processes to compose with electronic sound, is a very particular
kind  of  art-music  practice  developed  in  the  high-tech  infrastructure  of  the
famous  Cologne  electronic  music  studio  at  the  WDR  radio  station.
Stockhausen's brand of  high modernism seems far removed from that of the
acid-house  producers Maurice and Hot Hands,  also pictured in the gallery's
images, who are best known for their single titled This is Acid. A sub-genre of
house  and  techno  music,  acid-house  is  widely  associated  with  Chicago's
warehouse parties where the music developed; events  that are often said to
have  broken down  boundaries  between  different  races  and  sexualities  in
popular music culture. The “acid” sound used by Maurice and Hot Hands was
created on a cheap bass-line synthesiser, the TB-303, which is also on display
in  Oramics.  Like  many  objects  in  Oramics,  the  TB-303  is  famous  for  its
misappropriation  rather  than  the  function  for  which  it  was commercially
designed.  Somewhere  between  'high' and 'low'  art  we find  the  synthesiser
pioneer Wendy Carlos, who is pictured in front of an enormous modular Moog
synthesiser. Best known for the  album  Switched-on Bach,  the  first  classical
album ever to score Platinum record sales,  Carlos painstakingly worked with
the notoriously  imprecise and monophonic analog synthesiser  to  reproduce
Bach's  contrapuntal  compositions.  Not  only  experimental  in  her  musical
practice,  Carlos  is  also  known for  her  transgressing  of  gender  boundaries,
previously  having  lived as  Walter  Carlos.  Such a mix  of  different artistic  and
musical  styles,  social identities and cultural classifications offers a staging of
electronic music experiments as events that draw few boundaries and instead
appear  to  create relations  between  seemingly  heterogeneous  people  and
things. 
One further way in which Oramics appears different from other exhibitions that
the visitor has encountered so far in the Science Museum is that  its curators
appear  in the gallery  displays.  In the gallery's cinema,  a series of films are
presented, one of which is described as “a documentary about how we made
this exhibition”.  The  documentary shows Science Museum curators working
with a group of musicians (in which I also feature as a participant) in workshop
settings, planning the displays. Also presented in the cinema are contributions
of two groups who are named as “co-curators” in the displays. First, a series of
monologues written by “women writers” are performed by actors that address
the issues of sound and invention. Despite their anonymity, the personality of
the  writers  is  expressed in  the  monologues,  a  dramatic  form used  for  the
articulation of subjectivity and lived experience.  The second film is a short 2-
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minute clip of a performance called  Oramix by a group of students from the
National Youth Theatre. The clip shows a multimedia performance in which a
group of students encounter the music of Daphne Oram through  interaction
with some sound scientists. In these various films visitors are shown not only
that there are many curators of the exhibition but that what counts as curatorial
practice  might  be  highly  diverse, incorporating  both  creative  writing  and
performance. In relation to other exhibitions in the Science Museum in which
the  curator  is  absent,  or  rendered  invisible,  the  Oramics  display  puts  the
curator in the gallery. The displays in the gallery, these films suggest, did not
drop  from  the  sky  ready-made but  resulted  from experimental  curatorial
procedures involving highly diverse groups. 
Having taken a brief tour of the Oramics gallery displays, the visitor might now
pose questions that will be central concerns in this thesis. The visitor may want
to know  why  in  London's Science Museum  we find  an exhibition  about the
invention  of  electronic  music  in  which  experimental  practice  appears  as
amateur, artful and playful studio practice and in stark contrast to the serious
experiments of pure laboratory science; why diversity and heterogeneity in the
gallery  displays  are  privileged  over  demarcationist  conventions  that  would
discriminate  between  innovative  technology  and  mass-produced  consumer
products, or between 'high' art-music and pop; and,  why we find not only the
Science Museum's  curators  featured in  the  exhibition's displays  but  also  a
display about an experimental curatorial process that includes highly diverse
groups? In what ways  is the  Oramics  related to the  exhibitions of industrial
history  and  contemporary  science displays  the  visitor  encountered on their
journey through the Museum? In the remaining sections of this introduction I
will outline how these questions will be addressed through this empirical study
of Oramics and situate them in relation to the research traditions with which I
am  concerned, namely: science and technology studies (STS),  social  theory
and exhibition studies. This introductory chapter is in three parts. First, I situate
the  Oramics  exhibition in relation to the  problem of “culture” in the Science
Museum and elaborate why in this setting we find concerns about the relations
between science and culture. Second, I outline how the Oramics exhibition can
be  said to  differ  from other kinds of  experimental  exhibition  in  the Science
Museum and introduce the concept of the “public experiment” that I will use to
characterise the exhibition in the analysis of this thesis. Finally, I advance the
central proposition of this thesis that we can understand the Oramics exhibition
as an experiment in the relations between science, culture and the public, and
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introduce some analytical approaches that will enable us to appreciate some of
the ways in which the exhibition might be said to be inventive. The subsequent
outline  of the thesis structure and a breakdown of the chapters is meant to
provide the reader with a brief overview of how the questions raised here are
addressed and developed through this study.
The culture question in the Science Museum 
In a documentary about the making of Oramics, shown in the gallery's cinema,
the curator Tim Boon describes the novel curatorial approach to Oramics and
introduces the problem of culture in the Science Museum:
“The Oramics exhibition is the first exhibition in the Public History
Project  and we're  planning two others.  Co-curation,  participation,
co-creation; [this approach is] not having the curator saying “here is
the gospel come and read it” but instead bringing in people like our
visitors to work on the development of the Museum's cultural offer.”
Boon describes  the experimental “public history”  curatorial  process,  involving
multiple participants, as a means of developing the Science Museum's “cultural
offer”. As Boon speaks, the films shows a group of people standing around the
Oramics  Machine peering  with  intrigue at  its  various component  parts  and
discussing its place in electronic music history. The Oramics Machine, the film
makes clear, is central to the public history curatorial experiment.  The film is
reinforced by  gallery displays  that inform  visitors  further about  the  curatorial
experiment  in  public  history.  They explain  that  public  history  is  about  how
visitors  relate  to  the  Science  Museum's  historical  object  collection.  The
Museum is interested in how its visitors think about these objects, the kind of
historical knowledges they might have about them and the stories they might
tell about the history of science and technology. The film makes clear that the
Oramics  exhibition  has  been  curated in  a  very  particular  way  that  is
experimental  for  the Science Museum both in  terms of  the  participation  of
different  groups  in  the  curatorial  process  and  in  the  ways  in  which  these
groups are represented as culturally literate in the Oramics gallery displays. 
It is not controversial to highlight that certain forms of culture have often been
considered  antithetical  to  the  concerns  of  science  and  technology.  In  the
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Science Museum, one cultural form that has, for many reasons, often been
excluded is 'art'. In one of my first meetings with the Museum's curators, I was
told that  the  public's  relation  with  the  Science  Museum  differed from  art
museums  insofar  as  the  exhibitions  of  art  museums  encouraged  public
“appreciation”  while  science  museum  exhibitions  are  oriented  towards
technical explanation.  Later,  while  researching the Museum's history, I found
the same argument,  made almost  verbatim,  in  one of  the  accounts  of  the
development of the Science Museum by one of its first directors Henry Lyons
(between 1920-1933). Lyons is credited by the Museum’s curators (see Morris,
2010) as  the  first  director  to  have  defined  the  Science  Museum  as  an
institution  that catered for a visiting public; an institutional orientation that is
often considered to define modern museums9. Lyons' argued that: 
“The objects exhibited in a technical Museum differ fundamentally
from those in an art museum since they are shown on account of
their utility and not for their beauty or attractiveness…While in an art
gallery it is a question of appreciating the beauties of an object, in a
collection  of  technical  and  scientific  exhibits  the  visitor  must
understand their purpose before he can realise their importance and
be interested in them.” (quoted in Follett, 1978: 100) 
In Lyons' modern visitor-centred  account of the Science Museum,  technical
objects are conceived as differing in a fundamental way from art  objects.  For
Lyons, art objects are not interesting for their artefactual character but rather
for their immediate beauty, their ability to aesthetically affect the visitor to the
artistic museum. Technical objects, by contrast, are entirely anathema to the
public  unless  their  utility  and  function  are  already  transparent. In  Lyons'
account  the Science Museum  distinguished  itself  from  art  museums  on the
basis  of  these  fundamental  differences  in  the  objects  of  exhibition.
Understanding and appreciation implied different modes of public engagement
because any lay-person could appreciate the beauty of works displayed in art
museums but  in  science  museums  the  public needed  a  particular  level  of
literacy in order to understand the technical objects on display.
The  ease  with  which  we can  trace  Lyons' view  in  contemporary  curatorial
discourse  at  the  Science  Museum  testifies  to  the  endurance  of  certain
settlements of the relations between science and culture.  An early director of
the  Science Museum,  Lyons developed his account of the public display of
science  and  technology  at  a  time  when  the  institution  was  known  as  the
9 The establishment of the modern museum as a public institution is discussed at length in 
Chapter Two.
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National Museum for Science And Industry (NMSI)10 and was part of the British
State: staffed by civil servants, the Museum was a government instrument for
promoting the  utility  of  applied  science  and  for advancing  the  interests  of
British  industry and commerce in the service of  national political community.
With its origins in The Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations,
at the Crystal Palace in 1851, the history of the Science Museum is bound up
with  the celebration  of industrialism,  evolutionary civilization, monarchal rule
and  Empire  (see  discussion  in  Bennett,  1995).  In  its  current  location on
Exhibition  Road,  in  London's  tourist  hotspot  of  'Albertopolis',  the  Science
Museum is  often informally  referred to  as  the 'poorer cousin' of its neighbour
the Victoria and Albert Museum  (V&A):  the two museums separated  from a
common origin in the object  collections of the South Kensington Museum, as
its “art” (V&A) and “non-art” (Science Museum) objects11. Lacking the artificer's
objects of choice,  history offers one  explanation  for  why early directors like
Lyons  appealed  to  the  utilitarian  and  functionalist  virtues  of  the  Science
Museum's  collections  of  technical  objects. In  the  institutional  history  of  the
Science  Museum,  then,  we  find  one  significant  articulation  of  the  “culture”
problem in the separation of  art  from technology;  a settlement that is clearly
considerably unravelled in the displays of Oramics. 
More recently,  a  sociological  study of  the Science Museum under-taken  by
Sharon  MacDonald  (2002) in  the  late-1980s  describe  a  different  set  of
negotiations  between  science  and  culture. MacDonald's  study  Behind  the
Scenes at the Science Museum discusses a “cultural revolution” in which the
Science Museum  became an institution  focused and organised around the
visiting  public.  MacDonald's  account  describes  the  transformation  of the
institution  from  an  object-centric  to  a  public-oriented  organisation  that
marketed  displays  of  science  to “consumer-citizens”.  This  revolution  was,
MacDonald suggests, in part  an effect  of the  neo-liberal reforms of Margaret
Thatcher's government under  which  the Science Museum became  a  quasi-
independent  organisation,  no  longer  under  direct  State  control12.  One
consequence of the reforms was the introduction of admission charges and the
ensuing  creation  of  a  'market'  in  which  the  Science  Museum  entered  into
competition  with  other  leisure  and  tourism  industries.  Though  the  Science
10 The various histories of the Science Museum created by its workers account in minute 
detail the various bureaucratic committees, reports and buildings involved in the historical 
establishment of the Science Museum from the non-art collections of the South Kensington 
Museum (see for example Armitage, 1957; Follett, 1978; Greenaway, 1951). 
11 The South Kensington Museum was created from the objects assembled for the Great 
Exhibition. A discussion of the cultural politics of the South Kensington Museum can be 
found in by Bennett (1995).
12 The Science Museum was made independent in the 1983 National Heritage Act, in which it 
attained the legal status as a non-departmental public body.
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Museum is now formally independent of government, sociologists nonetheless
have described the ways in which the Museum continues to participate in the
challenges of governing in advanced technological societies.  The interactive
exhibition,  pioneered  in  Britain  by  the  Science  Museum, was  a  format  of
exhibition that,  as Andrew Barry  (1998) has described,  was  developed and
took on particular significances  during the  neo-liberal political reforms of the
1980s and 1990s. MacDonald and Barry's respective accounts offer yet more
versions of the 'culture problem' in the Science Museum as the challenges that
arise  from  the  gulf  between  science,  economy  and politics.  In  the  cultural
revolution at the Science Museum in the late-1980s, to which the respective
experimental exhibitions discussed by MacDonald and Barry were a response,
the curating and display of science is shown to be highly instrumentalised and
in service of particular politico-economic ends.
The question of the relations between science and culture are, I argue in this
thesis,  central  to  appreciating  what  the  Oramics  exhibition  is  'doing'  in  the
Science Museum. Although politics, economy and art have provided important
focuses for approaching the question of the relations between science  and
culture at  the Science Museum, I  deliberately  do  not  privilege them  in  my
analysis  of  Oramics.  Politics,  economy and  art  are  not  absented  from the
analysis I present in this thesis: they are both clearly important registers for
appreciating why we find, in Oramics, an exhibition in which the experiment is
staged as hybrid musical-technical practice, a socially inclusive form of public
display and facilitates the participation of lay knowledges in curating the history
of science and technology. But, importantly, I argue in this thesis that Oramics
is also doing  more than simply  representing recognised 'cultural deficits'13 in
the public display of science and technology. Instead, I suggest that Oramics is
an exhibition that might also be said to propose new kinds of relations between
science, culture and the public. The focus of my analysis therefore centres on
the  question  of  to  what  extent  the  exhibition  could  itself  be  said  to  be  an
experimental format.  Approaching the exhibition in this way, I hope to show
how  in  the  complex patchwork  of  knowledges,  things,  people,  issues  and
settings  that  are  assembled  in  Oramics  we  can  distinguish  some  very
particular  experimental  interventions in the relations between science, culture
and the public.
13 The concept of a 'deficit' holds particular significance in the Science Museum where it has 
often been attributed to the public's understanding of science rather than to the Museum. 
This is discussed further in Chapter Two's treatment of the public understanding of 
science.
22
Oramics as an experimental exhibition
At each entrance to  the  Oramics  exhibition,  the  two text graphics  informing
visitors that what they  the exhibition they  are about to  visit  is “experimental”.
What  is  at  stake  in  the  claim  that  Oramics  can  be  understood  as  an
experimental exhibition? Before beginning to elaborate what will be the central
concern of this thesis,  it is useful to distinguish between three ways in which
we can understand the concept of experimental exhibition: (1) exhibitions that
publicise experimental facts and artefacts; (2) exhibitions that are experimental
methodologically;  and,  a  third  version that  I  advance in  this  thesis  (3),  the
exhibition as an experiment. The first two of these versions of the experimental
exhibition  are  well  developed  genres  of  the  experimental  exhibition.  In
London's Science Museum I suggest that we find these respective versions of
the experimental exhibition in gallery displays of experimental instruments that
materialise 'pure'  science  an  in  the interactive  displays that  facilitate  public
engagement with science.  In both of these formats of experimental exhibition
the experiment  is principally a scientific  genre and its exhibition is principally
for  diffusing  knowledge  to  the  public.  The  third  version,  the  exhibition  as
experiment,  could be said to have  various precedents – for instance, Hans
Obrist's  2007  Experimental  Marathon exhibition  in  London  (see Obrist  and
Eliasson, 2009) – but in this thesis I focus on those accounts we find in social
studies of science  that have suggested  that exhibitions can be  formats that
might be said to be inventive as forms of material practice. I will here elaborate
briefly these different versions of the experimental exhibition that we find in the
Science Museum in order to make clear some of the ways in which Oramics
can be said to differ as an experimental exhibition and introduce the concept of
the “public experiment”  which I suggest can help us appreciate the  Oramics
exhibition as an experimental intervention.
Gallery  displays about  experiments  have  often  served as  vehicles through
which 'pure' science is given material form in the museum context. Displays of
experimental  instruments,  for  instance, have  been  central  to  the  task  of
materialising  'pure' science in a  gallery setting, and such  displays are often
accompanied  and  elaborated  by  detailed  descriptions  and  illustrations  of
experimental  processes through which  facts  are  produced.  In  one  Science
Museum gallery about 18th century science, a reproduction of the painting An
Experiment on a Bird in the Air Pump by Joseph Wright of Derby shows the
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(in)famous demonstration of the creation of a vacuum by the air pump. Next to
the painting one such air pump,  which was collected by King George III,  is
displayed  in  a  case  and  the  fact  of  the  vacuum  is explained  in  the
accompanying  text.  The text  situates  the  air  pump  within  the  historical
development  of  science,  emphasising  the  significance  of  Britain's  Royal
Society, the scientific institution formed through the meetings of experimental
philosophers in the 17th century. Centred around the experimental instrument,
the air pump, the exhibition serves as a neutral space within which the results
of  an  experiment  can  be  made  public;  through  displays  of  experimental
instruments science is represented in public as a complete product ready to be
applied.  In this version,  and  others of this kind  that we find  in the Science
Museum, the experimental exhibition serves the publicity of pure science. 
Another  version of  the experimental  exhibition  at the Science Museum is  the
interactive exhibition, described above by Barry (1998). Interactive exhibitions
deploy the experiment as a method for engaging the public with science: the
interactive  exhibition  is  a  medium  through  which  visitors  can  experience
experimentation  themselves,  giving  the  public  'hands-on'  experience  of
science. The Science Museum's flagship interactive exhibition LaunchPad is a
gallery  in  which  such  interactive  exhibits  are  used  to  promote  the  public
understanding  of  basic  physics principles.  In  this  sense,  and  like  the  first
version of the experimental exhibition, interactive exhibitions  like  LaunchPad
can also be said to be concerned with 'pure' science.  Where the display of
experimental  instruments,  described above,  the  gallery  simply  provided the
context  for  the  materialisation  of science,  the  interactive exhibition  features
few,  if  any,  such  objects.  Rather,  in  LaunchPad's  displays visitors'  bodies
become sites of on which the principals of physical science are materialised as
they  experiment  freely,  without  instruction,  with  the  exhibits;  scientific
knowledge is  here  diffused through experimental experience.  The  interactive
exhibition  can in this sense be said to  mediate a particular kind of relation
between science and the public in which the museum visitors is  facilitated to
experiment  as the lay public for science.  In this version of the experimental
exhibition the relations between science and the public appear dynamic and
responsive  even  though,  as  Barry  (1998) has  pointed  out,  in  practice
interactive exhibitions like  LaunchPad are often highly prescriptive about the
ways  in  which  the  public  interacts  with  science.  In  this  version  of  the
experimental exhibition, the experiment is a method of display  through which
the exhibition of science is accomplished.
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In this thesis I describe how both of these forms of experimental  exhibition –
the publicity of experiments and the experimental display – could be said to be
present  in  Oramics:  both  experimental  instruments  and  interactive  exhibits
feature in the Oramics gallery14. But I also suggest that these two versions of
the experimental exhibition, even if taken together, do not adequately account
for  what  is  experimental  about  Oramics.  Unlike  the  former  two  kinds  of
experimental exhibition,  in  Oramics  the experiment  is not  exclusive,  or even
apparent, as a register belonging to science and nor is it limited to a method of
gallery display. Indeed, in many  senses  there might  be said to be only very
limited  traces  of  'pure'  science  in  the  Oramics exhibition.  In  this  thesis  I
describe how  in  Oramics  we find that the experiment refers not only to the
exhibition as a format of display but also to particular traditions of experiment,
most  centrally to  music and curating15.  Unlike the former two versions of the
experimental exhibition, the multiple  styles and modes of experiment  that we
find in Oramics do not straightforwardly serve to make public a 'pure' science
that  is  already  complete.  Rather,  Oramics  is  an  exhibition  in  which  the
experiment is staged as a distinctly 'impure' category: the curatorial experiment
invites lay persons to participate in constructing multiple histories of science
and  technology,  the  electronic  music  experiment  is  staged  as  a  hybrid  of
musical and engineering practice. 
While  we  can  identify  elements  of  both  of  these  versions  of  experimental
exhibition  in  Oramics, in this  thesis  I suggest  we need  a different concept  to
account  for  what  is  experimental about  Oramics.  In  all  of  the  modes of
experiment I've identified  above – as an experimental public  display in the
Science Museum,  a  curatorial  experiment  in historical knowledge  and  in the
hybrid musical-engineering experiments in early electronic music studios – we
find the relations between science, culture and the public look very different. In
this thesis I  propose that  we can understand  Oramics  as an experiment in
making  relations  between science,  culture and the  public.  To advance this
proposition, I suggest, we need a concept of the experiment that can account
for the bringing together of very different experimental styles, practices and
instruments without privileging one  experimental  formalism  (e.g. the science
experiment)  over  any  other  another.  In  this  thesis  I  propose  to  apply  a
14 For instance, the Oramics gallery displays tell us that the Oramics Machine was “co-
curated” with researchers from Goldsmiths College, where the Daphne Oram Trust is 
based. These researchers, mostly computer scientists, have also designed an interactive 
application of the Oramics Machine which has been modified for the Oramics exhibition, 
displayed next to the Machine, on which visitors can experiment themselves with the 
sound making techniques developed by Daphne Oram. 
15 Both music and exhibition curating are spheres in which experimentation has long been 
established as a practical focus (see, for instance MacDonald, 1998; Nyman, 1999)
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particular  concept  of  the  experiment  which  has  been  called  the  “public
experiment”.  I  will  elaborate  this  concept  in  more  detail  in  Chapter  Two's
literature  review  when  I  consider  some  of  the  different  theories  of  the
experimental  exhibition as a medium that makes relations between science
and the public. 
Experimental  multiplicity:  a  materialist  and  symmetrical
analysis 
There are two challenges to advancing the proposition that  Oramics  can be
understood as an experiment in making relations between science, culture and
the public. First, this proposition might appear highly abstract and it might be
asked how we can give an account of  such an experiment through empirical
social  description.  Second,  I  have  suggested  we  find  some  very  different
modes of experiment which do not conform to a single formalism: how, then, it
might be asked can we analyse and compare such heterogeneous modes of
experimental practice. In what follows I suggest some of the ways in which this
attempts to address these analytical concerns about how to describe Oramics
as an experiment that is at once empirically materialist and able to account for
heterogeneous versions of experiment.
The Oramics Machine is the centre-piece of Oramics.  It is also an object that
occupies a  central  position  in  the  analysis  of  this  thesis.  In  the  Oramics
Machine  we find the  three  modes of experiment, just described,  assembled
together in material form: the Oramics Machine is an experimental electronic
musical instrument developed by  the composer  Daphne Oram, it is the focal
point of the experimental display in the Science Museum, and it is the object
around which the curatorial  experimental  in “public  history”  was developed.
The Oramics Machine is an object that  can be said to materialise  relations
between very different traditions of experiment.  It is an object that therefore
offers  a  useful  starting  point  for  the  analysis  of  this  thesis  that  seeks  to
understand the ways in which the  Oramics  exhibition  might be said to be an
experiment in the relations between science, culture and the public. And, once
we begin to look closely at the Oramics Machine in this way the more dynamic
and  complex  the  exhibition  seems  as  an  empirical  object.  Such  apparent
dynamism and complexity, I suggest here, are in no way counter-productive to
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the task of empirical description but rather  are the very conditions that  make
possible an analysis of the exhibition as socio-material practice.
In an email conversation with one of the curators of Oramics,  we discuss the
role of  the Oramics Machine  in the curatorial “public history” experiment, the
curator tells me:
“was the Oramics Machine important as an invention? Maybe not, 
but it is important in the sense that it says so much about the 
inventiveness and creative minds that were involved in electronic 
music in those early years. And it’s a nice counterbalance for the 
idea that it’s a masculine story involving knobs, dials and an 
emotionless process. I think museums should talk about dead-ends 
quirks and failures a lot more. They are part of the history of 
Science, Technology, Engineering and Medicine and can help us 
see the big stories in a different, more diverse and balanced light.” 
(personal communication from a curator)
The  curator  is  largely  unconcerned  that  the  Oramics  Machine  was  never
demonstrated as a technical or artistic innovation or even by the fact that the
Machine might have been a total failure. For the curator the Oramics Machine
is an object that tells us something about the diverse processes and practices
of “inventiveness” in early electronic music. The Oramics Machine, the curator
suggests, is an object that might enable us to think of invention in science and
technology in ways that are “more diverse”, gender sensitive, and “balanced”.
So, though the Oramics Machine might have been a “dead-end” or “failure” the
object is actually useful for thinking about, and putting into curatorial practice,
alternative approaches to the history of science and technology. The curatorial
experiment in “public history” is discussed at length in Chapter Four, in which I
discuss the curators' attempts to invent new procedures that can involve lay
persons in curating the history of science and technology.
I have already  introduced the gallery display of the Oramics Machine in the
Science Museum, above, but it is here worthwhile noting that the gallery is not
the only setting in which the Oramics Machine is publicised as an experimental
object for the Science Museum. Much of the news media, for instance, focused
on the 'discovery' of the Oramics Machine rusting in the back of a French barn,
effectively  destined  for  the  dustbin  of  history until  it  was  rescued  by  the
Science Museum16. In this publicity, the Oramics Machine is an object which is
16 See for example: http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/music/features/science-
museum-to-display-legendary-oramics-machine-2340020.html and 
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unlike most of the historical artefacts in the Science Museum insofar as it is
largely  unknown to history.  Elsewhere,  a Facebook17 page  for  the  Oramics
Machine,  set up by the Science Museum, was used extensively to publicise
the exhibition to  a  diverse  'social network'.  This digital publicity consisted of
regular “posts” with updates linking to magazine articles, films, exhibitions and
concerts involving or related to  the Oramics Machine or music from Daphne
Oram. The digital Facebook medium offers some very simple ways in which to
put on public display  some of the heterogeneous  people and things  that are
brought into relation through  the Oramics Machine: the “likes”,  the “friends”
who comment on stories  and the  “timeline” of events that have occurred on
the Facebook page.  If we are interested in the experimental  public display of
the Oramics Machine then such forms of publicity cannot simply be considered
instruments that promote, or extend,  the  Museum's  gallery display.  Instead,  I
suggest that  the  gallery  display  is  one  among  several  other  formats  of
experimental publicity of the Oramics Machine for the Science Museum. This
point is addressed further in the Chapter  Five which focuses on some of the
different ways in which the  Oramics  can be appreciated as an experimental
public display. 
In the course of this research I've encountered many very different accounts of
the Oramics Machine  as an experimental  musical instrument  in settings as
diverse  as  sound-art  exhibitions18,  feminist  blogs19, academic  conferences20
and  theatre  performances21.  A  particularly  memorable  setting  was  the
experimental music venues Cafe Oto22 which hosted a seminar discussing the
Oramics Machine and Daphne Oram's drawn sound. On a warm evening also
in  April  2011 I  joined a queue outside  Cafe  Oto  for  the  event  called  “The
http://www.djmag.com/news/detail/3037 and 
http://eandt.theiet.org/magazine/2011/11/oramics-to-electronica.cfm (all accessed 15 June 
2012)
17 See: https://www.Facebook.com/OramicsMachine (accessed on 30th July 2013)
18 One significant exhibition that featured displays about the Oramics Machine was a sound-
art exhibition called Sho-zyg which is discussed in Chapter Six. Information about the 
exhibition can be found here: http://sho-zyg.com/ (accessed 02 April 2014)
19 Several blogs link the Oramics Machine and electronic music to the concerns of 
contemporary feminism. A post on the Guardian Women's Blog about the Oramics 
Machine is discussed in Chapter Five (can be found at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/the-womens-blog-with-jane-
martinson/2011/aug/07/daphne-oram-oramics-electronic-music (accessed 02 April 2014) 
and a post on the Her Noise blog can be found here: http://hernoise.org/tara-rodgers/ 
(accessed 02 April 2014).
20 A presentation about the Oramics Machine by the computer scientist Mick Grierson can be 
found here: 
http://vimeo.com/50834273 (accessed 06 March 2014) 
21 A performance by students of the National Youth Theatre called Oramix is discussed in 
Chapter Three, a short clip of the performance is display in the Science Museum gallery.
22 The Cafe Oto event was part of The Wire magazine's monthly Salon series. Information 
about the event can be found here: http://cafeoto.co.uk/wire-salon-daphne-oram.shtm  
(accessed on 01 May 2012)
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Sounds of New Atlantis: Daphne Oram, Radiophonics and the Drawn Sound
Technique”23.  The  organisers  were  perhaps not  expecting  such  a  turnout
because  when I arrived they  were  frantically rearranging furniture inside the
venue  so  the  crowd  could  get  in.  The  evening's  programme  ranged from
presentations  about  the  significance  of  the  Oramics  Machine in  relation  to
British computer music, to the Science Museum's Tim Boon outlining how the
Museum intend to display the Machine and invited the audience to take part in
curating it,  while  the music journalist Dan Wilson discussed  Daphne Oram's
interest in New Age philosophies,  and  the sound-artist  Jo Hutton described
Oram's life and role in founding the BBC's Radiophonic Workshop. The event
ended  with  a  screening  of  a  filmed  interview  with  the  engineer  Graham
Wrench,  who  collaborated  with  Daphne  Oram  to  construct  the  Oramics
Machine.  This  event  made  clear  some  of  the  highly  diverse  accounts  of
Daphne  Oram's  electronic  music  experiments  in  developing  drawn-sound
composition technique,  and these are elaborated in the discussion of Oram's
experimental drawn-sound in Chapter Six. 
This study will not be the first to describe some of the ways in which electronic
music instruments like the Oramics Machine materially assemble very different
traditions of experiment. An important reference point for the following study of
the exhibition of the Oramics Machine is  Pinch  and Trocco's (2004) Analog
Days: The Invention and Impact of the Moog Synthesiser, an historical account
that  traces  the  development  of  the  Moog  synthesiser  from  196424 to  mid-
1970s.  Pinch and Trocco's account  of  the “synthesiser culture”  in which the
Moog  developed  is  broadly  conceived  and includes actors  as  diverse  as
musicians,  engineers,  artists, feminists and businessmen;  objects that range
from  oscillators  to  mind-bending  drugs; and  settings  that  include  studios,
factories, counter-cultural arenas like the Trips Festival  and concert halls.  In
other words, Pinch and Trocco describe the invention of synthesiser culture as
distributed across heterogeneous actors, objects and settings. In their analysis
of synthesiser culture,  Pinch and Trocco  conceptualise  the synthesiser as a
“boundary object”25: as a “liminal entity” that moved between different  social
23 Information about the event can be found here: http://cafeoto.co.uk/wire-salon-daphne-
oram.shtm (accessed on 01 May 2012)
24 The significance of the date 1964 is that this is when Moog first built a voltage controlled 
synthesiser and demonstrated it to the American Audio Engineering Society. The precise 
dates of the Oramics Machine's construction are unknown at the time of writing but it is 
described in the exhibition as occurring in the early 1960s.
25 Indeed, I suggest, the concept of the “boundary object” seems particularly salient in 
describing the Oramics Machine as an experimental instrument. The concept was 
developed by Star and Griesemier (1989) to describe the ways in which objects facilitate 
the practices of science and technology. They describe boundary objects as the following: 
“Boundary objects are objects which are both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and 
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worlds,  took  on  different  meanings  and  transformed  those  worlds.  They
describe  how  actors  become  “boundary  shifters”;  how  engineers  became
central  players  in  counter-culture,  how  the  musicians  improvising  with
synthesisers became designers of them, and how avant-garde artists became
synthesiser  sales people.  Like the Moog, the  Oramics Machine  might too be
characterised  as  a  “boundary  object”,  as  it  brings  together  very  different
traditions of experiment. But, unlike the Moog, the Oramics Machine was never
demonstrated as an innovation, it never made it out of the studio where Oram
and  Wrench  developed  the  Machine.  So,  unlike  the  Moog,  the  Oramics
Machine has not  circulated through different  social  worlds. Rather,  it  is  the
exhibition  of  the  Oramics  Machine  that  assembles  these  very  different
traditions  of  experiment  together.  In  the  analysis  of  this  thesis,  I  therefore
attempt to ground the analysis of Oramics as an experiment in material things
and practices as a way to think about exhibition as an inventive practice.
One way to  appreciate  how the  exhibition  of  the  Oramics  Machine  makes
relations between  different  modes of experiment, I argue in this thesis, is by
drawing on the analytic concept of “symmetry”. Minimally, we might say that to
be symmetrical  about experiment  simply means that  we attempt to apply the
same styles of analysis to the different  traditions  of experiment  that  we are
presented with in Oramics.  Indeed, many different  social science approaches
have  stressed the  importance  of  symmetrical  analysis for  socially  studying
science and technology. The canonical argument for symmetrical analysis was
the constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a 
common identity across sites. They are weakly structured in common use, and become 
strongly structured in individual site use. These objects may be abstract or concrete. They 
have different meanings in different social worlds but their structure is common enough to 
more than one world to make them recognizable, a means of translation. The creation and 
management of boundary objects is a key process in developing and maintaining 
coherence across intersecting social worlds.” (393). Star and Griesemer's concept of the 
boundary object is particularly pertinent because it was developed from a museum study. 
In this study, Star and Griesemer showed how the creation of boundary objects was key to 
the successful establishment of the Museum of Vertebrate Zoology at Berkeley. Boundary 
objects enabled the range of different actors involved in the Museum – the scientists, the 
administrators, the patrons etc – to communicate effectively whilst maintaining the 
autonomy of their respective social worlds. Boundary objects were, the authors suggest, 
the basis on which the Museum of Vertebrate Zoology was founded as an institution able 
to do scientific research because they allowed all actors involved to achieve their individual 
goals. This institutional orientation of the concept of the boundary object is thus also 
relevant to the current study which allows us to understand why institutional 
experimentation would involve a multiplicity of very different actors. The cornerstone of the 
boundary object is its flexibility to move between different groups of actors. Boundary 
objects are created or emerge as a way for groups of actors inhabiting different social 
worlds to coordinate at the points where these worlds intersect. In other words, boundary 
objects facilitate comparison and cooperation between heterogeneous groups. In this 
respect, we can understand why boundary objects would play a central role in efforts to 
address the “culture” problem in science and technology exhibitions, like Oramics. As 
objects that facilitate cooperation, boundary objects may create new relations between the 
heterogeneous actors and settings. 
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developed for the social study of knowledge controversies in science and the
subsequent  success  of  some  knowledge  claims  and  failure  of  others.
Advocates of the Strong Programme (Bloor, 1976) argued that the categories
of “truth” and “falsity” could not be used to explain the relative success and
failure between competing knowledge claims in a scientific controversy. They
argued instead that explaining the closure of a knowledge controversy required
the analyst to treat all knowledge claims symmetrically, as if there was nothing
innately true or false in them. In this way, the analyst could be attentive to the
social processes involved in the construction of scientific knowledge that were
not accounted for in the naturalistic accounts of practising scientists and the
epistemological accounts of philosophers of science26.  The application of the
principal of symmetrical explanation to the different styles of experimentation
that  we find  in  Oramics,  I  suggest  here,  can  help  us  understand  how  the
exhibition of the  Oramics Machine  might be said to make particular kinds of
relations between science, culture and the public.
Equipped with  the  analytic of  symmetry, I  suggest  we are better  placed to
appreciate  Oramics  as an  exhibition  that materially assembles very different
styles of experiment. The Oramics exhibition, I suggest in this thesis, does not
accomplish symmetry in a way that would flatten out all differences between
experimental styles between music, curating and public display. In this thesis I
am not  interested  in  evaluating  whether  experimental  symmetry  is  or  isn't
accomplished in  Oramics. Looked at another way, the analytic of symmetry
simply enables us to identify some of the many asymmetries in the relations
between science,  culture and the public that  are unsettled in  Oramics.  For
instance,  Oramics invites us to  ask why Daphne Oram's invented  Oramics
Machine  was largely  unsuccessful  in  its  own time,  why the experiences of
“women” rarely feature in accounts of technical invention, and why genres like
rap and acid-house are often left out  from 'high culture' displays of music we
find in other museum exhibitions. The analytic of symmetry, I suggest, enables
us to view Oramics as an experimental setting without over-determining what
does  or  doesn't  count  as  'proper'  experimental  practice.  Focusing  on
processes through which  the curatorial  experiment,  the musical  experiment
and the experimental display are assembled in  Oramics, I argue,  we gain an
appreciation of  some of  the  ways  in  which  the  exhibition can be said to be
26 A subsequent development in this tradition of symmetrical analysis was the argument 
made by actor-network theorists (Callon and Latour, 1992) for a “generalised symmetry” in 
which no one analytical category (such as “the social”) could be used to ground 
explanations of the development of science1. The argument for “generalised symmetry” is 
discussed at length in Chapter Two's literature review.
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inventive as material practice.
Thesis structure and chapter summary
The structure of  this  thesis  is  designed to  explore what happens when we
apply the concept  of  the “public  experiment”  to  the  Oramics  exhibition  and
attempt  to  describe  exhibition  as  both  inventive  and material  practice.  The
following two chapters present  a  detailed elaboration of  the concept  of  the
public experiment and discuss the methodology used to study the  Oramics
exhibition. Chapters Four, Five and Six comprise the main body of  empirical
analysis and are organised thematically to reflect the material practices  that
organised the different modes of experiment: these are public participation (the
curatorial experimental), exclusion (the experimental public display) and media
(the electronic  music  experiment). In  the  conclusion  I  discuss some of  the
broader  implications  of  approaching  the  exhibition  as  a  public  experiment,
exploring  what  the  empirical  analysis  reveals  about  the  exhibition  as  a
particular kind of inventive format and the Science Museum as an experimental
setting.
In Chapter Two, the literature review of this thesis, I elaborate the proposition
of the  exhibition  as a public experiment.  In this chapter I survey a range of
literatures  in  social  studies  of  science that  have discussed exhibitions  and
related  formats  of  public  display,  including:  the  public  understanding  of
science, the sociology of scientific knowledge, governmentality, actor-network
theory  and the  social  construction  of  technology. The literature  review first
looks at those literatures in which experimental exhibitions have been treated
as a means to keep science demarcated as a special sphere of culture. The
review looks  at  how literatures  in  the  public  understanding  of  science,  for
instance,  have  sought  to  use exhibitions as instruments that  can solve the
political  problems  in science.  The  review,  then,  discusses  some  'post-
instrumental'  approaches  to  the  experimental  exhibition  that  suggest
exhibitions can be treated as inventive formats. Post-instrumental approaches
like  actor-network  theory  argue  for  an  “ontological”  understanding  of
experimental exhibitions, and these approaches are elaborated in depth along
with some important epistemological objections. In concluding, I highlight what
we might gain by applying the concept of the public experiment to the Oramics
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exhibition. 
Chapter  Three  is  the  methodology  chapter  of  this  thesis  and  outlines  the
ethnographic  approach  undertaken  in  this  study.  The  chapter  offers  an
overview of the empirical materials collected and how they have informed the
thematic analysis of the subsequent chapters. I also outline the background to
the empirical study, and specifically address why the Science Museum was
chosen as a site for research. Substantive discussion is presented concerning
the  particular  tradition  of  ethnography  on  which  this  study  draws and  the
particular relation of the ethnographer to the empirical setting that is developed
in this tradition.  Critiques of this tradition of ethnography are also highlighted
and  discussed.  The  chapter  then  turns  to  some of  the  practical  questions
concerning how the study developed, how my initial attempts to study Oramics
as  a  curatorial  experiment were  complicated  by  empirical  events,  and
subsequently how the focus of the empirical research shifted in order to take
into account the other  modes  of experiment that we find in the exhibition. In
concluding  I  outline  the case for  the thematic  analysis  that  appears in  the
subsequent empirical chapters of the thesis.
In Chapter Four I discuss the curatorial experiment in relation to the problem of
public participation in the Science Museum. I focus on why public participation
is significant as a problematic of the relations between science and culture at
the Science Museum. This chapter  foregrounds  an unresolved  disagreement
between two groups of museum staff about the question of public participation
and the cultural  offer  in  Oramics.  This  disagreement offers  insight  into  the
different versions of curatorial practice we find in the Science Museum. Though
not all staff may not be institutionally recognised as curators, they nonetheless
hold practical investments in the way in which science is curated in this setting.
The chapter looks at the competing ideas about public  participation  and the
different kinds of imaginations of the Science Museum that are materialised in
the practices of both of these groups.  The chapter highlights that while these
groups seek to use Oramics to develop the Science Museum's “cultural offer”
by  unsettling distinctions between the insiders and outsiders  of science, the
practices  of  these two groups nonetheless  also have the consequences of
producing new outsiders who are excluded in different ways from participating
in Oramics. 
Chapter  Five  focuses on the exhibition's experimental  gallery display which
brings together many different things that have been conventionally 'excluded'
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from science exhibitions. Specifically, the chapter focuses on the  display of
work by a group of “women writers”, who are staged as a group that is doubly
excluded by virtue of being both 'gendered' and 'vulnerable'. In the displays of
Oramics the work of the writers,  describing the lived experience of gender, is
staged as giving insight into the experimental music practice of Daphne Oram.
However,  despite  the  presence  of ironic  gender  references  throughout  the
exhibition's  displays  and  a  narrative  of  social  inclusion,  the  women writers
nonetheless appear as excluded 'outsiders' in many accounts of the exhibition.
The chapter discusses the problem of the exclusion of women from science,
reading the displays in Oramics through the debate in feminist theory between
“standpoint”  and  “post-gender”  approaches.  The  chapter  highlights  the
complexities of  exclusion as a way of  understanding the relations between
science, culture and the public.
In Chapter Six,  the last empirical chapter, I  discuss  electronic  music  as the
experimental medium of the Oramics exhibition. The chapter  foregrounds the
staging of the electronic music experiment as mediating between musical and
electro-mechanical  practices.  The  analysis  foregrounds  Daphne  Oram's
attempt to invent new drawn-sound composition techniques, which she sought
to realise in the development of the Oramics Machine. The chapter compares
two approaches  that  might  be taken to  understanding what  Oram's  drawn-
sound  'does' in the context of the  Oramics  exhibition, these are: (1) media-
specific  approaches,  and  (2)  audition-centric  approaches.  I  highlight  the
differences between these two approaches in terms of  appreciating how  the
displays of drawn-sound in Oramics might be said to make relations between
science, culture and the public. 
In  the  concluding  chapter  of  this  thesis,  Chapter  Seven,  I  examine  more
broadly the implications of this study for thinking about exhibitions as inventive
formats. The chapter offers a brief summary of the findings from the empirical
study of the  Oramics exhibition. I revisit  the  decision  to apply the concept of
the  “public  experiment”  to  the  Oramics  exhibition.  I  discuss  the  empirical
analysis of Chapter 4-6 and how it  contributes to  the proposition I attempt to
advance that we can understand  Oramics  as an experiment in the relations
between science, culture and the public. I  ask in what the implications of this
study  might  be  for  considering the  Science  Museum  as  an  experimental
setting. And, in closing, I discuss the question of the relations between science
and culture, and suggest some of the challenges that this study raises both for
sociological study of science.
34
2. Exhibition as public experiment: a literature review 
Introduction
In the first  chapter of this thesis  I  introduced the  Oramics exhibition  at  the
Science  Museum,  an  exhibition  which  appears  experimental  in  various
different ways. Specifically, I  highlighted three distinct  modes of experiment:
the  curatorial  experiment,  experimental  music  and  experimental  display.  I
suggested that to deal with  the  experimental complexity  we find in  Oramics
that we needed a concept of experiment that doesn't reduce the experiment to
a single procedure, style or formalism. Instead, I suggested we need a concept
that can allow us to describe empirically how  the  Oramics  assembles these
multiple modes of experiment together in a single exhibition. In Chapter One I
introduced the concept of the “public experiment” as one such concept and it is
the purpose of this chapter to elaborate what this concept is and some of the
implications in applying it to the Oramics exhibition. In this chapter I present an
overview of some literatures through which the proposition of the exhibition as
a “public  experiment”  could be understood to  have emerged.  I  doing  so,  I
elaborate  the theoretical basis from which we might  examine the proposition
that exhibitions could be said to be experiments in relations between science,
culture and the public.
It is worth noting that exhibitions have not always been considered significant
as sites for the study of invention. It is only relatively recently that sociologists
concerned with experiments have looked to exhibitions as worthwhile settings
for empirical research, and as formats that do more than simply communicate
or diffuse experimental results into society. In this literature review I situate the
study  of  exhibitions  in  relation  to  the  interdisciplinary  field  of  science  and
technology studies (STS). Though other fields have equally sought to establish
the significance of exhibitions  in terms of  relations between science,  culture
and  the  public, few  outside  science  studies  have  attempted  to  describe
exhibitions as inventive formats.27 The proposition of the exhibition as a “public
27 The omission of museum studies literatures from this literature review reflects a deliberate 
choice to set-up the problem of the experimental exhibition in a particular way. Though this 
thesis is a social study of a museum exhibition, the Science Museum was chosen 
principally because it is a site where science and technology are made public. So, in this 
literature review I am concerned to treat the Science Museum exhibition as a format that it 
is continuous with other genres of public display of science and technology. This literature 
review is therefore not concerned with developing a general framework for the study of 
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experiment” is therefore developed here primarily through an engagement with
the issues, problematics and concerns of STS.
While studies of exhibitions in the Science Museum have in recent years been
undertaken by social  researchers  of  a broadly constructivist  inclination,  the
contemporary social studies of science and technology exhibitions can also be
situated  in  relation  to  antecedents  in  twentieth-century,  'pre-constructivist',
sociology.  Early  studies  in the sociology of  science were  broadly concerned
with accounting for the 'social structure' and 'cultural context' in which science
developed28.  In these studies,  science was assumed to constitute a unified
social institution and the aim of sociologists was to explain the particular ways
it  developed  both  in  relation  to  other  social  institutions  and  through cross-
cultural comparison. In an historical context in which totalitarian regimes were
appropriating science to legitimise oppressive policies, sociologists like Robert
Merton  argued  for  a  normative  account  of  science  that  maintain  the
independence  of  knowledge  production  from  political  appropriation. An
important  distinction  these  early  studies established  was therefore  between
'internal' and  'external' accounts  of  scientific knowledge29.  In  these
internal/external  models of  science  and  society,  the  sociological study  of
science  was  limited  mostly  to  giving  'external'  accounts  of  science. In  this
internal/external frame, exhibitions and other formats of public display appear
experimental exhibitions, qua gallery formats, but rather attempts to show what is at stake 
in experimental public displays of science and technology. The Oramics exhibition is 
therefore approached here principally as comparable with other forms of public display of 
science and technology, rather than through a comparison with other experimental 
museum exhibitions. The following literature review is therefore not an exhaustive listing of 
all possible literatures that are implicated by this study but rather an attempt to formulate 
the Oramics exhibition as a particular kind of experimental apparatus.
28 An early body of literature from which the concerns current study derive is the sociology of 
science, most often associated with the work of Robert Merton. In this sociological 
literature, the central problematic was to define the ways in which social and cultural 
factors shaped the institutional organisation and development of science. The notion that 
social and cultural factors constitute the external context for science is was central to the 
development of the sociology of science (for discussion see Shapin, 1988)(for discussion 
see Shapin, 1988a)(for discussion see Shapin, 1988)(for discussion see Shapin, 1988)(for 
discussion see Shapin, 1988a). In Merton's (1973) account, the social factors that shape 
scientific knowledge include the institutional structures of science and the reward systems 
that incentivise the work of scientists. Culture was conceived by Merton as the repository 
of the norms, beliefs and value systems that underlie scientific research. Science, in 
Merton's account, is thus socially structured and culturally situated. 
29 In the mid-twentieth century, science appeared heavily politicised in its uses by Nazi 
Germany and the Soviet regime to legitimise totalitarian and fascist political ends. 
Sociologists like Merton were therefore concerned to develop an account of science that 
could critique these appropriations of science as 'misuses'. The distinction between 
'internal' and 'external' accounts of science was therefore central to early studies of the 
political relations between science and society, and its invention is often credited to Merton 
(Shapin, 1992). In Merton's account, rationality, cognition and material evidence were 
'internal' to science while culture was the 'external' context; the task of sociology was to 
assess the extent to which non-scientific cultural factors, like the Protestantism ethic, 
influenced the development and progress of science as a whole. Though the use of the 
concept of the culture often varies considerably across different social studies of science, 
many have worked within the framework of that seeks to specify the relations between 
science and its cultural 'context' (see, for example, Barnes and Edge, 1982).
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significant  only  insofar  as  they  communicate  knowledge  produced  inside
science to its external publics.  In other words, in these science and society
models we  can  perhaps  see  why  exhibitions  might  appear  relatively
uninteresting as sites for sociological research. 
By  contrast,  later  sociological  studies  problematised the  inside/outside
distinction that, it was argued, limited sociological approaches to giving only
external  accounts  of  science,  leaving  knowledge  itself  'off-limits'.  Such
accounts therefore also unsettled distinctions between the social structure and
culture  context  of  science,  and  the  independence  of  science  from politics.
Studies in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), for instance, attempted
to show that sociology could cross between the internal and external spaces of
science  to  describe  the  ways  in  which  scientific  knowledge  was  socially
constructed30. These studies sought to show that  the social studies were not
limited  to  giving  merely  contextual  or  structural  descriptions  of  science but
could  also  account  for  the  facts  and  knowledge  claims  put  forward by
scientists. In these studies, the politics of science was not limited to a separate
sphere of social life but was rather shown to present in the working practices
and knowledges produced by scientists. Other constructivist approaches have
highlighted  that  such  approaches  can  be  applied  not  just  to  scientific
knowledge  but  to  all  technical  practices  and  the  artefacts  they  produce31.
30 Broadly speaking this tradition, often called the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), 
built on earlier work in the sociology of knowledge (including functionalist and Marxist 
approaches) and developments in the philosophy of science (particularly Kuhn's account of 
paradigm shifts) in an attempt to give a sociological account of the so-called 'internal' 
aspects of science (Bloor, 1976; Collins, 1981a; Pinch, 2008; Shapin, 1992, 1995). The 
central focus of internalist SSK studies was the knowledge controversies that occurred 
between scientists: these studies argued that in such controversies the 'rationality' or 'truth' 
of competing ideas could not constitute the criterion for determining the success of one 
position over another. In other words, scientific rationality was an effect, post-facto, of the 
closure of knowledge controversies rather than the criteria that determined the progression 
of knowledge. One central tenets of such studies was the “symmetry postulate”, Bloor 
(1999) elaborates: “Both true and false, and rational and irrational ideas, in as far as they 
are collectively held, should all equally be the object of sociological curiosity” (84). Social 
studies of the natural and physical sciences, like Collins (1981b)(1981a)(1981b)(1981a)
(1981b)(1981a), deployed an extreme methodological relativism in attempting to 
symmetrically study the closure of controversies. Relativism about knowledge claims 
allowed sociologists to offer explanations for the construction of scientific knowledge which 
incorporated social and cultural factors. 
31 In sociology, the study of science developed largely independently of the study of 
technology. Since technology has often been considered the application of science – as 
applied, for instance, in commercial products, industrial infrastructures and organisation 
techniques, to name a few – it has also often been considered the politics. As Bijker and 
Law (1992) note, the politicisation of technology is common because technologies often 
breakdown and cause social problems, even disasters. However, more recently the social 
studies have highlighted the interconnections between the concerns of science and 
technology and politics. One important body of literature which drew attention to these 
interconnections were cultural studies. Within cultural studies of science and technology 
there are very different traditions which include the social construction of technology (Bijker 
et al., 1987), cyber-feminism (Haraway, 1997) and actor-network theory (Latour, 1993a). 
Though these approaches are distinct, all share a common assumption of the hybridity 
concerns about science and technology. These studies have described contemporary 
social life as conducted within societies of densely permeated socio-technical networks 
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Moving  away  from  the  language  of  internal  and  external  accounts,
contemporary  social  studies  have  described the  “dis-unity”32 of  science.  In
contrast to early sociology of science, these studies suggest that culture is not
simply a 'context' for science because, when studied empirically, there appear
many different  cultures  of  science comprising heterogeneous practices  and
localised to particular settings33. In science and technology studies (STS), the
appearance of science as a unified sphere of social life is therefore no longer
an analytical given but rather considered a deeply political construct34. It is as
formats that actively inform public perception and intervene in political life, that
exhibitions  have more recently  been  approached as  more  than  mere
intermediaries  between science and society (see, for example, Barry, 2001;
MacDonald,  1998). As political  concerns,  exhibitions  have been studied  as
sites  that produce particular kinds of  relations between  science, culture  and
the  public (see,  for  instance,  Haraway,  1984). From  the  perspective  of
contemporary STS, exhibitions therefore take on a significance which they did
not  have in  earlier  sociological  studies of  science.  The  highly  situated and
localised  character  of exhibitions,  which  once perhaps  limited  their utility as
sociological research sites, is increasingly no longer antithetical to the study of
science but rather symptomatic of their dis-unified practice.
Recent social studies of science and technology have argued that exhibitions
are formats that can be used to conduct experiments (MacDonald and Basu,
2007; Weibel and Latour, 2007).  In this literature, exhibitions are said to be
experimental when they mix together very different concerns in an attempt to
create new kinds of social relations. Latour and Weibel (2002; see also Latour,
2005a), for instance, created an exhibition, called Iconoclash, that juxtaposed
the practices, genres and concerns of science, art and religion in an attempt to
show  the  synergies  between  these  domains  of  social  life  that  are  often
considered separate.  Experimental  exhibitions,  these literatures  tell  us,  are
heterogeneous in the sense that they bring together many very different styles
and traditions of experiment. The experimental exhibition is therefore a “risky”
and systems.
32 The “dis-unity” of science is described in Knorr-Cetina's (1999) of the different “epistemic 
cultures” of high energy physics and molecular biology. The notion of “dis-unity” makes 
clear the departure from earlier sociological studies of science, such as Merton, in which 
science was considered to constitute a unified social institution.
33 Many contemporary studies of science and technology emphasise an analytical focus on 
“practices” (for example, Mol, 2003; Pickering, 1992). as a way to account for the socio-
material
34 From the perspective of cultural studies, the unification of science and technology as a 
single sphere is a particular fabrication that serves the ends of an imperialist, sexist and 
racist political culture (Harding, 1986, 2004). In the cultural account, the unity of science 
and technology is a fabrication that is used by particular actors to preserve and extend 
existing political relations of domination. 
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proposition for its various participants who are required to submit themselves
to experimental requirements of heteronomy (Weibel and Latour, 2007). In the
account given by MacDonald and Basu (2007) exhibitions are not simply static
displays  that  represent  pre-formed  curatorial  choices  but  rather,  as
experiments,  are  “spaces of  encounter”,  the  effects  of  which  are  highly
uncertain.  These  accounts  suggest  that  experimental  exhibitions  are like
“laboratories”, sites for the manipulation and creation of novel phenomena that
travel beyond the walls of gallery spaces.  In contrast to formats of exhibition
where  displays  attempt  to  communicate information  or  enact  particular
experiences for visitors,  these literatures argue that  experimental exhibitions
can usefully be regarded as messy and complex displays, as “assemblages”35.
To propose  exhibitions  as  experiments,  these  studies  suggest,  is  to  treat
spaces of public display as sites in which invention occurs.
In this literature review I make the case for approaching the Oramics exhibition
as a  public  experiment. I'm going to argue not only that exhibitions have the
capacity to be experimental,  as if  to mark out a distinction between different
kinds of  exhibition (e.g. experimental vs un-experimental exhibitions).  Rather,
in  this  literature  review I  explore  the  claim made in  the  studies  discussed
above that exhibitions like Oramics can be approached in a similar way to the
experiments  that  take  place  in  laboratories36.  From  some  perspectives,  to
approach  an  exhibition  as  an  experiment  is  an  absurd  proposition.
Experiments  and  exhibitions,  these  accounts  argue, are  fundamentally
different kinds of format: to conflate them is to confuse the practice of science
with  its public  display37.  By contrast, the approach I propose in this literature
review argues that exhibitions and laboratory experiments have much more in
common than  such criticisms would acknowledge.  The literatures considered
here are therefore mostly drawn from science and technology studies (STS)
and are focused specifically on the politics of experiments and public display.
In what  follows I am going to outline both  what is gained in the choice to
approach  the  exhibition  as  an  experiment  and  some  of  the  analytical
obligations that this places on us.  Specifically, I am going to argue that  the
benefits of this analytical choice are that exhibitions appear as formats that: (1)
invent  new things,  producing ontological  novelty, (2)  reveal  the  dis-unity  of
35 The concept of “assemblages” has been used to describe the hybridity of social and 
technical relations and the processes through which they are reorganised. It is discussed 
below in reference to the 'post-instrumental' account of the experimental exhibition (Irwin 
and Michael, 2003).
36 The comparison with the laboratory experiment is used here because this genre of 
experiment has often been considered by sociologists to be the 'hard case' for 
demonstrating the social and political character of experimental practices. 
37 These objections are addressed in the third section of this literature review.
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science, and (3) reorder the political relations between heterogeneous actors.
In this literature review, then, I seek to make the case for normatively valuing
exhibitions  as  sites  of  invention  rather  than  mere  intermediaries  of
communication.  In this way, the literature review prepares the ground for  the
analysis  of  the  Oramics  exhibition  that  follows  in  the  following  chapters  in
which I seek to  explore how the exhibition produces and negotiates relations
between science, culture and the public.
In this literature review I attempt to show how the proposition of the exhibition
as  public  experiment emerged as a concept  through science and technology
studies (STS).  In  these studies  formats of  display, like exhibitions,  take on
increasing significance as settings where these relations between science and
the public are unsettled and negotiated.  In the first  section of the literature
review  I  look at studies of the politics of  science communication and public
engagement  in  public  understanding  of  science  (PUS)  literature.  I  drawn
attention to the ways in which,  in the PUS tradition, formats of public display
have been conceived as 'instruments' that 'solve' the politics of science. In the
second  section  of  the  review,  I  discuss  literatures  from  social  studies  of
science and technology, such as actor-network theory (ANT), that have given
an “ontological”  account of public  display; as  formats  that  can be treated as
processes of invention that produce novelty.  Ontological approaches suggest
that  exhibitions  not  only  communicate  experimental  findings  in  public  but
produce  new  kinds  of  publics and  political  actors,  and  I  explore  such
implications in detail.  Finally, I consider some epistemological critiques of the
ontological approach to the experimental exhibition. These critiques argue that
the proposition of  the experimental  exhibition confuses two distinct  political
concerns with the practice and display of science. More significantly, perhaps,
the epistemological critique suggests that in adopting an ontological approach
we have to give up too much analytically, since we are no longer able to simply
use categories like 'the social'  and 'the political'  to  explain  the workings of
science. By looking at such critiques of the experimental exhibition, I suggest
that we gain a greater understanding both of the advantages of the ontological
approach as well as the analytical obligations that this approach requires us to
accept.  What I seek to do in this literature review, then, is make the case for
approaching Oramics as a public experiment and in doing so to describe some
of  the ways in which  exhibitions can be seen to  intervene in the politics of
science and culture.
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The instrumental account of the public experiment
An  important  context  in  which  to  situate  the  Oramics  exhibition  is  as  a
response to concerns about science communication and public engagement.
Two  related  fields  of  literature  in  which  these  concerns  are  discussed  in
science and technology studies  are: (1) the public understanding of science
(PUS),  and  (2)  public  engagement  with  science  (PES).  PUS  and  PES
developed  largely  out  of  what  has  been  called  the  'science  and  society'
tradition,  and  were  particularly  concerned  to  address  controversies  which
mobilised the public against scientific institutions  (Wynne, 1995).  The former,
PUS,  proposed that  science  communication  could  solve  controversial
situations by “diffusing” scientific and technical knowledge from institutions to
the  public.  The  latter,  PES,  developed  later  and  was  concerned  with
developing  a  two-way  “dialogue”  between  scientists  and  other  technical
experts  and  the  public  to  establish  consensus  over  how  to  manage
controversies.  Both PUS and PES are concerned with what has been called
public  “interactivity” with  science  and  technology.  The  account  of  public
interactivity  offered  in  PUS  and  PES  is  largely  conceived  as  a  form  of
communication. The difference is that in PUS diffusion occurs post-facto as the
communication of  scientific  knowledge while in  PES public  dialogue occurs
'upstream' during the research process. However, a fundamental assumption
shared  by  both  PUS  and  PES  is  that  the  communication  of  science  is
independent of the practice of science.  In both cases, public interaction with
science is  conceived  as a response to controversies, to which  experimental
forms of communication attempt to provide a 'solution'38. I argue here that the
notion  of  the  public  experiment  developed  in  PUS  and  PES,  of  which
exhibitions are one  format, offers  only a largely instrumental  account of the
relations between science,  and politics.  The communication experiments  of
PUS and PES assume both that science constitute a singular, united sphere of
social  life  and that  politics is  a  separate sphere.  In  controversial situations
when politics  becomes a  problem for  science,  PUS and PES  suggest  that
public experiments  are  instruments  that can  solve and settle their  relations.
However,  critical  STS accounts  of PUS and PES  have highlighted that this
instrumental model of the public experiment offers only a limited account of the
politics of science,  and fails to account for the socio-technical complexity of
controversies. By  looking  at  the  critical  STS  studies  of  PUS  and  PES,  I
38 In the discussion of PUS and PES I often conflate the idea that the exhibition solves the 
politics of science and technology with a separate idea that science, technology and 
politics should be kept separate. It should be noted, as is discussed in the final section, 
that there are other traditions which would accept the former idea while rejecting the latter.
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suggest,  we  gain  an  appreciation  of  some  of  the  key  concerns  that  the
proposition of the exhibition as experiment aims to address.
Sociologists have widely described the increasing controversial situations that
we  find  in  scientifically  and  technologically  advanced  societies.  In  these
controversies,  technical  experts  and  governmental  institutions  lose  their
assumed  monopoly  to  frame  and  determine the  trajectory  of  the  issues  at
stake. The increasingly frequent occurrence of such political controversies has
raised  fears  in  government  about  declining  public  deference.  Barry  (1998)
offers an analysis of the way in which experimental science exhibitions attempt
to  'solve' such  political  problems  of  public  governance  in  technologically
advanced societies. Barry argues that experimental exhibitionary practices can
be  situated  within a broader political  context  of  attempts to  make  institutions
more  responsive  to  the  public.  In  Barry's  account,  the  interactive  science
exhibition enacts a model of public governance that rejects the pursuit of public
deference and instead promotes public experimentation. Barry describes how
this form of interactivity is realised in science exhibitions in which the visitor's
free experimentation with their “untutored body” facilitates a particular kind of
engagement  that  eschews  hierarchical  and  didactic  modes  of  public
participation.  This  kind of  interactive  science exhibition,  according to  Barry,
facilitates the production of an active and self-governing citizen,  producing  a
spectacle  of  public  participation  that  enacts  liberal  ideas  of  progressive
enlightenment and  individual autonomy. Interactivity,  Barry argues,  offered a
solution to the political  problems of  public  governance, insofar  as  individual
self-experimentation  (whether  as  a  visitor,  consumer,  citizen  etc)  can  be
institutionalised  as  a  form  of  public  participation. As  Barry  notes,  though
interactivity might appear as a spectacle of socio-material  engagement with
science and technology, in Science Museum exhibitions like LaunchPad public
experimentation  is  only  instrumentally  enacted as simply  the  means  for
realising  a  more didactic,  hierarchical  diffusion  of  scientific  knowledge  from
institution to visitor39. As I will discuss in this literature review, this instrumental
version of the public experiment and interactivity, as an attempt to solve politics
with communication, is characteristic of PUS and PES40. 
39 Boon (2010) highlights the importance of the concept of “interpretation” in the development 
of “science communication” approaches at the Science Museum. The term interpretation 
had a very specific meaning in the Science Museum which pertained to the function of the 
newly established Science Communication Division in the late 1980s. Boon describes the 
range of techniques of interpretation which ranged from the inclusion of explainers in 
galleries and practical demonstrations in science shows for museum visitors, to techniques 
of audience research as the means to determine the most effective ways to curate displays 
for different audience groups (see also Durant, 1992; Gregory and Miller, 2000).
40 Indeed, Boon (2010) highlights the failure of the Science Museum's version of interactivity 
to solve the institution's political problems, which are not limited to matters of governance. 
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The “diffusion model”  of science communication is premised on the one-way
flow  of  information  from  science  to  the  public,  mediated  in  and  through
technologies (Latour,  1988;  Miller  and  Gregory  2000).  An  account  of  the
development  of  an  experimental  diffusion  model  exhibition  is  given  in
MacDonald's  (2002) Behind the Scenes at the Science Museum. MacDonald
studied the making of an exhibition – called Food for Thought – at the Science
Museum,  describing  the  ways  in  which  the  Museum was  shifting  from an
institution  oriented  around  objects  to  one  increasingly  oriented  around  the
public.  Food  for  Thought  was  an  experimental exhibition  for  the  Science
Museum in the late 1980s, which trialled a new approach to curating based on
diffusion model notions of public interpretation of science, which MacDonald's
study  followed ethnographically. The Science Museum of the late 1980s and
early  1990s  was  concerned  specifically  with  the  public  understanding  of
science (PUS), making this its corporate 'mission statement' (44). In the PUS
diffusion  model,  the  exhibition  is  a  medium through  which  science  can  be
represented to  the  public,  conceived  as  the  external  masses who  lack  an
understanding of  science  and  technical  knowledge.  However,  MacDonald
argued,  this PUS diffusion  model  inadequately accounted for the  politics  of
curating  and  exhibiting  science  observed  in  the  ethnographic  study.
MacDonald argued  that what  the visiting public couldn't  see was the back-
stage of the making of the exhibition in which the science represented in the
exhibition is entangled in a host of other messy and controversial concerns
hidden from the audience's view. By getting behind the scenes, MacDonald
highlighted the importance of the Museum's institutional culture and politics in
shaping  the  representation  of  science  in  the  gallery  displays.  MacDonald
showed that the  science represented in  Food for Thought  was influenced by
local cultural  concerns within the Science Museum. MacDonald argued that
the science communication model of exhibition hid from view the controversies
involved in making science public. MacDonald's study, then, highlights some of
the ways in which the diffusion model of PUS failed to adequately account for
the politics of experimental science exhibitions.
Just  as  MacDonald's  study  highlights  the  significance  of  the  local  and
contextual factors in shaping experiments in science communication, so too
Boon argues that while science communication occupied a central role in the work of the 
Science Museum in the 1990s, the focus on contemporary issues in science and 
developed independently of the Museum's other main focus on the history of science. 
Framing Oramics as an experiment in “public history”, Boon (2011) suggests the 
significance of other political registers in the Science Museum beyond the contemporary 
concerns of public governance.
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other  empirical  research  on  the  public  understanding  of  science  has
highlighted  that interpreting science  is  always  a  context specific  activity that
occurs in multiple different ways (Michael, 1998). Irwin's (1995) case study the
public  safety  information  of  a  petro-chemical  complex  in  Manchester,  for
example, showed how the institution failed to take into account the diverse
ways in which local residents understood the technical risks to which they were
exposed.  The  understanding  of  technical  advice  was,  Irwin  argued,  an
intrinsically social activity and in its local context could not be separated from
the other concerns of daily life. The problem with the diffusion model of PUS,
these studies have argued, is that  it naively assumes that  given existence of
knowledge asymmetries  between those people who are socially identified as
scientific  or technical and those who are socially identified as the lay public,
what  Wynne  (1992a) terms  the  “deficit  model”  of  the public.  These studies
argue  that  by  operationalising  a  “deficit  model”  of  the  public PUS fails  to
account  for  the  relational  character  of  knowledge  asymmetries  and  the
particular  contexts  in  which  they  emerge.  Wynne  (1992b),  for  example,
described the way in which Lake District sheep farmers' livelihoods suffered as
a  result  of  government  scientific  advice  in  the  wake  of  the  Chernobyl
catastrophe. Wynne described how the sheep farmers were required, against
their  own judgements,  to  follow the official  advice of  government scientists
responsible for managing the threat posed by radiation from Chernobyl, advice
which later turned out to be incorrect and which had a devastating impact on
the farmers'  livelihoods.  This  happened,  Wynne  argued,  because  the  local
knowledges of the Cumbrian sheep farmers were ignored by the government
scientists sent to advise on the radiation threat to the area from Chernobyl,
who simply assumed the farmers to be lay.  The  diffusion model of  science
communication was therefore widely problematised in these critical studies of
PUS  which  highlighted  the  model's  failure  to  represent  the  practices  of
science, to take into account the context-specific ways in which science was
understood, and the political effects of the “deficit model” of the public41. These
critical PUS  studies  therefore  question  the  extent  to  which  science
communication experiments can 'solve' the politics of science and technology.
Concerns to address the political challenges associated with the “deficit model”
of PUS, have led to an emphasis on public engagement with science (PES) as
an alternative to the diffusion model. A model developed in PES posits that the
41 One of the ways in which the Science Museum responded to the critique of the “deficit 
model” was to experiment with new models of interactivity the public. For example, in one 
experiment the public was assembled to deliberate in a “consensus conference” about the 
governance of new plant biotechnologies (Durant and Joss, 1995). 
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flow of information  between science and the public  is  a  two-way “dialogue”
which is shaped by local and contextual factors (for an overview see Elam and
Bertilsson,  2003)42.  As  a  two-way  model,  the  dialogue  version  of  science
communication  is  proposed  as  a  model  that  addresses  the  political
inadequacies of the  one-way diffusion model  (House of Lords, 2000).  In this
dialogue  model  of communication,  democratic  mechanisms like  consultations
are conceived as the experimental fora through which the public and scientists
participate in  mutually  framing  controversial issues  and  democratising  the
governance of  techno-scientific  innovations.  Unlike  the  post-facto  model  of
communication  in  PUS,  in  PES  the  emphasis  is  on  “up-stream”  public
engagement  that  can  inform  the  trajectory  of  contemporary  research  and
technological  application  (Wilsdon and Willis,  2004). In the  dialogue model,
then, public  engagements are proposed as political instruments  that address
the  'democratic  deficit'  in  science  and  technology.  This  capacity  of  public
engagements to 'democratise' science and technology is premised on a notion
that public dialogue aims at establishing consensus  (Horst and Irwin, 2010).
However,  empirical  PES research has questioned the extent to which “public
dialogue”  experiments  can  establish democratic  'solutions'  to  the  political
problems of science and technology. Thorpe and Gregory (2010), for example,
argue that the “two-way” dialogue model brackets the broader political context
in which communication between science and the public  takes place. They
argue that  PES models  are  blind  to  the  existing  political  asymmetries that
shape the capacities of different actors to engage in dialogue about science. In
consultations, for example, the capacities of the public to participate are often
often partly dependent on the  framing of  the issues  (see also Michael  and
Brown,  2005).  For  instance,  Irwin's  (2001) case  study  of  a  government
consultation  about  the  regulation of  biotechnology and genetic  modification
highlights the role that government issue framing played in both structuring the
issue  and  allocating  competencies  to  the  public  that  could  participate.
Moreover, PES researchers  have argued that the  framing of issues prior  to
42 In the Science Museum, this two-way PES dialogue model was one factor informing the 
development of the Museum's Wellcome Wing – a new multi-gallery space focused on 
contemporary science – which opened in 2000. The exhibition of science in the Wellcome 
Wing sought to abandon the didactic aesthetics of earlier PUS exhibitions while 
maintaining an emphasis on visitor learning. Some empirical studies have question 
whether the forms of interactivity in the Science Museum's Wellcome Wing exhibitions in 
fact depart from earlier PUS models, since their displays remain principally concerned with 
individual cognition (Heath et al., 2005). The public engagement focus of the Wellcome 
Wing was extended later with the opening of the Science Museum's Dana Centre in 2003, 
a space which was explicitly focused on establishing public “dialogue events”. The practice 
of dialogue events in the Dana Centre attempted to create spaces for informed public 
debate on contemporary socio-technical issues, with a strong focus on education (Davies 
et al., 2009). Dana Centre dialogue events were thus designed to introduce a fluidity and 
dynamism into the PUS models, and in this sense largely sought to extend the aims of 
PUS in attempting to solve the politics of science and technology with public 
communication (Davies, 2009). 
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public  dialogue experiments renders the  two-way model simply extension of
the earlier  one-way  diffusion model  (for  an overview see Felt  and Fochler,
2008).  Leach et al  (2005),  for instance, argue that  dialogue  experiments are
shaped  by discourses  about  scientific  development  containing highly
normative accounts of citizenship,  presuming particular forms of  agency  held
by  citizens  to  influence  the  governance  of  science  and  technology.  These
discourses  therefore  tacitly  frame  the  parameters  within  which  public
experiments  take place, limiting  the scope and modes of  public  participation.
Wynne  (2005) also argues that framings of  controversial  issues in public  are
highly  prescriptive  with  respect  to  ways  in  which  publics  can  engage  in
dialogue  with  science.  Specifically,  Wynne  argues  that  public  dialogue  in
contemporary issues is often limited to questions of the risks in the applications
of  new  forms  of  knowledge;  risk  discourse  being  deeply  embedded  with
cultural assumptions about the place of science in society and the nature of
citizenship. In limiting the political possibilities of dialogue to questions of risk,
the  PES dialogue model, Wynne argues, enacts  versions of the  PUS “deficit
model”. In a similar line of argument, Jasanoff (2005, 2007) shows in relation
to  the  GM  foods  controversy  how  policy  framings  of  the  issues  allocated
power. Jasanoff throws doubt on the extent to which the democratic fora of the
dialogue  experiments  can  overcome  existing  forms  of  exclusion  and
domination  in science and technology.  Elsewhere,  Horst  and Michael (2011)
argue that science communication and public engagement processes not only
often  fail  to  establish  dialogue  but  also  have  the  undesirable  effect  of
producing  “idiots”,  outsiders  who  refuse  communication  for  other  forms  of
action which are not accounted for in PES models. These critical PES studies
of  public  dialogue  suggest some of the  limitations of  attempts to use public
experiments as communication instruments for 'solving' or 'democratising' the
politics of science and technology.
There are,  then, considerable  commonalities in the models of PUS and PES
insofar  as  both  treat  science  and  technology  as  political  unified  and
communication  experiments  serve  principally  to  engage a  public  that
establishes both  their  utility  in  commercial  applications  (diffusion)  and their
democratic accountability (dialogue). In these models of the public experiment,
political  problems  are  considered  potentially  solvable  because  politics  is  a
separate sphere and that controversies are the exception rather than the rule
in  science  and  technology. However,  the  critical  studies  of  PUS and  PES
discussed  here have  questioned the extent to which  public experiments  can
'solve' controversial  situations  that  arise  in  advanced  industrial  societies.
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These  studies  highlight  that  for  all  the  focus  on  creating  public  relations
through communication, the PUS and PES models ultimately attempt to keep
science, technology and politics separate. Irwin and Michael (2003) argue that
the  models  of PUS and PES therefore give an inadequate account  of  public
experiments.  They  argue  that  public  experiments  should  be  thought  of  as
context specific “assemblages” in which  science,  technology and politics  mix
together.  Approaching  public  experiments  as  assemblages,  they  argue,
highlights  the  failures  of  communication  models of  public  experiments  to
account for the social-technical relations in which the participating actors are
entangled. Unlike the models of PUS and PES, they suggest that the politics of
science and technology are neither principally problems of communication nor
that they are 'solvable'.  In their account of experimental assemblages, Irwin
and Michael argue for a post-instrumental model of the public experiment that
isn't simply a means to close down and externalise politics from science and
technology. It  is  in  the  development  of  such  post-instrumental  accounts  of
public relations with science and technology, I suggest, that the proposition of
the exhibition as experiment becomes significant.
The ontological account of the public experiment 
The discussion of PUS and PES above highlights the limitations of formulating
the experimental exhibition as an instrument for 'solving' the controversies that
arise  in  advanced  industrial  societies.  The studies highlighted  that  the
instrumental  version of the public  experiment inadequately accounts for the
complex socio-technical  relations  that  are characteristic  of  controversies.  In
what  follows  I'm  going  to  explore  further  what  has  been  termed  'post-
instrumental'  accounts  of  public  experiments.  In  these  post-instrumental
accounts, public experiments are not  simply, as they were in PUS and PES,
the instrument through which public institutions attempt to solve controversies.
Rather, these accounts suggest that controversial situations occur precisely as
a consequence of attempts to keep domains of science, technology separate
from other domains of  public life.  In other words, the very formats, models,
techniques and programmes that present science and technology as unified
spheres  also  produce  the  conditions  for  controversies  to  occur.  Public
experiments, in this account, do not simply describe only the instruments that
are deployed in controversies but  rather describe the process through which
controversy  occurs.  The  accounts  of  the  public  experiment  that  will  be
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considered in what follows describe processes that are not only disrupt but that
also  produce  novelty.  Public  experiments,  in  these account,  are  inventive
processes  through  which  relations  between  science  and  the  public  are
unsettled and reordered.
Born  and  Barry  (2010) give  one  such  account  of  public  experiments
highlighting how their approach differs from the experimental communication in
the  PUS  and  PES models.  They argue for an “ontological” approach to the
public experiment, which they distinguish in the following way:
“public  experiments  do  not  so  much  present  existing  scientific
knowledge  to  the  public,  as  forge  relations  between  new
knowledge, things, locations and persons that did not exist before in
this way producing truth, public, and their relation at the same time.”
(116)
Where  instrumental  conceptions of  the public  experiment  in  PUS and PES
attempts  to  keep  science, technology and politics separate,  Born and Barry
propose  an  analytical  shift  to  treating  experiments  as  formats  that  create
ontological novelty, which they describe as “new knowledge, things, locations
and persons that  did not exist  before”.  Introducing ontological  novelty, they
suggest that public experiments disrupt and 'reveal'43 the political organisation
of  science  and  technology.  So,  Born  and  Barry's  account  of  the  public
experiment  is  unlike  the  PUS/PES  models  of  experimentation  insofar  as  it
does  not  attempt  to  'solve'  the  politics  of  science  and  technology.  In  the
ontological  account  of  the  public  experiment,  politics  does  not  cross  into
science and technology  from outside, as it is assumed to in  internal/external
models.  This  version  of  the  public  experiment,  Born  and  Barry  argue, is
premised on the dis-unity of practices of science and technology which always
occur within heterogeneous political entanglements. This account of the public
experiment  doesn't  simply  assume  that  public  space  and  political  actors
provide  the  external  context  with  which  science  and  technology need  to
reconnect and engage. Instead, Born and Barry propose the public experiment
as an institutional format that renews and reorders relations between science,
technology and the public. Public experiments not only create new objects but
also new public spaces and political relations between heterogeneous actors.
In this sense, the ontological account of the public experiment, Born and Barry
43 Born and Barry draw on Hannah Arendt's account of the revelatory character of political 
action in order to describe the politics of public experiments (see Arendt, 1957). Arendt's 
account of politics is largely developed as a critique of instrumentalisation of political action 
in liberal and Marxist theories. 
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suggest, enables us to grasp  the relations between science, technology and
politics  without  instrumentalising politics or  reducing  complex  socio-technical
issues to  internal/external  models.  In  what  follows I  draw on actor-network
theory to suggest that the ontological account of public experiments places the
following obligations on accounts of the politics of science and technology: (1)
politics is issue-specific, (2) public space is not a context for experiments but is
produced  in  socio-technical  processes,  (3)  political  action is  not  an  innate
property of individual subjects but  occurs across distributed relations, and (4)
non-humans are admitted into political collectives and registers of democracy
multiply. In what follows, I look at how these accounts of the politics of science
and technology are  developed in  social  studies  of  experiments  in  order  to
make  clear  what  is  at  stake  in  approaching  the  Oramics  exhibition  as  an
experiment.
The  ontological account of  public experiments  draws on ideas from science
and technology studies (STS) that  have highlighted the similarities between
the repertoires and resources of science, technology and politics (Callon et al.,
2009; Ezrahi, 1990; Haraway, 1997; Latour, 1993b; Marres, 2012a).  In these
accounts  public  experiments  do  not  properly  belong  to  either  science,
technology or politics but rather are rather formats that create new things that
disrupt and reorder  social  relations between these domains.  One account of
the ways in which  public  experiments  intervene in matters of  social  order is
found in  Shapin and Schaffer's  (1985) study of  the  historical development of
the experiment in the 17th century. This study describes the way in which the
experiment was invented as a particular material, social and literary technology
that intervened in the  contemporary  problems of political  order.  Shapin and
Schaffer describe the roles of the 17th century public in the establishment of the
space for experiments to take place,  in  modestly  witnessing and testifying to
experimental  demonstrations, and in providing the literary addressees for the
reporting of experimental matters of fact. Shapin and Schaffer's account looks
at  the  ways in  which  these  various  roles  of  the  public  enabled  the  facts
performed in local experimental societies  (specifically, the Royal Society)  to
gain  virtual  mobility  that  could  transcend  the  local  conditions  of  their
production. Once experiments had been witness in public space and written up
for  a  public  audience,  facts  became  mobile  and  immutable.  Shapin  and
Schaffer's account makes clear  the limitations of  epistemological  accounts of
experiments:  experiments,  they  argue,  did not simply replace the  deductive
rationalism  of  philosophers  like  Thomas  Hobbes  with  a  new  theory  of
knowledge.  Rather,  at  a time of  social  instability in Restoration society,  the
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experimental  method  also  provided  a  solution  to  problems  in  political
philosophy about  how to establish a political order that  guaranteed universal
assent;  natural knowledge could  provide  the  authority on which to  establish
political order  in  a  way  that  monarchal  rule  had  failed  to.  The  creation  of
experimental  facts,  which  at  once  demonstrated  and  commanded  public
assent, Shapin and Schaffer argued, provided a new basis on which a political
order could be founded. Shapin and Schaffer's account of the debate between
Robert  Boyle  and  Thomas  Hobbes highlights  that  deep  interconnections
between these figures' natural philosophies about the material world and their
political concerns  about  public  order;  the  problem  of  political  order  being
intrinsic  to  the  formulation  of  both Hobbes'  plenist  and Boyle's  corpuscular
materialist  philosophies. In  their analysis  of  the  controversial  history  of  the
experiment,  Shapin  and  Schaffer's  account  makes  clear  the  synergies
between the technologies of science and politics.
Philosophers of science (Hacking, 1983; Stengers, 2010a) have been quick to
point  out  that  this  ontological  account  of experiments  does  not  render
experimental  science  indistinguishable  from  forms  of  political  activity. For
institutions  of  science  and  technology,  the  ontological  account  of  the
experiment  rather  poses  the  challenge  to  explain  the  formation  of  modern
science  despite  its  practical  similarities  with  politics.  Stengers  (1997),  for
instance,  argues that  the ontological approach does not require  philosophers
to abandon normative accounts of experimental practice in science. Stengers
(2000) argues that  the good  experiment can be  considered  in terms of the
“risk” that  it  places on the “experimental author”  who, in  putting forward an
experimental proposition, seeks to gain the authority to speak on behalf of the
things  on  which  they  are  experimenting. Stengers  argues  that  risky
experimenters are those that provoke the “maximum heterogeneous interests”
in  their  experimental  propositions.  Where epistemologists have  emphasised
the  importance of  the  disinterestedness of  experimenters,  Stengers  argues
that it  is  in fact only when experimental propositions are “interesting” – the
Latin “inter-esse” meaning to be “situated between” (in a way that creates new
relations between interested actors) – that experimental authors are conferred
with the power to speak for the things on which they are experimenting. A good
experiment, Stengers argues, is  an  apparatus  that  establishes itself  between
actors and their interests and which therefore forces actors to pass through the
apparatus in order to pursue their interests44.  Ontologists  like Stengers  make
44 A similar account of the experiment is given in actor-network theory in Michel Callon's 
(1986) concept of the “obligatory passage point”. 
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clear that the confusions and exchanges between science and politics can in
part  be  understood  as  a  consequence  of  the  failings  of  epistemology  to
establish  a  basis  on  which  to  demarcate  science  from  non-science.  If
philosophers of science  invariably  engage in  the 'scientisation of politics',  as
critics might argue, the ontological version advocated by Stengers nonetheless
is a form of politics that conceives the cosmological foundations of science as
inherently problematic:  highlighting the ontological  multiplicity, heterogeneity,
and  risky nature  of scientific practices  in their relations to the common world
(Stengers, 2005). Far from undermining the raison d'être of institutions like the
Science Museum, accounts of the ontological account of experimental science
and  its  practical  similarities  with  politics  instead  can  be  seen  to  invite  the
renewal and reordering of the territory that is given the name of science.
One  obligation  the  ontological  approach  to  public  experiments  places  on
sociological analysis is to orient our descriptions of political action around the
fabrication of new  objects,  or  “things”45.  Social  studies of experiments have
argued that the experimental production of new things is an inherently political
activity. The  materiality  of  experimental  objects is  not,  these studies argue,
easily separable from  the actions of  experimental participants (Latour, 2004;
Marres,  2012a;  Mol,  2003;  Stengers,  2010a). These  studies  of public
experiments  have argued  that experimental  objects are not singular, cleanly
delimited  and  independent  of  context,  as  they  are  supposed  to  be  in  the
communication politics of PUS and PES. Instead, in public experiments objects
appear  as  multiple,  entangled  in  heterogeneous  relations  and  distributed
across different settings. In this way, social studies of public experiments have
complicated theories of political action that would seek to keep separate the
concerns of  objectivity  from concerns of  subjectivity.  In  public  experiments,
they  argue,  'objects-in-themselves'  are  not  clearly  distinguishable  from  the
techniques  of  the  political  actors  who  represent them:  objects  do  not  just
constitute the material context in which political action can take place. Latour
(2004, 2005a),  for example, describes the ontological approach in relation to
two  kinds  of  “object-oriented  politics”:  Latour  argues  that  in  adopting  an
ontological approach to experiments we need to shift  our  analysis of politics
from the clean objects of “matters of fact” to the messy objects of “matters of
concern”. The  latter  objects,  “matters  of  concern”,  occur  in  controversial
situations in  which  the  public  presentation  of  an  object  is  a  necessarily
45 In the essay From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik: Or How to Make Things Public, Latour (2005) 
makes the case for a “politics of things”. Drawing on Heidegger's etymology of the term 
“thing”, as a gathering, Latour argues that the fabrication of things, or objects, is an 
inherently political form of action.
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experimental process which assembles many different concerned groups. The
making public of an object, Latour argues, is an experiment that is constitutive
both of the object itself and the public. In  a representational “matter of fact”
politics,  actors compete  to  exclude  all  other  claims  about  the  things  that
occupy public space. By contrast, a politics of “matters of concern” centres on
the objects that concern different actors and maps out a different kind of public
space  which  is  dynamic  and  distributed.  In  public  experiments,  then,  the
materiality of objects is not separable from the concerns of the heterogeneous
actors or the particular public settings where objects are staged.
Another  way  to  characterise  the  politics  of  “matters  of  concern”  is  as  an
argument that  politics is an  issue-specific  activity (Marres, 2005,  2007).  An
issue-specific account of politics problematises internal/external models of the
relations between science, technology and the public. Marres (2012) argues in
relation  to  experimental  situations  that  it  is  here  impossible  to  distinguish
between who the insiders and outsiders of public spaces are or should be or
which should be involved in settling controversial issues and, hence, the public
here  becomes  a  fundamentally  problematic  category.  To  account  for  the
experimental politics of issue-publics, Marres suggests, is to attend to the ways
in  which  the  problems  of  the  public are  distributed.  Studies  of  public
experiments attempt to redistribute the problems of the public from procedures
for political  representation to the assemblages of actors, objects and settings
of which issues are comprised.  For instance,  Callon and Rabeharisoa (2004)
highlight how articulations of public space and political action are constructed
by mobilising particular distributions of issues. In their discussion of the moral
agency  of  a  patient  of  neuro-muscular  disease,  Callon  and  Rabeharisoa
highlight  how  different  configurations  of  the  issue  construct  competing
accounts of the public space in which the patient has the capacity to act, or not
to act, politically.  Publics, in this view, are material entanglements which, in
experimental settings, appear malleable with the capacity  for  “movement” as
issues develop and change (Lezaun and Soneryd, 2007). These studies argue
that the externalisation of the public from science and technology leaves us ill-
equipped to account for the issue-specific modes of public assembly we find in
experimental settings.
The notion that public space is produced  as a consequence of  experimental
situations is found in studies of contemporary political controversies in science
and technology. These studies argue that the entanglement of techno-science
in  the  fabric  of  daily  life  leads  increasingly  to  political controversies  and
52
therefore to experimental situations (Callon, 1998; Callon et al., 2009; Latour,
2004).  Public  space  is  therefore  not  simply  a  context  for  displays,  or
exhibitions,  of  science  and  technology  but  rather  dense  and  dynamically
entangled with technical practices. Attempts to contain or 'solve' controversies
through governance and communication techniques, such as those described
by PUS and PES, only further proliferates their entanglements in public. Callon
(2009) develops the concept of the “hybrid forum” to describe the experimental
settings that arise from contemporary controversies such as GM foods, BSE,
nuclear waste, asbestos  and so on.  In hybrid forums, the asymmetries  that
structure  the  liberal  democratic  ideas  of  public  space  –  constructs  that
demarcate citizens from politicians, and experts from lay people and delegate
to each different  capacities  for  acting and representing  –  are  blurred.  This
blurring does not  only  change the interactions between different  individuals
and groups, as if these occurred against a static background, but rather more
fundamentally  reconfigures  the  materiality  of  public  space. In  studies  of
contemporary controversies, claims to objectivity – the preserve of experts and
politicians in  liberal  democratic  models of  public  space – are distributed in
relations between the actors, objects and settings assembled in experimental
situations. In experimental situations, the staging of public space is not clearly
distinguishable from  the  actors  and  objects  that  populate  it,  and  thus  the
materiality of experimental public spaces appears a 'hybrid' concern. Hence, in
concepts like the hybrid forum we can understand some of the ways in which
public experiments reorder the materiality of public space. 
Studies  of  public  experiments  have  therefore  argued  that  the  capacity  for
political  action  is  not  the  monopoly  of  human  actors,  or  at  least  that  the
capacities  of  the human actor  becomes a much more  complex  proposition
when  they  are  entangled  in  an  experimental  setting.  Actor-network  theory
(ANT) in particular has developed the idea of apply a “generalised symmetry”
in the treatment of “human” and “non-human” agency (Callon, 1986). The ANT
account  describes the capacity of experimental  formats to enrol and mobilise
distributed  networks  of  actors,  or  “actants”  (both  human  and  non-human
actors).  In  ANT,  public  experiments  are  means  of  introducing  and
domesticating new entities in the collective world (Latour, 2004). ANT studies
have argued that epistemic objects of experiments are never isolated, though
they may appear to be in controlled settings like a laboratory, but instead are
always  entangled within broader  socio-material  relations. For ANT,  then,  the
scientists involved in experiments  are not simply  epistemic  participants  who
compete  over  representations  of  the  world  with  other  scientists,  but rather
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participants  in  competing  programmes of  action  (Latour,  1988). These
programmes  of  action  are  not  limited  to  controlled  settings,  such  as
laboratories, but are distributed across complex networks that involve many
different kinds of actors from across society. Action, in ANT therefore occurs
when these networks are mobilised. This happens not only when scientists do
experiments but when all sorts of other social actors develop programmes of
action. Analytical models that assume, a priori, the separateness of  science
and society, and the concomitant distinctions between the social and natural,
technology and politics (etc) fail to adequately account for the complexities of
these actor-networks (Latour, 1993).
Political action considered asymmetrically to be only the capacity of humans, it
is  argued,  inadequately  accounts  for  the  way  in  which  non-humans  also
participate in the politics of experimental settings (Gomart and Hajer, 2003). In
public experiments,  political action is a problem that includes phenomena as
diverse as microbes (Latour, 1993b), scallops (Callon, 1986), electric vehicles
(Callon, 1980), and diseases (Mol, 2003).  ANT studies have sought to include
“non-humans”  in ideas of  political  action  by treating them symmetrically with
humans  as  equally  “actants”  (Latour,  1988).  Another  name  given  to  the
inclusion of non-humans in politics has been called “ontological politics” (Mol,
2003).  While others have argued that including non-humans in politics entails
recognising  that  politics  is  not  the  base  pursuit  of  a  fallen  humanity  but  a
cosmological matter, in which questions of the physical world and the agency
to act in it are at stake (Stengers, 2005, 2010a, 2010b). All of these accounts
argue that accounts of non-human politics would necessarily move beyond 'off-
the-shelf' notions of politics,  and instead  requires us  to look at the ways in
which non-humans become “equipped” with political capacities (Marres, 2012).
Later ANT studies (Latour, 2007; Marres and Lezaun, 2011) have, for example,
attempted to  extend  the modes of  politics  in  which non-humans participate
beyond  the  forms  of  “action”  – action  being  a  distinctly “human”  political
concern  (Arendt,  1958) – to those modes particular  to  non-humans.  These
studies of  non-human politics suggest that in experimental settings our ideas
of politics are not immune to the demands of experimentality.
By admitting  non-humans into  political  collectives,  ANT therefore  claims to
extend  theories  of  democracy  to  encompass  the  practices  of  science  and
technology (Latour, 2004; Callon et al 2009).  Of course, in many senses, the
concern  to include  non-humans in democratic theory is not unique to  ANT.
Marres (2012), for instance, makes clear that there are many existing forms of
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democratic theory  that  include versions  of non-human,  or “material”, politics.
However,  Marres argues,  public  experiments  are uniquely suited as  testing
grounds  for  ideas  of  democracy  that  foreground  the  place  non-humans.
Marres,  for  example,  discusses  the  role  of  devices  in  sustainable living
experiments,  showing how  in  such experiments  non-humans  both  gain and
lose their capacity to participate in the public politics of climate change. Marres
argues that public experiments highlight  the  variability  of material democracy
which  may  involve non-humans  but which also does not necessarily depend
on  their  participation  for  its  accomplishment.  Elsewhere,  Lezaun  (2011)
describes the case of a 1970s Norwegian “offshore” labour experiment, aboard
the Bilbao ship, which attempted to test a very particular “industrial” version of
democracy.  In  Lezaun's  study,  the  inclusion  of  non-humans  in  democratic
politics appears  to multiply the  spheres of social life  that are  concerned with
questions of democracy. And, as Latour (2007) notes, if including non-humans
challenges  models  of  democracy  that  asymmetrically  limit  the  capacity  for
political action to humans, then the inclusion of non-humans also extends the
domains  and  registers  in  which  democracy  circulates  as  a  concern.
Ontological accounts  of public experiments, then, make arguments that both
challenge and also seek to extend our ideas of the proper concerns of politics
and democracy theory.
The ontological account, I have suggested here, helps to make clear what is at
stake in the analytical choice to treat the Oramics exhibition as an experiment
in  the  politics  of  science  and  technology.  These studies  tell  us  that
experiments produce ontological novelty: so, to look at the exhibition as an
experiment is not simply to treat it as a static surface of representation but to
see it as a dynamic space of invention. If we accept the ontological version of
the public experiment as the model for the exhibition, we find that experimental
exhibitions  are  forms  of  public  display  that  don't  simply  represent  or
communicate  science  and  technology  but  rather  are  creative  formats  that
invent new things, that reveal the distributed and heterogeneous character of
science  and  technology  and  which  reorder  socio-technical  relations.  This
version of the public experiment is not discontinuous with the 'doing' of science
and  technology,  as  it  was  in  PUS and  PES,  for  instance,  in  which  public
displays  served simply  as intermediaries  for  communicating  the findings or
products  of  experiments.  The  use  of  public  experiments  by  institutions  of
science and technology is, as Barry and Born argue, a way of renewing and
reordering  the  political  arrangements.  Producing  ontological  novelty,
experiments disrupt existing forms of  organisation and create new kinds of
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socio-technical  relations.  In this sense, public space is not simply the context
in which public experiments take place but is rather materially reassembled in
the experimental process. Politics is therefore not something external to public
experiments, as if experimental processes could be judged by existing political
models, but is rather specific to the experimental issues.  In this sense, Born
and  Barry  argue,  public  experiments  are  politically  'revealing':  they  render
visible the socio-technical relations in which issues are composed. 
Some  epistemological  objections to  the  experimental
exhibition
In  what  follows I  look at  some important  objections to  the  proposition that
exhibitions  like  Oramics  can  be  approached  as  experiments.  The  main
objections I am going to consider here  are  epistemological objections drawn
from within STS literatures  which argue that  experiments are  fundamentally
different  formats  to  exhibitions.  Experiments,  in  these epistemological
accounts,  are  formats  that  produce knowledge while  exhibitions  simply  put
knowledge  on  display.  These epistemological  critiques of  the  experimental
exhibition argue that we need to separate out experiments (or the practices of
science  and  technology)  from  exhibitions  (the  display  of  science  and
technology).  They argues that this separation ensures that we aren't tricked
into believing that well-rehearsed displays of exhibitions  have any relation to
messy  and  contingent  practices  of  science  and  technology.  These
epistemological  critiques  suggest  that  the  proposition  of  the  'exhibition  as
experiment' is  highly  unlikely:  exhibitions  are  about  'showing' rather  than
'doing' and  if  Oramics really  is  an  experiment  then,  in  the  epistemological
approach, it  surely fails as an exhibition.  For  these  epistemologists we can
have  either  exhibition  or  experiment  but  we  can't  have  both.  The  conflict
between  these  epistemological  and  ontological  versions  of  experimental
exhibitions can be seen in  relation to social studies of  demonstrations. From
the ontological approach, the demonstration appears as a genre of the public
experiment that retains all the features  described above:  demonstrations are
formats in which politics is issue-specific and which produce public spaces. To
the  epistemologists  discussed below, by contrast, demonstrations are simply
well  rehearsed displays of scientific  facts and are not formats that produce
knowledge. Looking at epistemological objections, I suggest, makes clear both
what we gain from adopting the public experiment as the model for exhibition
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as well the trade-offs and obligations that are involved. 
From  the  perspective  of  the  ontological  account  described  above,  the
demonstration appears as a genre of the public  display in which new things
are  created  and  which  intervene  in  the  composition  of  public  space.
Demonstrations  have  often  been  separated  into  the  distinct  concerns  of
science,  on one hand, and  politics,  on the other.  In contrast,  recent  social
studies of demonstrations, some of which have already been discussed above,
argue that the political and scientific accounts of demonstration are much more
closely connected than  is appreciated  by modern epistemology and political
theory.  Attempts to separate out  scientific  from political  formats often draw
distinctions between two historical meanings  of  the term  demonstration: the
earliest being the Aristotelian notion of the demonstration as a scientific  proof
for  a  finding  that  is  doubtable  or  not  immediately  obvious,  and,  the  more
historically recent understanding, since the 17 th century, of the demonstration
as  the  performance of  'showing' new  phenomena.  By contrast,  rather  than
attempting to separate out the scientific and technical content of demonstration
from  the  politics and  aesthetics of  'showing',  recent  social studies  of
demonstrations,  such  as  Girard  and  Stark's  (2007) analysis  of  public
participation in the proposed rebuilding of down town Manhatten after 9/11,
suggest  that it  is  only  by  treating  demonstrations  as  inseparably  socio-
technical  that  we can adequately attend to the ways in which public space is
assembled. Indeed, social studies of demonstrations have highlighted some of
the  problems  that  occur  in  attempts to  disentangle  experimental  'practice'
separate  from experimental  'display',  and  for  which  public  space  is  simply
assumed to be the external context in which experimental displays take place.
For instance, Lezaun (2011) argues that attempts to control the public spaces
in which experimental  demonstrations occur can have the unwanted effect of
limiting the capacity of an experiment to extend beyond the immediate site of
its  display.  Lezaun's  case  study  of  a  1970s  Norwegian  “offshore”  labour
experiment, aboard the Bilbao ship, also highlights the many different genres
of  public  experiments;  in  this  case,  as  an  attempt  to  demonstrate  a  very
particular “industrial”  version of social  democracy. Studies of demonstration,
then, not only highlight the ways in which public experiments  unsettle  socio-
technical  relations  but  also  draw attention to  the  heterogeneous  genres of
experimentation through which public space is reordered. 
An example of the way in which demonstrations intervene in composition of
public space is found in Barry's (2001) study of a protest against road building
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in  Newbury,  UK.  Barry's  study  compares  the  technical  direct  action  of
protesters living in trees and tunnels, on the site  on which the road building
was proposed, with a Friends of the Earth (FoE) “site-specific” art exhibition as
attempts to create the protest as an event for the media (for further discussion
of  the  importance  of  media  and  mediation  in  demonstrations,  see  Callon,
2004).  Barry contrasts the direct action  protesters  largely technical  concerns
about  the  methods  of  action  on the  site,  with  the  FoE  attempt  to  use the
exhibition format to publicise its message to the media. Barry argues that the
FoE exhibition highlighted the gulf between the organisation's generic political
techniques,  creating  an  art-exhibition  and  involving celebrities,  and  the
empirically specific  techniques of the direct action  protesters. Living in trees
and  tunnels,  the  direction  action  protesters  made  visible  the  complex
connections between the people and the land  which  was  translated into a
publicity  event  in  the  media.  By  contrast,  Barry  argues  that  the  exhibition
created by FoE largely failed to gain the envisaged media coverage because it
was not site-specific  enough.  Far from being a case study of the distinction
between formats of action and display, Barry's account highlights precisely the
similarity between both the direct action and the exhibition as publicity formats
which differ only in their relation to the object (the site of proposed road) that
they  sought  to  visualise:  the  direct  action  protesters  site-specific  methods
made the object  visible  through techniques of  intervention while  FoE  used
spokespersons  (celebrity  artists)  to  represent  the  objects.  In  terms  of  the
creation  of  public  space,  the  direct  action  protesters  were much  more
successful  because  their  techniques  of  demonstration  could  be  flexibly
interpreted  and  easily  be  translated  into  media  publicity.  Social  studies  of
demonstration therefore highlight the ways in which practices of public display
do not simply  bring new  objects  in an already  constituted  public space  but
rather are formats that are themselves constitutive of public space itself.
In contrast  to  the  account  in  social  studies  of  demonstration,  which  have
argued that  public space is  experimentally constituted in demonstrations,  the
epistemological  account  of  demonstrations  argues  that  there  is  a  clear
distinction between  experimental  'practice' and  the  'display' of  experimental
results. The epistemological account makes a clear distinction between public
space as external to experimental practice and as the context of experimental
display in  demonstrations.  A  sociological  version  of  the  epistemological
account is given in Collins' (1988) study of a televised crash of a train carrying
nuclear materials, a study of a public experiment designed to demonstrate the
safety of nuclear science  to the public.  Collins' argues that it is important to
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separate  out  the  concept  of  experimentation  as  a  scientific  practice  from
experimental  demonstrations which  are  simply well  rehearsed  displays that
occur after  experiments  have been conducted.  Collins'  conception of  public
experiments  is  in  many  ways  not  dissimilar  to  that  discussed  above.  For
Collins,  public  experiments  create new  forms  of  knowledge,  require  the
participation  of  heterogeneous  participants,  and  are  risky  endeavours.
However,  for  these  precise  reasons  Collins  finds  the  authentic  public
experiment a highly unlikely occurrence. Many events that are given the name
of  public  experiment,  Collins'  argues,  are  inauthentic  as  experiments  and
instead as simply well-rehearsed displays. Demonstrations, Collins argues, fall
into this latter category because their principal role is to educate and convince
audiences;  they are not  themselves experimental.  By separating out  public
experiments from demonstrations, Collins argues, sociologists are equipped to
evaluate whether or not public experiments really are experimental or simply
well rehearsed displays. In the case of the train crash, Collins argues that this
public  experiment  was simply  intended to  demonstrate that nuclear  science
was safe,  certain  and uncontroversial.  The train  crash was therefore not  a
public experiment  because it  did  not  incorporate  the  uncertainties  and
breakdowns that, Collins suggests, are integral in scientific practice46.  Rather,
Collins argues, the train crash was a  staged display  that attempted to allay
public  concerns  around  the  issues  of  nuclear  safety.  In  Collins  account,
demonstrations are instruments for displaying experimental results but are not
themselves formats of experimental practice. 
To conflate  formats  of  demonstration  with  practices  of  experimentation,  in
Collins' argument,  is  to  risk  uncritically  accepting  idealised  and  unrealistic
accounts of scientific  practice that empirical  studies in STS have sought to
debunk.  For  Collins,  staged  demonstrations  exaggerate  the  certainty  of
scientific practice at the expense of showing the breakdowns and failures that,
Collins claims, are intrinsic  (see, for example, Collins, 1987). For Collins, the
outcome or progress of an experimental knowledge programme is only known
after all uncertainty and controversy has been closed out. However, it is only in
controversies that we see how experimental knowledge is created, and for this
social  scientists  need  to  adopt  a  relativist  epistemology  in  order  to  treat
symmetrically  the  differing  claims  of  participants  in  the  experimental
programme  (Collins,  1981a,  1981b).  In  this  sense,  Collins  account  of
46 Elsewhere Collins (1987), for example, argues that the communication of science 
experiments on television is often misleading in its staging of them as experimental 
displays. Collins argues that the image of science on television overstates the certainty of 
scientific knowledge at the expense of the inherent uncertainty of science – break-downs, 
failures and competing interpretations – integral to its production. 
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demonstrations  is  not  dissimilar  to  arguments  made  in  PUS  and  PES  to
promote  the  correct  public  understanding  of  science.  The  authentic  public
experiment is,  in  Collins' account, is  completely unlike a demonstration or an
exhibition.  For  Collins  the  experimental  exhibition  is  therefore  not  only  an
unlikely  occurrence (there  are  very  few instances where  scientists  need to
experiment in public as opposed to doing so in the safety of a laboratory) but
when it occurs it is a  highly risky endeavour  for those involved that  offers no
guarantees  of  success.  The  epistemological  challenge  to  social  studies  of
demonstrations,  then,  is  that  they are unnecessarily  limited to  studying the
public presentation of science, and offer little insight into experimental practice.
Demonstrations,  in  Collins  argument,  have  nothing  to  do  with  public
experiments  because  demonstrations  and  experiments  are  fundamentally
different formats.  To be concerned with the empirical variety in  experimental
demonstrations, in this view, would simply pertain to the aesthetics of display
rather than  to  the epistemology of the experimental claims presented.  From
the perspective of Collins account, the proposition to study an exhibition as an
experiment either risks misrepresenting experimental practice or likely fails as
an exhibition. 
There are many potential  benefits  in  the epistemological approach  to public
experiments described by Collins. Equipped with the distinction between public
experiments  and  well-rehearsed  demonstrations  we could  approach  the
Oramics exhibition and sort out whether or not it is authentic as an experiment.
Moreover,  Collins'  relativist  epistemology  for  studying  experimental  practice
offers  both methodological  prescription and  explanatory power  insofar  as it
approaches symmetrically the competing claims of  experimental participants
and seeks to identify factors external to science, social factors, that account for
the  success of a particular version over its competitors (see Collins, 1981a;
1981b).  This  explanatory  power  is  sacrificed,  Collins  (Collins  and  Yearley,
1992) argues, by ontological approaches like actor-network theory that refuse
not  only  the  distinctions  between  natural  (internal)  and  social  (external)
accounts of experimental  claims  but of all  asymmetric distinctions, the most
controversial  of  which is  the distinction between humans and non-humans.
Where the relativist epistemology, Collins argues, allows analysts to alternate
between natural and social explanations because it assumes a human-centred
universe, the generalised symmetry of actor-network theory  rejects any such
centre around which organise its analysis. In Collins argument, the material-
semiotic method  of actor-network theory – semiotics being the method that
allows  sociological  analysts  to  accord  agency  to  non-human things  –  fails
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methodologically because it  offers no material foundation on which to ground
its explanations of science. While  the symmetrical treatment of humans and
non-humans  might  sound  philosophically  radical,  Collins  argues  that the
generalised symmetry and semiotic method of actor-network theory is simply a
linguistic invention that transforms the world into signs and in doing so empties
it of the material distinctions between words and things. The ontological claims
about  non-human  agency  might  sound  radical,  Collins  argues,  but  it  is
epistemologically conservative because it accepts at face value scientists' and
technologists'  'before  and  after' claims  about  the  invention  of  new  objects.
ANT's claims about non-humans, for Collins, mask a more reductive scientific
realism  and  technological  determinism  that  sociologists  of  science  and
technology  have  long  critiqued.  What  we  gain  from  the  (relativist)
epistemological approach to public experiments, Collins' account suggests, is
an  understanding  of  the  ways  in  which  scientific  knowledge  is  socially
constructed. Collins'  critique of the ontological account of public experiments
and  defence of relativist  epistemology and social  constructionist  account  of
science  and  technology  highlights  some  of  the  risks  of  the  ontological
approach  in falling back into a form of sociological positivism,  assuming that
actors  give  an  accurate  account  of  their  practices  as  opposed  to  critically
situating the practices of actors in a broader social context. In these respects,
the epistemological account makes clear some of the potential weaknesses,
methodological  and  explanatory,  of  the  ontological  approach  and,  perhaps
more problematically, that it risks giving up the very ground on which sociology
can account for science and technology.
In their response to Collins, Callon and Latour (1992) defend the symmetry of
ANT approach arguing that it is only by giving up their assumed monopoly over
social explanations, that sociologists can adequately account for the politics of
science  and technology. They  argue  that  the  relativist  epistemology  of
sociologists studying scientific knowledge is unsymmetrical in  its treatment of
naturalistic  and  sociological  forms  explanation,  explaining  scientists'
naturalistic  descriptions of  the world  in  terms of  social  factors.  Though the
social  constructionist  approach,  Callon  and Latour  argue,  makes clear  that
sociological description of science and technology is possible, this approach
also limits to sociology to giving 'social explanations' and in doing so maintains
scientists' hegemony  over  natural  explanations  of  the  world.  Collins'
sociological relativism is an epistemology in which the ontologies of 'nature'
and  'society'  are  simply  assumed  to  constitute  the  respective  domains  of
“things-in-themselves”  and  “humans-amongst-themselves”.  In  the  study  of
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experiments, the social constructionist approach is instrumental in its ontology,
using an ontological divide between nature and society as the foundation from
which to create social accounts of experimental (natural) facts. By contrast, as
described above, an ontological approach finds in experiments the production
new  things  that  cannot  be  reduced  to  either  a  priori  'natural'  or  'social'
ontologies.  If  experiments produce ontological novelty,  then both social  and
natural  ontologies  must  have  to  change  if  they  are  to  accommodate
experimental  fabrications.  The  attentiveness  to  the  production  novelty  in
experiments  requires,  this  approach  argues,  the  us  to  treat  ontology  as
variable.  Treating  ontology  as  variable  obliges  us  to  extend  ontology  as  a
property  of  many  other  things  besides  nature  and  society.  The  critique  of
demonstrations,  as formats of  display  that  simply reproduce well-rehearsed
experiments  but  in  fact  do  nothing  new,  denies  that  demonstrations  are
ontologically  significant.  In  contrast  to this  critique,  I  will  now  look at  some
ontological accounts of demonstration given by actor-network theory.
One account  of  the difference between the epistemological  and ontological
versions  of  demonstrations  is  given  in  Latour's (1993a) re-reading  of  Shapin
and Schaffer's history of the experiment (discussed above). Latour's replay of
the  debate  between  Hobbes  and  Boyle is  between  the  two  forms  of
demonstration we find conflated in contemporary usage: Hobbes' (Aristotelian)
apodeitic, self-evident reasoning versus Boyle's performances of the air-pump
which  reveal experimental  facts  to  witnesses  who  faithfully testify  to  their
existence.  Epistemological accounts, Latour shows, will either damn Hobbes
and Aristotelianism to the dustbin of history – celebrating Boyle's experiments
as a new form of knowledge – or render invisible the theatre of proof that Boyle
requires  to  successfully  demonstrate  his  facts  –  focusing  only  on  Boyle's
factual  claim  that  an  air-pump  can  produce  a  vacuum.  Epistemological
accounts,  Latour  argues  are  unable  to  take  into  account  the  ontologies  of
science and politics that are invented with the experimental programme:
“Boyle is not simply developing a scientific discourse while Hobbes
is  doing the same thing for politics; Boyle's is creating a political
discourse from which politics is excluded while Hobbes is imagining
a  scientific  politics  from  which  experimental  science  has  to  be
excluded. In other words, they are inventing our modern world, a
world in which the representation of things through the intermediary
of the laboratory is dissociated from the from the representation of
citizens through the intermediary of social contract” (27)
In Latour's re-reading of Shapin and Schaffer, science and politics are not fixed
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ontologies  through which  we can  explain the outcome of this Hobbes-Boyle
debate. Instead,  Latour argues,  the outcome of this  debate,  Boyle's victory,
created a  particular  ontological  settlement  between  science  and  politics;  a
separation that,  Latour argues, has shaped the modern world. Latour argues
that  Boyle's  experiments  were  successful  because  in  their  public
demonstration  they  mobilised distributed  networks  of  actors  in  a  way  that
Hobbes's  water-tight  logic  did  not. Shapin  and  Schaffer's  account  of  the
experiment,  Latour  argues,  shows that  the  success  of  the format  was  not
simply  that  it  enrolled those  who  were  immediately  involved  in the
experimental setting but because in public displays experiments also mobilised
large and powerful networks of actors including kings, parliaments, capitalists,
merchants,  publishers,  revolutionaries  and  so  on.  The  experimental
demonstration, in Latour's account,  is a  process that intervenes in radically
diverse networks of actors and which, in the process of creating new matters of
fact,  not only transforms scientific  practices but fundamentally reshapes the
practices of all  of the  other  actors  who are  enrolled. For  example, Latour's
(1993b) account of Pasteur's invention of microbes shows how this invention
radically  reformulated  the  entire  problem of  public  health  from a  matter  of
hygiene techniques to questions of microbiology. Central to Pasteur's success
was the public demonstration in which it could be shown that the experimental
apparatus  was  mobile;  experiments  not  only  worked  in  the  local  Parisian
conditions but  also  in  the  French  provinces.  In  Latour's  account  the
demonstration does not  simply disseminate the experimental  knowledge so
that it can be put into practice but rather, Latour argues, public demonstrations
are  always  practices  that  mobilise  distributed  networks  of  actors.  In  the
provincial demonstrations, it was not just microbes that were being mobilised,
Latour  argues, but  France  itself.  In  Pasteur's  provincial  demonstrations,  a
whole  diversity  of  actors  across  France  had  to  change  in  order  to
accommodate the new microbes.  Epistemological accounts fail to adequately
account for such distributed effects of  experimental demonstrations because
they assume public space to be independent from experimental practice and
therefore unaffected by the novel things that experiments produce.
The  ontological  approach  argues  that  once  we  accept  that  experimental
displays produce ontological novelty, then we can no longer make the simple
distinction between the 'doing' and 'showing' of science and technology. From
the ontological perspective, there is nothing unlikely in the proposition of the
experimental exhibition. By contrast, epistemological approaches argue that it
is only by making a priori distinctions between formats of experimental practice
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and  display  we  are  able  to  retain  explanatory  power  in  our  analysis  of
experiments, to show how science and technology are socially constructed.
Epistemological  critiques  of  public  experiments,  such  as  Collins'  account,
argue  that  ontological  approaches  give  up  far  too  much  analytically,
methodologically and ethically, in accepting the proposition of the exhibition as
experiment. Examining  such  critiques  highlights  that  the  adoption  of an
ontological approach obliges sociologists to treat ontology as both multiple and
empirically variable and in doing so reject modes of explanation that presume
an  ontological  foundation  e.g.  'the  social'  or  'the  political'  as  explanatory
resources.  By adopting the ontological approach we are therefore confronted
with a lot more complexity: politics, science and technology cannot be a priori
demarcated from one another as they were in the internal/external models of
PUS and PES,  for instance.  It might be argued that there is a  risk, perhaps,
that  in  adopting  the  ontological  approach  we  render  our  account  of  the
Oramics exhibition  too  complex.  However,  we  might  also  note  that  if
ontological complexity is a challenge for the sociological analyst then it is also
shared with those other participants in the experimental exhibition who accept
that  they  too  are  submitting  to  the  risks  of  heteronomy.  In  this  respect,
accepting ontological complexity can be seen not simply an arbitrary analytical
choice  but  rather  the  condition  on  which  the  sociologist  too  becomes  a
participant in the experiment.  What I have attempted to argue in this chapter,
then, is that it is only by accepting the proposition that exhibitions can produce
ontological novelty that we can approach  Oramics as  a setting  that reorders
relations between science and the public.
Conclusion
In this literature review I have condensed a large range of literature and in
doing so necessarily suppressed some of the complexity  of these debates  in
order to make an argument about what it means to treat Oramics as a public
experiment. I have also deliberately omitted several other bodies of literature,
that might otherwise be proposed as relevant to a museum study, in order to
set-up the exhibition  as an experiment.  I will therefore use this conclusion to
restate the central points of the argument to show what we gain by looking at
the Oramics exhibition in this way. I opened this literature review by proposing
that an  exhibition  like  Oramics  can  be  considered  as  a  response  to  past
attempts  to  use  experimental  exhibitions  as  instruments  for  'solving'  the
political  problems  of  science  and  technology.  By  looking  at  studies  of
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experiments in science communication and public engagement, I argued that
these studies offered instrumental accounts of the experimental exhibition and
for this reason they can be criticised for providing an inadequate account of the
relations between science, technology and politics.  In the second  section of
this review I looked at ontological  accounts of experiments in order to make
the  case that  the  experimental  exhibitions reorder  socio-technical  relations.
These accounts argue that experiments are productive of ontological novelty
and therefore both unsettle and 'reveal' socio-technical relations arrangements,
in the process of reordering them. The ontological approach to experiments, I
suggested, obliges us to rethink models of the public as the merely context or
backdrop  for  political  action: in  the  experimental  process,  I  argued,  the
materiality  of  public  space  is  recomposed.  The  public  of  the  experimental
exhibition is not, therefore, simply limited to the space of the museum gallery
because  in  what  the  public  consists  is  precisely  what  is  at  stake  in  the
experiment.  Finally,  in  the  third  section  of  this  literature  review  I  have
considered  some  epistemological  critiques  of  the  experimental  exhibition.
These critiques, I  have argued, not only make clear what is at stake in the
proposition of the experimental exhibition but also clarify some of the analytical
implications of the ontological account of the experiment. This does not mean,
however, that by accepting the ontological account we necessarily 'throw out'
the  epistemological  concerns  of  sociologists  like  Collins.  Rather,  the
ontological  account  suggests  some  of  the  limitations  of  epistemology  in
presuming the basis on which social  explanation can be established.  What
might be called a broadly social constructivist epistemology is an antidote to a
world that is split into two dominant ontologies of nature and society; once we
accept  the  proposition  that  ontology  is  variable  we  find  a  multiplicity  of
ontologies for  which  such  social  constructivist  approaches are inadequately
suited. The ontological approach proposes instead that for an empirical world
of variable ontologies we require sociological approaches that are attentive to
the issue-specificity of experimental practice. To approach Oramics as a public
experiment, then,  proposes that we investigate whether and how  something
'new' is being fabricated in the Oramics exhibition. 
There is, however, one significant  theoretical  weakness that might be said to
arise from the ontological account of the public experiment described above.
First, it might be objected that the ontological account of the public experiment
is  so  highly  generalised  that  it  could  be  applied  to  almost  any  social
phenomena. From an ontological viewpoint many things other than exhibitions
could equally well be described as a public experiments, and in this sense the
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concept does little to distinguish what is particular about exhibitions as public
experiments as opposed to other forms of public experiments. Worse still, it
might  be argued that  if  the public  experiment is  simply a synonym for  the
creation of novelty then it is not sufficiently distinguished from the vast range of
sociological concepts that do similar work. These are both pertinent challenges
to the account of the public experiment developed here and both are to some
extent  true of the account  as I  have presented it.  However, I  argue in this
thesis  that  what  we  might  sacrifice  in  theoretical  specification  through  an
ontological account of the public experiment we gain in empirical and analytical
purchase. Though the ontological account of the public experiment might seem
generalisable to many other social situations, in the particular empirical setting
of the  Oramics  exhibition  I  suggest  it  offers us a way to take seriously the
different  modes  of  experimentation  that  we  find  in  the  displays.  Thus,  its
weakness as a  sociological  construct is a strength in the particular empirical
setting of this study  where experimentation has very particular significances
(discussed in Chapter One). And, moreover, though it might be argued that the
ontological  account  tells  us  little  more  than  that  novelty  is  created,  it  is
precisely  because  exhibitions  have  rarely  been  studied  as  processes  that
create ontological novelty that applying the concept of the public experiment to
the  Oramics  exhibition  we  might  explore  some  of  the  ways  in  which  the
exhibition might be said to be an inventive format.
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3.  Methodology:  ethnographic fieldwork and  thematic
analysis 
Introduction
In  the  first  chapter  I  introduced  the  Oramics  exhibition  and  the  central
questions of the thesis, and advanced the proposition that we can understand
the exhibition as an experiment in relations between science, culture and the
public. In the second chapter I elaborated the central concept of the thesis, the
“public experiment”, and highlighted the implications of applying this concept to
the Oramics exhibition. In this chapter I discuss the ethnographic methodology
used  for  the  research  and  the  different  phases  of  fieldwork,  present  an
overview of the empirical material collected, and outline the  structure of the
analysis  presented  in  the subsequent chapters.  I  also raise some important
methodological considerations what kind of empirical object the experimental
Oramics exhibition is, and how to research this object ethnographically.
This thesis began with a proposal to study the relations between science and
the public  and to  empirically  research an experimental  process involving  a
scientific  institution.  The identification of  the Science Museum as a site for
research into this subject was partially the result of  connections I had made
with  the  Museum's  curators  during  my  prior  professional  work  on  public
engagement with science and technology. Though I could likely have chosen
other field sites for research into public experiments, this does not mean that
the  Science  Museum  was  somehow  an  arbitrary  choice.  In  preliminary
meetings with the curators it was clear that we shared an interest in some of
the same issues in the social  study of  science and technology, which they
sought to address through the experimental Oramics exhibition. The Oramics
exhibition was the first attempt of the Museum's curators' to develop what they
call a  “public history”  approach  to curating  exhibitions,  which attempts to tap
into the historical knowledges of 'lay persons'. The Science Museum therefore
seemed an appropriate setting for the research based on a  shared  interest
with  the  curators  in  the  proposition  of  the  experimental  exhibition  and  the
problem  of  the  relations  between  science  and  the  public.  Beginning  my
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research by observing the curators' experimental work, I sought to explore how
a public experiment developed in practice.
By attempting to apply the concept of the public experiment to the  Oramics
exhibition, I sought to  use this concept  to  develop a better understanding  in
what was the exhibition might be said to be an inventive format. The empirical
analysis  presented  in  this  thesis  is  neither  a  field  report  of  the  curators'
experiment nor does it use the empirical material simply to confirm the concept
of  the  public  experiment,  as  it  was  discussed  in  Chapter  Two's  literature
review. Rather, in the analysis I attempt to look at the different ways in which
the  empirical engagement with Oramics  exhibition  would  problematise  some
existing ideas (some of which were raised in Chapter Two's literature review)
about how experimental exhibitions  make  relations  between science and the
public.  Such problems I hoped might reveal something about the practice of
experiment in settings outside of the laboratory and thus also something of the
exhibition as an inventive format. 
The  methodology  used  for  this  study  built  on  a  very  particular  version  of
ethnography,  for which  a  key  reference  are  the  laboratory  ethnographies
developed  in  science  and  technology  studies  (discussed  below).  In  this
tradition, ethnographic studies of experimental settings have highlighted how
“the empirical”  is  often  difficult  to  disentangle  from the ethnographer's  own
theoretical  concepts. For  instance,  ethnographers  of  experimental  settings
have highlighted how  theorising the experiment is  not  the monopoly of  the
ethnographer and that there is often role confusion between the ethnographer
and others in the setting (for instance, Law 2004). This tradition of ethnography
seemed particularly  relevant  in  my  case  not  simply  because  the  empirical
setting was publicised as experimental but also because it was clear that I was
not the only actor in the setting attempting to theorise what was going on – as
noted  already,  the  Science  Museum's  curators  had  a  highly  sophisticated
social-theoretical account of what they were doing. In the analysis below I will
also point to some instances of role confusion particularly in the my attempts to
observe the curatorial  experiment.  In  the analysis  below I  discuss why the
ethnographic fieldwork conducted for this study was both a procedure of data
collection  and a  process  of  empirically immersing  and  testing  sociological
ideas about experiments and exhibitions.
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This chapter begins with an overview of the fieldwork conducted for this study.
I discuss the ethnographic method used to gather the empirical material  and
the different phases and focuses of the fieldwork process. I also elaborate the
significance of the background to the study both in terms of how the research
questions were shaped but also in accounting for the focus of the fieldwork in
its later stages. The particular tradition of ethnography developed in laboratory
studies  is  discussed  with  reference  to  other  important  methodological
precedents  in  studies  of  experiments.  Following  this  I  give  an  empirical
account of the initial stages of the fieldwork and some of the methodological
problems that were raised and which led to a subsequent shift in focus away
from  treating  the  experimental  exhibition  as  a  simple  empirical  object  to
studying it as distributed across multiple  modes  of experiment.  Importantly, I
discuss some methodological objections to the approach taken to the latter
phase of fieldwork and in doing so offer some insights  into the  challenges of
empirically studying  the  Oramics  exhibition as  a public experiment. Finally, I
conclude by outlining the rationale for the thematic analysis which is developed
in the following substantive chapters of the thesis.
Overview of empirical material
There were two broad phases of fieldwork that can be broadly distinguished as
the initial  phase of  ethnographic  observation  of  the  experimental  curatorial
process for  Oramics at the Science Museum and a later phase of fieldwork
studying  the  other two  modes of experiment – experimental electronic music
and the experimental display – that are also the focus of analysis in this thesis.
Much  of  the  empirical  data  about  the  curatorial  process  of  Oramics was
collected over the period of six months – between January and October 2011
(when the exhibition opened) –  during  which I was in close contact with the
curators of the Oramics exhibition. The initial fieldwork included participating in
and observing  the experimental curatorial process,  the  curatorial and design
meetings and the public events in the build-up to and launch of the exhibition.
During this work I took a broad approach to studying the curatorial experiment,
not  simply  limiting  this  to  the  work  of  those  staff  formerly  called  curators.
During this period I conducted a series of interviews, formal and informal, with
the curators and other members of staff who were involved with the Oramics
exhibition, including Audience Research,  Design, Digital Media, Conservation
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and  Learning  and  Outreach.  The  second  phase  of  fieldwork focused on
studying  the  experimental  display  and  experimental  electronic  music  were
ethnographic in quite a different way. 
In order to research Oramics as an experimental display, I became much more
familiar with other forms of exhibition in the Science Museum. I spent some
time visiting the other exhibitions taking place in the Museum and followed the
Museum's social media output that would publicise new developments. I also
researched the history of experimental display at the Science Museum making
the  occasional  trip  to  the  Museum's  archive  where  gaps  appeared  in  the
various written histories. One key reference point in terms of appreciating the
different  forms of  experimental  public  display  in  the  contemporary  Science
Museum  seemed  to  be  the  public  understanding  of  science,  which  was
incorporated  as  the  'mission  statement'  of  the  Museum  during  the  1990s.
Various  conversations  with  curators  and  other  members  of  staff  offered
different perspectives on these other forms of experimental exhibition which
are  discussed  in  more  detail  in  Chapter  Four.  This  focus  of  the  empirical
research was often desk based but also guided by conversations I would have
with  various staff  and academics who had been involved with  the Science
Museum at different times.
The  other  focus  of  the  second  phase  of  research  was  on  experimental
electronic music, the subject matter of Oramics. This research focused largely
on developments in the 1960s during the time that Oram was working on the
Oramics Machine. As an amateur musician, I had some loose ideas about this
history but  during the ethnographic work of  the curatorial  experiment I  met
many people  who offered me some  important  guidance.  During  this  time  I
interviewed, formally and informally, key researchers and artists involved in the
Oramics Machine's 'rediscovery'. It was particularly fortuitous that I was based
at  the university, Goldsmiths,  where Oram's archive was kept and where a
computer scientists and sonic artist, Mick Grierson, had led the search which
resulted in the Machine's acquisition by the Science Museum. In this process I
interviewed several of the key people involved with the Daphne Oram Trust
and several researchers investigating the significance of the Oramics Machine.
Mostly  researchers,  these  'Oramites'  not  only  directed  me  to  various
contemporary music and research events related to Oram and the Machine but
also  helped  me  to  situate  the  composer's  development  of  the  Oramics
Machine and the particular traditions of electronic music history in which it was
significant.  Importantly  too,  two  of  the  researchers  developed  another
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exhibition of materials from Oram's archive which offered an interesting and
useful  counter-point to the Science Museum's display (see Chapter Six).  In
part  due  to  the  obscurity  of  the  subject  matter  – Oram  was  largely
unrecognised within electronic music history prior to the Science Museum's
exhibition  (Reynolds,  2012) –  I  relied  on  several  key  contacts  I  made  at
Goldsmiths  to  guide  me to  materials  and  events  which  would  help  me to
situate the Oramics Machine in the history of experimental electronic music.
It was during the  initial stage of fieldwork, observing the Science Museum's
curators' experiments, that I identified the themes that would be relevant to this
study of Oramics as a public experiment (although it is fair to say that during
the  research  process  these  distinctions  between  the  different  experimental
focuses were not always as clear to me as they now appear in this written
account). The opening of the exhibition six months after I had begun fieldwork
therefore did not seem to mark the end of the empirical study. However, it did
change the emphasis of my empirical orientation. In the six months prior to the
opening  of  the  exhibition  I  had  been  principally  focused  on  following  and
understanding  the  Science  Museum's  curators'  account  of  what  was
experimental  about  Oramics,  while  at  the  same  time  developing  a  basic
understanding of the exhibition's focus on experimental electronic music. In the
second six months of fieldwork this settlement was to some extent reversed
and while I spent some time with the Science Museum's curators observing
their follow-up work on the exhibition, I also spent a lot more time researching
Daphne Oram, the Oramics Machine and the history of electronic music, the
various gallery displays of the exhibition and the other forms of experimental
display at the Science Museum. This shift in focus alerted me to events at the
Science Museum that I might otherwise have written off as unimportant if I had
only  focused  the  study  on  the  experimental  curatorial  procedures.  For
instance, in the last six months of fieldwork at the Science Museum I observed
a series of events related to the Oramics exhibition including, most notably, an
electronic music day and a late-night event on experimental music (these are
discussed in Chapter Six).  I also became aware of the significance of other
publicity  formats  used  by  the  Museum's  curators  such  as  the  Oramics
Machine's Facebook page which was regularly updated over the first year that
the exhibition ran, and a resource which highlighted the diversity of audiences
interested in the exhibition of the Oramics Machine. Although after one year of
fieldwork I relaxed my engagement with the empirical  setting, I  still  went to
work at the Museum from time to time  and  this  kept  me  in touch with major
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events or developments that took place  around the exhibition. For instance,
after a year and a half the gallery displays were altered and several elements
referring to  the experimental  curatorial  process were removed (notably, the
cinema hosting content from various participating groups - see discussion in
Chapter Five). In the later stages of fieldwork I therefore attempted to balance
the initial emphasis on the experimental work of the Museum's curators with an
equal focus experimental electronic music and forms of experimental display at
the Science Museum. 
One  way  to  characterise  the  scope  of  the  empirical  research  would  be
temporal, as the six months prior to the launch of the exhibition and then six
months after. In this sense, the material gathered includes both the question of
the exhibition's  curation and its reception.  However,  this  is  not  how  I  have
organised the presentation and analysis  of  the empirical  material,  which is
instead  arranged  thematically.  These  themes  derive  in  part  from the  initial
research questions with which I approached the Oramics exhibition and from
the  subsequent  identification  of  the  different  modes of  experiment  in  the
setting.  Each theme is focused on a particular arena of material practice in
which the exhibition can be said to intervene.  They can be summarised as:
participation  (Chapter  Four),  exclusion  (Chapter  Five)  and  media  (Chapter
Six). I have attempted to show how these themes make associations between
the  different modes of experiment we find in  Oramics: how they connect the
experimental work of the Science Museum's curators, the experimental gallery
displays and the subject of experimental electronic music. In doing so, I seek
to  specify  some  of  the  ways  in  which  we  might  understand  the Oramics
exhibition  as  an  experiment  in  relations  between  science,  culture and  the
public. This format of analysis is designed to hold onto the Oramics exhibition
as the central object of analysis  without over-determining in what and where
this empirical object consists.
Background
The  background  to  the  study  is  worthwhile  briefly  elaborating here  as  it
highlights the particular  orientation to  the public experiment that I brought to
the  study of  the  Oramics  exhibition  as  well  as  the  methodological  choices
72
made during the study. Prior to beginning this research I  had worked as a
researcher  for a public participation think-tank  which was involved in  running
experimental  “dialogue”  and  “public  engagement”  processes  on  emerging
techno-science  issues,  principally  on  a  consultancy  basis  for  government
departments and agencies.  Having  developed  connections with the Science
Museum during  my work  with this think-tank  I  arranged to meet with several
curators to discuss setting up a case study. The timing of my study coincided
with the “project history” that the curators were developing and through which
they  would  trial  “co-curation”  techniques  with  a  range  of  public  groups  in
making an exhibition.  The curators were interested in how different groups of
the public thought about the history of science and technology and through
“co-curation” experiments sought to investigate this. I  subsequently submitted
a proposal to the curators to ethnographically study the co-curation processes
for the exhibition. Though the proposal did not use the concept of the “public
experiment”  explicitly, the research questions  were framed  through Latour's
(2005a) materialist theory of public assemblies as gatherings around “matters-
of-concern”, the controversial things that unsettle and reorder public life. Since
my proposed ethnographic study required significant access to the spaces in
the Science Museum, it was arranged for me to be affiliated to the Museum as
a “research associate”. This status gave me the security clearance to access
the various Museum buildings, an email address and log-in to the Museum's
computer network to access project information and search archival material,
and a desk in the research department from which to work. 
I  proposed  an ethnographic  methodology  for  several  reasons47,  but  one
significant factor informing this choice was that many social studies of science
and technology,  on  which  the proposed research was  modelled,  had used
ethnographic techniques to study experimental settings. The paradigmatic use
of  ethnography  in  science  and  technology  studies  is  often  said  to  be  the
laboratory studies of the late 1970s and early 1980s in  which ethnographers
sought to give accounts of how science was made that differed from those of
both  practitioners  (scientists  themselves)  and  theorists  (epistemologists  or
philosophers  of  science) (Collins,  1981b;  for  instance,  Knorr-Cetina,  1999;
Latour and Woolgar, 1986).  As highlighted in the literature review,  in some
social theories a setting like the Science Museum would appear considerably
distant  from  the  experimental work  of  laboratories  studied  by  these
47 Significantly, my prior training in social anthropology had equipped me not only with the 
practical basis from which to develop an ethnographic study but also a broad 
understanding of the philosophy, history and politics associated with this mode of research.
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ethnographers of science and technology; museum exhibitions, in such social
theories, are located at the opposite end of trajectories of invention from the
laboratories  where  experimental  objects  are  produced.  However,  like  the
Science Museum's curators, I was not convinced that laboratories are the only
settings of  experimental  practice,  particularly  in light of  subsequent work in
science and technology that drew attention to the importance of public displays
and  demonstrations  in  not  only  communicating  experiments  but  also  as
participating in the 'doing' of experiment (see discussion in literature review on
the proposition of the experimental exhibition). Discarding the false opposition
between the lab and the museum exhibition, the ethnography of the science
exhibition as an experimental setting seemed highly plausible. 
In  setting up  the fieldwork I  proposed to  approach  the  (yet to be developed)
Oramics  exhibition  as  if  it  was  principally  the  Science  Museum  curators'
experiment;  treating  the  curators  as  if  they  were  analogous  to laboratory
scientists and I were the ethnographer there to study them. I went to curatorial
and  design  meetings,  I  observed  and  participated  in  the  experimental
curatorial  process for  Oramics (discussed below), I  researched the Science
Museum's history and how organisational changes changed along with styles
of  exhibition,  and  I  engaged  in  formal  interviews  and  many  informal
conversations with the staff  who were working on or were interested in the
Oramics  exhibition. In these  early stages of the  fieldwork I attempted to pay
attention to the micro processes through which Oramics was developed as a
curatorial experiment: how  it  disrupted  the  'business  as  usual'  curating  of
science  and how  it  was  troubling  for  the  curators  themselves,  or  raised
questions about science  exhibition. However,  even in the early stages of  my
research  it  seemed  clear  that  this  empirical  focus  limited the  scope  of
describing the exhibition  as an experiment. Though  Oramics  clearly was an
experiment for the Museum's curators and other staff working on the exhibition
(discussed at length in Chapter Four) it was seemed that the exhibition  was
experimental in other ways that were perhaps equally significant. 
The  methodological  question  of  how  to  empirically  study  Oramics  as  an
experimental exhibition became more problematic as I realised that equally, if
not  more  significant,  styles of  experiment  were to  be  found in  the  subject
matter of  electronic music.  Oramics  was an exhibition that not only departed
from the conventions of science exhibitions in terms of its curatorial procedures
but also in terms of its distinctively art-oriented subject matter, namely Daphne
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Oram's  Oramics  Machine  and  the  invention  of  electronic  music.  When  I
realised, early on, that the Oramics Machine had come to the attention of the
Science Museum's curators via  a  sonic artist  and computer scientists,  Mick
Grierson, at  my  own  university  of  Goldsmiths  where  Oram's  archive  was
held48,  it seemed clear that  if I was to appreciate the potential of  this artefact
experimentally  mediated  relations  between  science  and  the  public  I  would
have  to  expand  the  scope  of  my empirical  work  beyond  the  galleries  and
offices of the Science Museum. 
I  began  this  expansion  in  empirical  focus  early  in  the  research,  most
memorably attending an event about Daphne Oram at the experimental music
venue called Cafe Oto which occurred a few months after I'd begun fieldwork
at the Science Museum and which featured both Tim Boon from the Science
Museum and Mick Grierson from Goldsmiths  (described in Chapter One). In
fact, I was already quite familiar with this venue: as an amateur musician with
an interest in electronic music I'd visited Cafe Oto on various occasions to see
live  music.  The subject  matter  of  the  Oramics exhibition  therefore  also
presented itself as a moment in which my own scientific  and artistic interests
might  come  together  in  new ways.  Alongside my fieldwork  at  the  Science
Museum, then, I also established relations with those musicians, computer and
media  artists  who  were  actively  involved  in  the  exhibition  in  someway,
including those participating in curating its displays and researchers (most of
whom were at Goldsmiths) studying Daphne Oram and working on her archive.
My experiences as an amateur musician helped in making these connections
and in doing so opening up the question of what kind of 'rediscovery' Daphne
Oram's  Oramics  Machine  was. In  what  follows,  I  outline  some  of  the
methodological implications of my choice to shift the focus of my fieldwork to
settings  beyond  the  experimental  curatorial  procedures at  the  Science
Museum.
There is one highly significant discrepancy between the original aims of this
study – to  research  how the  Oramics  exhibition  might be understood as an
experiment in  relations between science and the public  – and the analysis
presented  in the thesis which adds to this a focus on the relations between
science  and  culture.  This  additional  focus  on  culture  was  perhaps  already
latently  present  in  my research proposal  to  study  a  museum exhibition  as
48 A video of the Oramics Machine being received by Grierson can be found at: 
http://vimeo.com/21310959 (accessed 20 October 2014)
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opposed,  for  instance,  to  a  political  event  such  as  a  science  dialogue.
However, during the early part of the study I had no intention of making culture
into  an  analytic  focus.  There  were  many reasons for  my bracketing  of  the
cultural question. One highly significant factor was my former training as an
anthropologist had left me with some serious doubts about the value of  the
concept of culture as an analytic category49.  However, in the empirical work I
came to discover that culture was a concept of considerable importance within
the  setting  of  Science  Museum.  Not  only  were  notions  of  material  culture
central to the curators' self-understandings of their work, but culture appeared
a concern of many other staff in whose work the Museum appeared variously
an  institution  of  multiculturalism,  a  repository  of  high-culture  and  as  a
competitor  in the  culture  industries. Moreover, these concerns about culture
were  articulated  through  the  Oramics exhibition  in  various  ways  (see
discussions in Chapter One and Chapter Four), not least in the subject matter
of the exhibition which was distinctly removed from the mainstream concerns
of  professional  science.  In  my  empirical  work  it  seemed  that  in  order  to
appreciate  the  Oramics  exhibition  as  an  experiment  in  relations  between
science and the public I also had to take into account the relations between
science and culture.
Ethnographic approaches to studying of experimental settings
Methodologically, the ethnographic fieldwork conducted for this study was the
means to  immerse a set of sociological concepts and problematics  within an
empirical setting. This does not mean that the fieldwork was simply an attempt
to confirm via empirical  study the validity of the proposition, developed in the
previous chapter, that  Oramics can be understood as an experiment.  Rather,
by going to a setting where the concept of the public experiment was being put
into practice, in this case by the Science Museum's curators, the ethnographic
fieldwork offered the prospect of  exploring  and problematising social theories
about  both  experiments  and  exhibitions.  The  practice  of  the  ethnographic
method  was  therefore  not  only  envisaged  as  the  instrumental  means  of
collecting data  for  subsequent  analysis.  Rather,  alongside  the  collection  of
observations I was also interested in how the practice of ethnography  might
49 Some of the central criticisms of the use of culture as an analytic category in anthropology 
include Clifford and Marcus (1986) and Abu-Lughod (1991). For a good overview see 
Brightman (1995). 
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itself  unsettle my own prior framing of  Oramics as an experiment  in  relations
between science and the public.  And indeed, when I subsequently found out
that  the  exhibition  would  be  about  electronic  music,  the  framing  of  the
exhibition as an experiment  in the relations between science and the public
became a much more complex proposition to advance.
The particular ethnographic methodology used in this study takes its influences
from studies of experiments  developed in science and technology studies.  In
these traditions ethnography provided largely a way for the researcher to offer
a  social  description  of  science  independent  of  both  theoretically
overdetermined  accounts  of  scientific  practice  in  epistemology  and  the
naturalised accounts of the practising scientists.  Different traditions  in social
studies  of  science  including  ethnomethdology  (Lynch,  1985),  social
constructivism (Knorr-Cetina, 1999), controversy studies  (Collins, 1981b) and
actor-network theory (Latour, 1999) have all used ethnographic techniques as
a means to study experiments. The uses of ethnographic techniques to study
experiments, often grouped together as 'lab studies', are often said to mark an
innovation that introduced a new kind of empirical focus into the social study of
science.   One  significant  character  of  lab  studies  was  the  capacity  of  the
ethnographer to  recast  the  experiments  by  playing  the  'stranger'  to  the
practising  scientists,  the  most  extreme  version  of  which  was  Latour  and
Woolgar's  (1986) anthropological descriptions of the lab scientists as if they
were  a  “tribe”  engaged  in  exotic  rituals.  Empiricising  the  social  study  of
experimental  science  through ethnographic  observation  therefore  could  be
said to offer social studies of science a very particular methodological solution
and way out of the bind between 'internal' and 'external' accounts of scientific
practice.  The  particular  capacities  of  ethnographic  techniques to  both  offer
micro  and  mundane  observations  of  the  experimental  practices  that  were
presented as 'extraordinary' by philosophers and scientists, have often been
pointed to as significant in establishing the possibility of empirically describing
experimental  practice  (Hess,  2001).  In  the lab  studies  tradition,  the  use of
ethnography is  therefore  not  only  an instrument through which to collect raw
data  or  to make the empirical  world  transparent  to sociological  description.
Rather, in this tradition of social studies of science, ethnographic observation is
also a method that in its practice demonstrates the possibility of sociologically
describing  the  experimental  practices  which  are  overdetermined  in  the
accounts of philosophers and scientists.
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One reason  for  situating  my  own use  of  ethnography  in  relation  to  social
studies of science is to highlight its specificity as an empirical  methodology.
This is not to  claim that  the techniques I practised as an ethnographer were
somehow radically distinct from those practised in other fields of anthropology
and  sociology.  From  the  perspective  of methodological  technique  and
procedure alone it is likely that my own use of ethnography is comparable and
even identical in many respects with research practices in fields as diverse as
organisational ethnography or urban ethnography, for instance. The specificity
of  using  ethnography  to  study  science  experiments,  I  suggest, is  not
distinguished from other  kinds of  ethnographic  research on the grounds of
research  techniques  or  procedures.  Rather,  as  we  see  in  the  laboratory
studies,  the  use  of  ethnography  to  study  experimental  practice  takes  on
methodological  significance in  its  relation to the analytical problems of social
studies of science: the bind of inside/outside distinctions of science, the over-
determination of the experiment in epistemology, and so on. To situate my own
use  of  ethnography  in  relation  to  this  tradition,  then,  is  to  highlight  the
importance of particular problematics to the orientation and development of the
empirical research.  In this sense,  my use of  ethnography can be understood
as  both  the  use of  a  particular  set  of  research techniques  coupled with a
particular  set of  analytical  commitments. By practising ethnography to study
the Oramics exhibition my research situates the significance of this empirical
object in relation to particular problematics in social studies of science. 
Social  studies  of  science have argued that  in  public  experiments empirical
objects  do  not  come  already  composed  but are  rather  the  subject  of
contestation between participants in the experiment (Irwin and Michael, 2003;
Latour,  2005b;  Law,  2004).  Such  studies  have  argued  instead  that  in  the
“mess” of experimental settings we find that methodology offers no guarantee
of a researcher's privileged capacity to represent the empirical object. Indeed,
in  experimental  settings  the  'special'  status  of  a  method  often  appears
problematic and the capacities of the researcher distributed in the practices of
heterogeneous actors:  for instance,  informants become theorists  (Callon and
Rabeharisoa,  2004),  expert  and  lay  participants  switch  roles  (Whatmore,
2009),  and  scientific  research  appears  difficult  to  distinguish  from  political
practice (Latour, 1993b; Stengers, 2005). These studies argue that procedural
accounts of methodology, as simply the  unproblematic  application of 'off-the-
shelf' techniques to the study of an empirical object, inadequately account the
ways in which experimental settings unsettle and redistribute the capacities of
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the researcher  to represent an empirical object (Marres, 2012b). Rather than
looking  to  methodology  for  the  epistemological  basis  on  which  to  ground
empirical  descriptions,  these studies suggest  that the study of experimental
objects  problematises  ontologies  of  method  that  would  separate  out  as
radically distinct  questions  of  research practice from the object  of  research
(Law, 2004)50. 
In attempting to shift methodological discussion away from abstract procedures
that are radically distinct from the objects they are used to describe,  several
traditions  in  the  social  studies  of  science  have  argued  that  rather  than
attempting  to  find  procedures  that  can ground empirical  descriptions  of  an
experimental object, social researchers should instead attend  to the  ways  in
which  the  experimental  object  becomes operationalised  in  the  practices  of
heterogeneous  actors  (Mol,  2002;  Latour  2005a)51.  One  version  of  this
approach to methodology has been called the “sociology of translation”; which
simply attempts to describe the different ways in which an experimental object
is translated in practice.  In doing so, the  sociology of  translation  attempts to
assemble  the  heterogeneous and distributed  actors participating in a public
experiment who are “concerned” by a particular empirical object (Callon et al.,
2009; Latour, 2005a). To study processes of translation is therefore to account
for  the  very  different  ways  in  which  an  object  of  one  group  of  actors  is
'problematised'52 by  the practices of  another.  Following the ways in which an
object becomes problematic in practice both reveals the distributed character
of that object and is a process of making associations between between very
different groups of actors. To describe the different ways in which an object is
translated the researcher describes an assemblage of different actors that are
concerned  around  it;  the  researcher describes  how  relations  are  created
between these actors and in doing so also assembles the experimental object. 
Another approach to the problem of studying a distributed object is found in
Annemarie Mol's (2003) ethnographic study,  The Body Multiple:  Ontology in
50 There is of course a long history of ethnographers challenging this account of the practice 
of ethnography, one significant account is Clifford's work on the character of ethnographic 
authority (see Clifford, 1983).
51 Another version of this argument has been called “multi-sited ethnography” (see discussion 
in Marcus, 1995).
52 The notion that researchers should account for the “problematisation” of empirical objects 
is not particular to actor-network theory but is found in other sociological traditions. One 
particular important version of problematisation is given by Michel Foucault (Foucault and 
Rabinow, 1997) who argued that to describe empirical objects through their 
problematisations is to facilitate the conditions for new modes of political action to develop, 
because problems, Foucault suggested, are means of unsettling and reordering relations 
between political actors. 
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Medical  Practice,  which  describes  a  methodological  approach  Mol  calls
“empirical  philosophy”:  an  approach  that  attempts  to  show  how  a  single
conceptual problem appears multiple and more complex when it is immersed
in  a  fieldwork setting.  Though  Mol's  theoretical  questions  come  from
philosophy  rather  than  social  science,  her  ethnographic  approach  is
nonetheless  relevant  to the question of  methodology discussed here.  Mol's
study  presents  an  ethnography  of  a  singular  object,  the  disease
atherosclerosis,  which  is diagnosed, analysed and treated across  a range of
settings in a hospital. Mol argues that an object like atherosclerosis has a very
different  ontology  depending  on  the  practice  in  which  it  is  “enacted”  (e.g.
outpatient  diagnosis  compared  with  pathology).  To  study  how the  singular
disease, atherosclerosis, can have very different  ontologies, Mol argues that
the  ethnographer  has  to  be  attentive  to  the  specificity  of  its  practical
enactments. Representation of the  empirical  object,  usually the monopoly of
the researcher, is in Mol's ontological approach distributed in the practices of
actors – doctors, patients, machines, tools, veins, forms, drugs – found across
the various departments of a hospital. Despite the ontological multiplicity of the
disease and the body of the individual patient it inhabits, Mol describes how
both  cohere  as  shared  objects  across  the  hospital.  The  singularity  of  the
disease and the patient body, Mol argues, is assembled  in the negotiations
and relations created  between different practices. Mol's  ontological approach
to ethnographic study thus permits  the ethnographer to  both account for  the
very  different  practices  used  to  enact  the  object  while  also  maintaining  its
singularity by describing the relations between these practices;  the forms of
coordination, collaboration and engagement between different actors through
which the singularity of the empirical  object is accomplished.  Mol's “empirical
philosophy”  approach highlights the ways in which  ethnography  can facilitate
the empirical exploration and development of concepts.  
Various  social  studies  of  science  exhibitions  have  used  ethnography  as  a
technique  to  explore  the  politics  of  knowledge  (Lavine  and  Karp,  1991;
MacDonald,  1998). In  relation  to my  study  one  significant  ethnographic
precedent  is found in Sharon MacDonald's  (2002) ethnographic study in the
late-1980s  of  the  making  of  an  experimental  exhibition  at  the  Science
Museum. As the title of MacDonald's study Behind the Scenes at the Science
Museum makes clear, the sociologist's role in observing the exhibition was to
get behind the appearance of the exhibition “to find out how it  works, what
kinds  of  passions  and  ideas  motivate  practice,  and  whether  and  how this
80
percolates into the science that is put on public display”. By getting behind the
scenes, MacDonald highlighted the role of the Museum's curatorial culture and
politics in shaping the way that the science and technologies of food (the focus
of the exhibition) were represented in  the gallery displays. This model of the
exhibition as a format of representation, therefore permitted the ethnographer
to get behind the scenes and to study what was taking place off-stage, behind
what was represented in the gallery displays. Significantly, MacDonald's study
concluded:
“What is also clear, then, is that there is no sovereign author: the 
agency to shape the outcome of the exhibition is distributed among 
multiple actors – non-human as well as human, conceptual as well 
as material. Nevertheless, it is distributed.” (2002, 256)
MacDonald's claim that exhibitions have “no sovereign author” is an argument
against the notion that exhibitions are simply the materialisation of a curator's
ideas and, hence, an extension of the critique of the exhibition conceived as a
space  of  representation.  Instead,  MacDonald  argues,  the  curating  of
exhibitions is “distributed”,  extending the scope of exhibition ethnography to
the  various  settings  where  the  knowledge  represented  in  an  exhibition
circulates. 
Unlike MacDonald, in this study I do not treat the  experimental exhibition as
principally an epistemological format which represents knowledge. Rather, as
the study of an experimental  exhibition one of the central  questions of this
thesis is precisely what kind of empirical object an exhibition is. As highlighted
in the previous chapter,  applying the concept of the public experiment to the
exhibition obliges us to approach the relations between science, culture and
the public as  not only epistemological but also ontological  matters.  For this
reason the question of the politics of knowledge, though one important way of
characterising  the  relations  between  science  and  the  public,  is  not  the
dominant  focus of the current study of the Oramics exhibition.  The politics of
knowledge is significant insofar as this seems to be precisely what the Science
Museum's curators are investigating in their co-curation experiments. Indeed,
one  way  to  understand  the  Science  Museum  curator's  experimental  co-
curation  approach  would  be  as  putting  MacDonald's  conclusion  about  the
distributed multiplicity of curatorial agency  into practice.  But  if  we extend the
question of the distribution of curatorial agency to the concerns of exhibition
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ontology,  as I argued for in the previous chapter, then we have to take into
account not only the  sites  where the politics of knowledge  is played out  but
also to other formats of publicity beyond the gallery displays. Ethnographically,
then,  to  study  the  exhibition  as  a  public  experiment  requires  treating  the
exhibition as an empirical object which is not limited to a single material site,
such as  a  gallery  display,  or in  a  single  procedure,  such as  the  curatorial
procedure,  but  instead  attempt  to  take  into  account  the  way  in  which this
empirical object is distributed in  multiple  modes  of experimental practice and
display.
Ethnographic  challenges:  the  experimental  exhibition  as
multiple and distributed object
In this section I'm going to  describe some of the events that  occurred in the
first six months of fieldwork that led to the  shift in  empirical  focus, from the
initial  focus  on  experimental  curatorial  practices  to  the  study  the  multiple
modes  and  styles of  experiment  that  we  find  in  the  Oramics exhibition.
Specifically,  I'm  going  to  describe my  experiences  of  observing  two “co-
curation”  procedures for  the  Oramics  exhibition.  Observing these procedures
threw up some important questions about how to study the Oramics exhibition
as an empirical object.  The  co-curation events may have been experimental
curatorial procedures for the Science Museum's curators but  as sociological
events  they seemed to be experimental in various other ways.  For instance,
the seemingly unrelated identities of the two groups (musicians and theatre
students, elaborated below), both to each other and to the Science Museum as
a scientific institution, highlighted the significance of the subject matter of the
exhibition – electronic music and the Oramics Machine – in establishing both
as  participants  in  the  experimental  exhibition.  Also  significantly,  my  own
relationship to the  Oramics exhibition became more complicated than simply
one of detached observer as I joined the group of musicians as a “co-curator”.
In  these  events  which  were  filmed,  photographed  and  blogged  by  various
participants I was clearly not the only observer. My status as an ethnographer
at these events therefore seemed both challenged – if I had assumed I would
be the only one making notes and describing these events, the presence of
note takers,  a  film maker,  and other observers, made clear I wasn't  -   and
expanded, as my experience as an amateur musician became a way for me to
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not  only  observe  but  also  to  participate  in  defining  the  exhibition's  subject
matter that would go on display in the gallery. In what follows I describe how
my  initial  attempts  to  use  ethnographic  techniques  to  study  the  curatorial
experiments  raised  the  problem  of  what  kind  of  empirical  object  the
experimental exhibition is and how to study it ethnographically.
My access to these “co-curation”  procedures was  depended heavily on  the
Science Museum's curators on whom I  relied  for information about locations,
times, and access to the participants.  The two groups  around whom the co-
curation processes were focused  were: (1)  a group of students on a course
with  the  National  Youth  Theatre  (NYT)  designed  for  young  people  not  in
education  or  employment  to  gain  the  qualifications needed to  enter  higher
education53, and  (2)  a group of electronic musicians who formed as a group
specifically  for  the  purpose  of  curating  three  cases  in  the  Oramics  gallery
displays. These two groups clearly have very different relations to the Science
Museum and the proposed focus of the exhibition, the Oramics Machine:  the
NYT  students  are  largely  comprised  of  individuals  'excluded'  from  formal
education and as a group hold no determinate relation to electronic music,
while the musicians are a group of amateur 'enthusiasts'  who use technology
to make electronic music. And indeed, my relation as an ethnographer with
these groups was very different: I attempted to observe the NYT students from
'outside'  while,  by  contrast,  I  became  part  of  the  co-curating  group  of
musicians. The co-curation events with the NTY students also involved a wide
range  of  other  collaborators  including  choreographers,  script  writers,  film
makers, students, a creative writer, a sound artist, and a range of staff from the
Science Museum including audience researchers,  members of  he outreach
team,  and  explainers.  By  contrast,  the  events  with  the  musicians  involved
principally this group and the  Museum's  curators along with an independent
film-maker. In the subsequent gallery displays of these co-curation processes
these other participants are largely absent. In what follows, then, my empirical
description of  the co-curation processes departs quite significantly from the
way in which they are made public in the gallery displays of Oramics. Where
the gallery displays present the Science Museum's curators as the 'convenors'
of the experiment and the NYT students and musicians as the 'participants',
my ethnographic descriptions feature many more participants in the curatorial
experiment.
53 On an access course for higher education, many of the students have previously been 
excluded from mainstream education establishments.
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In the early months of 2011, 6 months before the Oramics exhibition opened, I
observed the first co-curation procedure involving a series of five workshops
that  took  place  at  the  Science  Museum with  students  of  a  National  Youth
Theatre’s access course. As mentioned before, these were explicitly designed
for  young  people  not  in  education,  employment  or  training  to  gain  the
necessary qualifications to enrol on a higher education course. The  Science
Museum's curators had described the workshops in largely procedural terms to
me,  stating that  it  would  involve  five  workshops  focusing  on  the  Oramics
Machine with the aim of developing content for a performance by the students.
The workshops were  focused largely on  the Oramics Machine and Daphne
Oram's compositions with the students engaging in various activities including
sound recording, creative writing, watching and discussing films, and visiting
different parts of the Museum.  Present at each workshop were various staff
from  the  Museum  and  the  National  Youth  Theatre  and  the  workshops
themselves  were  run  by  different  associates  whom  the  Museum  had
contracted, including several academics: a creative writer, a computer scientist
and  a  sound  artist.  The  workshops  also  involved  staff  from  different
departments across the Museum, including the curators, outreach staff, gallery
explainers, and audience researchers, several of whom highlighted to me that
they had never met and that their departments rarely collaborated on projects.
The number of intermediaries participating in the event and facilitating the NYT
students working with the Science Museum's curators seem to highlight the
relative distance of this 'excluded' group from the institution and the concerns
of  science.  In the events  with the NYT students  the  Oramics  Machine,  the
object  of  focus, seemed  to  take  on  a  multiplicity  of  significances  for  the
different  actors  involved.  In  the  computer  scientist's54 presentation  to  the
workshop group, the Oramics Machine was a highly technical artefact that was
a forerunner of graphical computer music software.  In the curator's account
presented to  the students the Machine was an artefact  from the history  of
electronic music.  In films shown in the workshops, scored by Daphne Oram,
the  Oramics  Machine  was  enacted  as  an  experimental  instrument  for  film
composers. The sonic artist55 presented the Machine as an heir of Edwardian
recording  technologies,  recording  the  scripts  of  some  students  onto  wax
cylinders.  And, in  the  students'  performance (discussed below)  the Oramics
54 A presentation about the Oramics Machine by the computer scientist Mick Grierson can be 
found here: http://vimeo.com/50834273 (accessed 06 March 2014) 
55 An interview with the sonic artist Aleks Kolkowski discussing his role in the project here: 
http://jussiparikka.net/2011/04/11/%E2%80%9Csonic-alchemy%E2%80%9D-an-interview-
with-aleks-kolkowski/ (06 March 2014)
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Machine  appears as  the radical innovation of  an underdog pioneer,  Daphne
Oram, whom the students appropriate from the pedagogue scientists.   What
for the Science Museum's curators was an experimental curatorial  procedure
appeared  a  much more complex sociological event  involving multiple groups
and individuals and issues. 
Following the workshops the NYT students staged a multi-media performance
called Oramix  which  took  place  in  the  Science  Museum's  Flight  gallery at
various times over a week. Boon later asked me if I would produce an analysis
of  the  way  in  which  “science”  was  represented  in  the  NYT  students'
performance in order to assist the Museum's public history research, to which I
agreed.  The role of the NYT students as participants in a science exhibition
was clearly still a question for the Museum's curators. Boon asked me to treat
the performance as a work of art that contained stories and which encoded the
encounter of the students with the Science Museum. Following this broadly
structuralist  mandate,  the  analysis  I  produced  drew  on  a  video  of  the
performance  and  a  draft  rehearsal  script  provided  by  NYT. The  analysis  I
submitted described  the performance  as  an encounter between a groups of
students and  sound  scientists,  in which the latter attempted to educate the
students  about  the  pioneering  work  of  Daphne  Oram.  The  trope  of  the
pedagogical relationship between the scientific institution and the students was
central to the organisation of the performance. But this trope is also subverted:
the  students  challenge  the  scientists  arguing  that  they  do  not  need  to  be
educated  about  sound  science  because  they  already  “know”  music,
demonstrating this through a series of scenes in which movement replaces
dialogue. The scientists do not reappear and the performance ends with the
students appropriating Daphne Oram  from the sound scientists  as  someone
with  whom they  identify:  an underdog  who  realised  her  own ambition  and
became a  pioneer  in  spite  of  considerable  hardship  and  obstacles.  In  my
analysis I suggested that the brief given to the students that the performance
should “reflect their [the students] experience” with the Museum appeared to
have followed quite literally –  the main focus of the performance being the
encounter between the students and the scientists who attempt to educate the
latter  about  Daphne  Oram  –  and  that  traces  of  the  workshops  appeared
throughout.  And indeed, I was not  alone in suggesting this. One video of the
performance also included an interview with Boon who enthuses about  what
he's just seen. Boon suggests  in the interview  that he thinks he might have
been “spoofed” in the performance's depiction of the sound scientists, adding
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“but I'm not even a scientist”. The findings of my analysis and Boon's response
to the students' performance, both of which identified traces of the co-curating
workshops, raised significant questions about the status of these events for the
participants; who had ownership over these events and the ends to which they
were used. Moreover, it also highlighted that the status of science in Oramics
was in question both for the curators and for the students. The entangled and
complex character of  the performance was perhaps one of the contributing
factors  to  the  curators'  decision  to  give  it  only  very  limited  display  in  the
Oramics gallery, as a two-minute edit of some of its scenes incorporated into a
longer loop of other video content.
 
I was not the only observer of the co-curation workshops with the students.
Notably, a film crew comprised of a participatory arts company and students
from City University were producing a documentary about the project56 and
various staff from the Museum, including curators and audience researchers,
also  dropped  in  to  observe  workshops.  In  observing  the  workshops  I  had
usually positioned myself with the other observers at the back or to one side of
the  room,  making  clear  my  detachment  from  the  process  taking  place.
However,  the distinctions between the  observers and observed were not so
easy to make. The multiplicity of identities among observers of the process –
the  various  museum  staff,  the  camera  crew,  the  NYT  staff,  the  audience
researchers – gave observation multiple significances.  For some participants,
the scale of observation was deemed to be a problem. The Museum's internal
evaluation of the project called 'Lessons Learned', conducted by the audience
research  department,  was  highly  critical  of  the  scale  of  observation.  The
evaluation report noted:
“The participants themselves [the NYT students] were very unsure 
of who was involved, where everyone was from (multi-partner 
project) and how they were contributing to the project. This led to 
some of them reporting that they felt like ‘guinea pigs’ – pawns in an 
experiment done by people they didn’t know and for reasons they 
were unsure of.” 
The evaluation report was critical of the way in which the workshops had been
conducted:  the  various  observers,  it  argues,  left  the  students  feeling  like
56 This project video can be found at:  http://www.togetherproductions.co.uk/oramix.html (access 10th 
December 2011)
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experimental  subjects57. The  observers,  of  which  I  was  one,  are,  in  the
evaluation  report,  described  to  have  created  obstacles  to  realising  the
collaborative  aims  of  the  curatorial  experiment.  Far  from  being  neutral
outsiders  to  the  experimental  process,  the  evaluation  suggests  that  the
observers appeared conspicuous to those they thought they were observing.
And yet, that participants like Boon recognised themselves and the workshop
process in the students' performance suggests that the capacity for observing
and recording the workshops was also a capacity of the students. Although the
museological  perspective  of  the  Audience  Research  evaluation  locates  the
capacity to observe in many actors except the students, if  we focus on the
performance  which  left  Boon  amused  that  he  was  “spoofed”  suggests  the
students were also observing the co-curation process. In this sense, observing
the  co-curation  process  appeared  as  a  capacity  of  several  of  the  actors
involved and seemed to be materialised in quite different media, including a
report,  a  film  and  a  performance.  Should  these  other  publicity  media  be
counted  as  equally  part  of  the  Oramics  exhibition  alongside  the  gallery
displays that would eventually materialise? If not, in what ways is it meaningful
to consider the theatre performers as “co-curators” of the exhibition? And, what
would be left out of an ethnographic description of these workshops as simply
curatorial procedures? Such questions suggested to me the need to revisit the
question of what kind of experiment the Oramics exhibition might be said to be,
and the methods required to study it as an empirical object.
Other,  often  similar, complexities  were apparent  in  the  second  co-curation
experiment I observed involving a group of 12 electronic musicians. Unlike the
first co-curation with the NYT students which I had observed as an outsider to
the  group,  in  this  group  I  participated as  one  of  the  group  of  electronic
musicians.  Being  an  amateur  musician  and  having  tinkered  making  laptop
music,  the  Science  Museum's  curators  invited  me  to  join  the  group  and
become a “co-curator”.  In contrast with  the  NYT students, who were already
constituted as a group prior to their engagement with the co-curation process,
the contemporary electronic musicians were formed as a group through the co-
curation process. The participants were recruited via an online advert on the
Museum's blog and social media58. They numbered 12 in total and included
57 For the audience researchers, the workshops should have been a process of the Museum 
working collaboratively with groups who are under-represented, but the experience of the 
students interviewed for the evaluation report suggested that the workshops in fact worked 
counter to this aim. See further discussion in Chapter Four.
58 This advert can be found at:  http://sciencemuseumdiscovery.com/blogs/insight/electronic-musicians-
wanted/ (accessed 15 April 2013)
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practising  musicians,  artists,  DJs,  journalists,  software  developers,  and
academics.  All  participated  in  a  series  of  5  workshops,  and  many  clearly
demonstrated  an  awareness  that  the  process  of  co-curation  was  linked  to
particular concerns  in  the Science Museum  about broadening the appeal of
their exhibitions beyond the immediate focus on Daphne Oram and electronic
music: for example, during introductions one participant noted that they'd run
similar processes for art organisations to engage with external groups. Even if
the such concerns hadn't been made explicit, they were built into the structure
of  the  co-curation  process  through  which  the  group  was  formed;  the
workshops featuring a significant focus on the challenges of museology and
curating at the Science Museum alongside the focus on the Oramics Machine.
The five workshops included: an introduction to the Science Museum and the
Oramics  Machine,  and  the  planned  Oramics  exhibition;  a  tour  of  the
conservation department, the Museum's electronic instrument collection, and
an early session on exhibition planning; a tour of the  Oramics  gallery space
and an exhibition planning session with the Museum's audience researchers; a
meeting  with  original  members  of  the  BBC  Radiophonic  Workshop  and
Electronic Music Studios, and; the making of detailed thematic plans for three
cases. This co-curation process was therefore also presented by the Science
Museum's  curators  as  a  procedure of  group  formation  in  relation  to  the
concerns  of  the  Oramics  Machine,  electronic  music  and  curating  at  the
Science Museum. 
Though  presented  as  a  group  in  the  gallery  displays  and  publicity  for  the
exhibition,  it  seemed  clear  that  all  of  the  individuals  in  the  co-curation
experiment had joined the process to advance  their own  particular interests,
from promoting their art/music, collaborating with other musicians, advertising
their business or  to  developing their careers in particular ways. Many of the
musicians,  for  instance, kept  blogs59 in  which  they  would  document  and
comment  on  the  process  of  co-curation  alongside  other  posts  about  their
interests  as  musicians  and  artists.  Others  wrote  or  gave  interviews  for
magazines60.  Others featured  in  podcasts discussing the Oramics Machine61.
One participant from a music tech company sponsored the drinks reception for
the exhibition.  After meeting Peter Zinovieff of the Electronic Music Studios,
59 See for example: http://www.fluid-radio.co.uk/2011/06/history-of-electronic-music-week-one    , 
http://www.djdownfall.com/post/7054240334/we-have-harmonies-which-you-have-not and 
http://jobinatinnemans.com/category/sound-art/ (all accessed on 15 April 2013)
60 See, for example: http://www.m-magazine.co.uk/features/m-captures-oramics-opening/ 
(access 06 March 2014)
61 See, for example: http://www.sonicstate.com/news/2011/07/21/podcast-sonic-talk-226-a-
dalek-from-birmingham/ (accessed 06 March 2014)
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one  of  the  participants  worked with  him on an interactive  computer  music
piece62.  Another  produced  a  radio  show  about  the  exhibition63.Others
collaboratively arranged a synth/noise concert at one of the Science Museum's
Late events. And,  in an email chain that was set up during the co-curation,
there  were  many  discussions  about  collaborations  on  a  range  of  projects
ranging from small concerts to large scale sonic art exhibitions. 
In  this  sense,  the  presentation  of  the  musicians as  a  group  in  the  gallery
displays  appeared to  assimilate  many  of  the  practical  differences  between
members  of  the  group.  The  gallery  displays created  by  the  musicians
comprised three cases of objects  addressing the history of electronic music
thematically. The emphasis of the case displays was to represent the diversity
of  electronic  music  history.  The  themes  of  the  cases  were:  (1)  the
democratisation of electronic music  (represented largely as the shift towards
cheap, mass-produced technologies), (2) sonic frontiers (emphasising the role
of algorithmic and sampling techniques in sonic invention), and (3) make do
and mend (suggesting the DIY ethos of electronic music). Each case display
comprised  a  different  theme  represented by  the  objects  assembled inside,
comprising mixtures of historical and contemporary music technology, home-
made and  mass  produced  instruments,  and  artefacts  associated  with  both
popular and art-music forms of electronic music. And yet, though these objects
might  represent a diverse  perspective on electronic music history, they also
present a distinctly museological approach to the task of co-curating; in effect
evidencing the successful assimilation of the musicians into museum curators.
This point is further suggested in the documentary film about the making of the
exhibition  which,  shown  in  the gallery's  cinema, stages  the  co-curation
procedure as a process of consensus. The workshops with the musicians were
filmed  from  the  beginning  by  an  independent  film  maker64 who  had  been
contracted by the Museum's curators. The film maker created  the 11-minute
documentary  of  the  co-curation  process  that  is  on  display  in  the  gallery's
cinema, as well as on the exhibition's webpage65,  its procedural focus clearly
stated in the gallery as “a documentary about how we made this exhibition”.
The  documentary  replays  the  central  issues  around  which  the  group  of
musicians formed: the film begins with an interview in which Boon discusses
the public history project, the co-curation process and the  Oramics Machine.
62 For more information see: http://jobinatinnemans.com/2011/11/08/mess-zinovieff-
tinnemans/ (accessed 06 March 2014)
63 See: http://ntslive.co.uk/17051/ (accessed 06 March 2014)
64 This video can be found at:  http://vimeo.com/29318062 (accessed 15 April 2013)
65 See: http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/ORAMICS (accessed 9th April 2013)
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The film then evidences Boon's narrative,  showing the group of musicians in
various scenarios discussing the Machine, electronic music, and the task of
curating part  of  the exhibition  (in  which I  appear  in one section discussing
genres of  electronic  music).  In  interviews,  individual  participants are shown
speaking,  expressing  their  views  and  aspirations  for  the  exhibition;  the
participants are shown to agree with  and consent to  the film's narrative.  This
emphasis in the gallery displays on consensus between the participants and
the success of this groups in curating an exhibition in the style of museum
curators  appeared,  on  one hand,  relatively  unproblematic  since few of  the
group members contested the film or the exhibition displays to any significant
extent. However, on the other hand, the emphasis on consensus in the gallery
displays also seemed  necessarily  to  omit  from these displays  much of  the
complexity of the events that I had participated in and observed. 
 
Two methodological problems were raised as a result of my experiences in
observing  and participating in  these experimental  curatorial procedures:  first,
the  object  of  the  study,  the  experimental  exhibition,  appeared  much  more
complex than I  had anticipated and, second, the capacity to observe these
events which I had naively assumed was the monopoly of the ethnographer
was clearly also the capacity of other actors in the setting. These two problems
are linked insofar as they are predicated on a particular assumption  that  the
events  I  was  observing  were  principally  the  Science  Museum's  curators
experimental  procedures  and  that  the  gallery  displays  would  mark  their
closure. In fact, it seemed clear that the gallery displays, alone, offer only a
very limited account of what I experienced to be experimental in these events.
Instead, it  seemed to me that  much of complexity  that I  observed in these
events  – the  range of  participants,  my different ethnographic experiences in
these events, and the  variety  of  forms of  publicity  (blogs, performance, film,
concerts,  and so on)  – was deeply  significant  to  appreciating  the particular
ways  in  which  Oramics  could  be  said  to  be  an experiment.  Rather  than
assuming  that  the  co-curation  workshops  were  only  the  experimental
procedures  of  the  Science  Museum's  curators,  it  seemed  to  me  more
promising  to  consider  these  workshops  as  events  that  were  more
experimentally complex in terms of the  modes and styles of experiment  and
the distribution  of  experimental  publicity. This  subsequently  required  me to
rethink how to describe the experimental exhibition as an empirical object, and
to specify the particular ways in which it  might be considered experimental
beyond the curatorial experiment.  In other words, to attend the experimental
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exhibition  not  only  as  a  single  procedure  or  site  but  as  a  multiple  and
distributed object.
Objections: too much complexity, too little agency? 
In what follows I'm going to argue that attending to the experimental exhibition
as a multiple and distributed object  does not mean abandoning ethnographic
practices:  ethnographic  researchers  have  long  debated the  use  of  this
methodology for studies beyond single sites, such as multiple settings or of
objects in circulation  (for instance, Marcus, 1995). However, attending to the
exhibition as an empirical object that is distributed across multiple modes of
experiment does require reformulating some of the claims that are often made
on behalf of the methodology,  principally that  method  can  unproblematically
provide the epistemological grounding on which to distinguish the knowledge
claims of  social  scientists  from other knowledge claims  about  the empirical
object.  I'm  going  to  elaborate  this  argument  by  exploring two  significant
objections  to  the  proposition  that  the  experimental  exhibition  constitutes  a
multiple  and  distributed  object  and  that  the  task  of  the  ethnographer  is  to
assemble these distributed versions of the object rather than using method as
the  ground  to  claim  priority  to  represent  it.  The  first  objection  is  that  by
adopting this account the ethnographer gives up too much autonomy and risks
passively accepting at face-value, and thus naturalising, the accounts given by
powerful actors at the expense of the articulations of the empirical object in the
practices  of  less  powerful  actors.  In  effect,  this  objection  proposes  that  in
giving up their monopoly claim to represent the object the researcher simply
reinforces  hegemonic  and  asymmetric  arrangements that  structure  an
empirical  setting.  The  second  related  objection  is  that  by  attempting  to
describe the  heterogeneous actors and distributed settings mobilised  by  an
experimental object the ethnographer makes the empirical site too complex to
say anything sociologically meaningful about it. One argument levelled against
such  approaches,  like  actor-network  theory  for  instance, is  that they  have
simply adopted an ontology of method that assumes empirical complexity and
in  doing  so  have sacrificed sociological  explanation  in  favour  of  mere
description  (Collins and Yearley, 1992).  In what follows I suggest that these
objections give us an insight into events that occurred during my study of the
Oramics experiment. In elaborating and countering these objections I go on in
the following section to demonstrate what we gain through an attentiveness to
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the Oramics exhibition as an empirical object that is distributed across multiple
modes of experiment.
 
One of the central risks of attending to the distribution of an empirical object is
that  the  ethnographer  unintentionally  ends  up  'going  native':  that  is,  the
ethnographer  becomes  naïve  about  the  empirical  setting  and  fails  to
distinguish their own sociological account from their informants. The gesture of
ethnographers to gain “behind the scenes” access to the empirical setting has
been  one of the central ways in which researchers have attempted to avoid
such  empirical  naïvety.  In  such  accounts,  ethnography  is  invested  with
privileged  access  to  an  empirical  setting while  also  maintaining the
distinctiveness  of  the ethnographer's  account  from other  participants  in  the
setting. By virtue of their methodology, the ethnographer maintains the reality
of their own description of the setting as distinct from both a priori theoretical
accounts and from the local  native accounts.  As Clifford  (1983) notes,  this
mode of authority has been defining of ethnography since it was pioneered by
early  social  anthropologists.  Anthropologists  like  Malinowski,  for  instance,
opposed the ethnographer's capacity to access the “native's point of view” with
what they saw as the  naïve comparative approach of the  Victorian 'armchair'
anthropologists. So too,  similar  claims about  ethnography are found in social
studies of science and technology  which  also  present  their methodology as
offering a critique of the unrealistic and abstract accounts of science given by
both  philosophical  theories and  scientist's  practical  accounts  (Bloor,  1976).
Indeed,  the  use  of  ethnography  in  fields  like  the  public  understanding  of
science enact similar gestures of “contextualising” abstract diffusion models of
science communication and redescribing public engagement with science as a
political practice (for a discussion, see Irwin and Michael, 2003; Wynne, 1995).
As social anthropologists have long debated (for example, Clifford and Marcus,
1986), in giving up the gesture  of ethnographic realism the researcher risks
sacrificing the methodological ground on which  to demarcate their  accounts
from accounts of the setting given by outsiders and insiders. The proposition of
redistributing the  task  of  ethnographically researching the  experimental
exhibition  therefore  risks  sacrificing  the  methodology  that  enabled  the
ethnographer  to  tack  back and forth  between the  native  accounts  and  the
theoretical  frame and  which  made the  ethnographic  researcher  a powerful
figure in modern social research. 
This risk was particularly clear in the case of my relationship with the Science
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Museum's  curators  on  whom  I  depended  for  the  access  and  information
necessary  to  carry  out  ethnographic  observation  of  the  experimental  co-
curation processes.  The curators' accounts of these experiments were often
developed  through  reference  to  ideas  from  social  studies  of  science  and
technology, and as seasoned academic researchers their familiarity with these
ideas was in many cases more advanced than my own. The proximity between
the  curators'  accounts  and  my  own,  often  drawing  on  similar  texts  and
vocabularies,  therefore  increased  the  likelihood  of  my  complicity  with  the
curators' framing of the experiment (which they called “public history”). Indeed,
'going  native'  emerged  as  an  explicit  issue when during  my  study  a  new
Department of Research and Public History was launched in the Museum. At
the launch event I found my thesis featured on this list of 10 PhD students
affiliated with the new Department; the title named as the following:
“Public History and Making Audiences for Science”
Though  I  have  given  my  research  several  titles  during  the  course  of  its
development,  none  have  ever  included  the  concept  of  “public  history”.
Significantly,  at  the  launch  event  my  thesis  appeared  as  the  only  one
addressing the new Department's focus on public history.  At the  launch,  my
research appeared as the only study attempting to advance the public history
agenda of the new Department: not only was I presented as a researcher for
the Science Museum but my research was also publicising the curators' public
history agenda. In this setting the independence of my ethnographic account of
the  experimental  exhibition  appeared conflated  with  the  Science Museum's
curators; my research had become about the curation of history in museums
and the development of new audiences for science exhibitions.
At this event it was clear that my research was “enrolled” in the curators' public
history project. However, being “enrolled”, I suggest, is not the same as 'going
native'. Going  native  suggests  that  the  ethnographer  uses  the  native's
categories in their own account. It is a criticism that suggests that studying the
Oramics exhibition as an “experiment” uses a 'native' category,  since this is
how the Science Museum's curators describe the exhibition.  In this respect,
the 'going native' criticism  presupposes that the natives of this ethnographic
study are the Science Museum's curators and that they hold the monopoly to
account  for  the  exhibition.  In  the  'going  native'  account,  the  “co-curation”
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process would appear as procedural decision taken by the Science Museum's
curators to extend their own curatorial authority to other actors. Events such as
Boon's experience of being “spoofed” in the NYT students' performance, would
simply  appear  as momentary  disruptions  to  a  curatorial  procedure  that  is
otherwise under the control of the Science Museum curators. In other words, it
is  an  account  of  co-curation  in  which  curatorial  authority  for  the  Oramics
experiment remains  the  monopoly  of  the  Science  Museum's  curators.
However, as the analysis of the co-curation processes made clear, the gallery
displays of  Oramics  are not the only  formats of  experimental publicity.  In the
above analysis  I  have  highlighted how the curators'  account  of  co-curation
processes, that we find in the gallery displays, gives a very limited account of
these processes when compared with my own ethnographic experiences. If we
mistake my enrolment in the public history project, at this very specific event,
for  the  much  broader  problem  of  'going  native',  we  would  close  out  all
discussion  of  other  kinds  of  relations  between  myself  and  the  Science
Museum's  curators.  By  contrast,  if  we  allow that  there  might  be  multiple
'natives' of the experimental setting, then the experimental setting appears less
clearly structured by a single hegemonic arrangement of power. This is not to
suggest that power relations are absent from the setting, but rather that they
are  not  determining  of  the  experiment.  The  actor-network  theory  (ANT)
concept of “enrolment” offers one account of the ways in which power relations
can  both  exist  in  an  experimental  setting  and  appear  contingent  and
indeterminate in their exercise. In ANT, the “enrolment” of one actor by another
is an attempt to demonstrate and mobilise a power relation and it is the main
way in which actors create relations with one another. However, as many ANT
studies have highlighted, enrolment is also always a process that risks betrayal
by those who are enrolled (for a discussion, see Callon, 1986). For this reason,
successful enrolment is more often a sign that there is a common proposition
of  interest  to  both  actors,  or  groups  of  actors,  rather  than  the  exercise  of
absolute  subordination  or  control  of  one  actor  over  another  actor (Latour,
2004). Rather than generalising the relation of the ethnographer to the setting,
that is implied in the 'going native' critique, I suggest here that the concept of
enrolment allows us to account for my close relation to the Science Museum's
curators, and to their  public history account of the Oramics experiment, while
also  allowing  that  there  are  other  styles  of  experiment  and  formats  of
experimental publicity beyond the Museum's gallery displays. At the launch of
the new department, my enrolment in the public history research programme
seems more obviously to demonstrate limited extension of the curators' public
history  account  – the  Museum's  curators  need  to  enrol  PhD  students to
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demonstrate the saliency of the public history research programme – rather
than a generalised co-option of my ethnographic research.
The second objection to this methodological focus on the distributed character
of  the  experimental  object argues  that by  making  this  decision  the
ethnographer  imposes  too  much  complexity  on  the  empirical  setting.  An
important  line of  argument here is that  by making the  experimental  setting
complex,  the  ethnographer  gives  up  explanatory  power  and  is  reduced  to
simply  describing  differences between actors.  To impose complexity on the
empirical  setting,  in  this  argument,  is  to  adopt  an  extreme epistemological
relativism in which all accounts of the experiment are equally valid.  Indeed,
epistemological  relativism  has  been  a  key  methodological  tool  for
ethnographers  studying  experimental  controversies  in  the  sociology  of
scientific  knowledge  tradition  (SSK)  (Collins,  1981b;  Shapin,  1995;  Wynne,
1992b).  Methodological  relativism  enabled  the  ethnographer  to  treat
symmetrically the  competing  knowledge  claims  of  different  participants  in
experimental  controversies.  Complexity  was  therefore  in  this  sociological
tradition  a  methodological  tool  for  studying  scientific  controversies
ethnographically  and avoiding asymmetrical explanations that occurred post-
closure (i.e. that the victor in the controversy won because their account was
more true,  accurate,  rigorous  etc).  But,  crucially  in  this  tradition  the
symmetrical method was  not extended to the level of analytical explanation:
methodological  relativism  was  supplemented  in  the  analytical  stages  of
research  with  social  theories  of  interests,  power  and  action.  In  this  way
ethnographers in the sociology of scientific  knowledge were spared from the
criticism that they had both imposed too much complexity onto the empirical
setting and that  their accounts were mere descriptions with  no explanatory
power.  To extend  the  relativism to  the  modes  of  explaining  the  closure  of
controversies would, for SSK researchers, be to debunk the entire endeavour
of creating objective knowledge about the world (Barnes et al., 1996). 
One significant limitation of the limited methodological relativism of SSK for the
current study arises on the matter of experimental  closure. However complex
and disputed they appear when studied close-up,  for SSK experiments are
ultimately  (social)  procedures  for  constructing  knowledge  that  are  always
settled  at  some  point.  The  closure  of  experiments  therefore  contains  and
delimits the complexity which the relativist ethnographer has to account for.
Disentangling  themselves  from  the  experimental  complexity,  SSK
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ethnographers therefore maintain the power to explain experiments  using a
sociological  analytic that is  'external' to the empirical complexity it describes.
But,  as  their  critics  have  pointed  out,  this  attempt  to  both  admit  empirical
complexity and maintain the plausibility of detached sociological explanation
seems to reintroduce the problem of  asymmetry into the social description of
science  (Callon  and  Latour,  1992),  for  instance  between  internal/external
accounts of science that ethnographic study attempted to get beyond.  It has
been argued, for example, that the attempt of the SSK account to maintain an
independent  role  for  sociological  explanation  has  to  effectively  deny that
'internal'  participants  of  experiments  have any purchase on explaining how
experiments close  (Galison,  1987).  By  contrast,  the  proposition  that  the
ethnographic  study  of  experiments  requires  attending  ontologically  to  the
distribution  of  experimental  objects,  enables  us  to  repose  the  problem  of
experimental  analysis  without  reimposing  asymmetries  in  sociological
explanation,  for  instance  between internal/external and  open/closed
experiments.  From  this  perspective,  experiments  do  not  'close'66,  in  the
instrumental  sense of a single linear procedure,  because every translation of
the experiment by different actors – as method, as fact, as invention, as history
etc – modifies the experiment in some way (on the sociology of translation, see
Callon, 1986).  If we foreground the question of the ongoing translation of the
experiment rather than its closure, we find that the multiple modes of practice,
style and forms of publicity that we find in Oramics all participate in assembling
the exhibition as an experiment. In other words, we allow that the experiment
is both distributed, multiple and dynamic:  the experiment ends when it stops
being  translated.  The  complexity  of  experimental  settings,  then,  is  not
antithetical  to the closure of  an  experiment  and the process of  sociological
analysis but is rather necessary to describing how experiments are assembled.
Complexity is not antithetical to the successful 'closed' experiment but is rather
a condition of inventive processes.
To treat experiments as sites of invention we have to accept that complexity is
there  in  the  setting  and  that  it  isn't  simply  an  arbitrary  choice  that  the
researcher  imposes  or  rescinds  at  their  discretion.  As  discussed  in  the
literature  review  of  the  previous  chapter,  if complexity  is  simply  a
methodological  choice,  as  it  is for  SSK researchers  (Barnes  et  al.,  1996;
Collins,  1981b),  this  leaves  the  social  researcher  unable  to  account  for
66 Though I would occasionally be reminded by senior staff at the Science Museum that they 
couldn't be expected to experiment all the time, in the museum setting experimental 
'closure' appeared much less of a concern than it perhaps is in the laboratory settings 
studied by SSK. 
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experimental  inventions except  as  social  constructs;  the  world  of  things
remains unaffected by the scientist's contingent representations.  In Chapter
Two, by contrast,  I  argued that  experimental settings are complex precisely
because  they  introduce and  domesticate new  'things'  into  the  world  and
unsettle  existing  empirical  arrangements.  Inventions  are  not  only  social
constructs but are ontological novelties. By limiting complexity to the choices of
scientists representing the world, SSK suggests that experiments create social
novelty but do not fabricate new things in the  natural  world. The attempts to
limit complexity to a methodological choice in the SSK account makes clear an
important trade-off:  to maintain that experiments invent new empirical things,
objects,  actors  (and  so  on) we  cannot  simply  limit  complexity  to  the
representations of scientists or the methodological choices of ethnographers.
To account for experiments as processes that produce ontological novelty we
must  allow  the  empirical  world  the  capacity  to  increase  and  decrease
complexity  in  the  same  way  that  SSK  grants  to  ethnographers. In  this
perspective, to follow-through the proposition of  the Oramics exhibition as an
experiment  is  to  methodologically  approach  the  exhibition  as  assembled
across multiple and distributed settings, practices and formats of display.
Conclusion:  a  thematic  account  of  Oramics  as  a  public
experiment
In this chapter I have discussed several important methodological problematics
that  have shaped the direction  of  the  research and its  presentation  in  this
thesis.  It  is  worth  here  restating  them  in  order  to  show why  the  analysis
presented in subsequent chapters is arranged thematically. 
The central research question that has guided this research is  in what ways
the  Oramics  exhibition  might  be  considered  an  experiment  in  relations
between science and the public. In the process of this ethnographic research
this question appeared increasingly challenging to answer principally because
there appeared to be multiple modes of experiment at work in Oramics; namely
the  curatorial  experiment,  experimental  electronic  music  and  experimental
display.  Not  only  was  the  register  of  science  conspicuously  absent  from
Oramics,  but  as  an  empirical  object  the  exhibition  appeared  much  more
complex both than models of the exhibition as curatorial procedure and gallery
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display would allow.  The experiment is,  in this sense, not only a discursive
category used by the Science Museum's curators (though it is this too) but also
modes of  socio-material  practice that we find  in  electronic music  and in the
gallery displays and other  forms of  publicity. Furthermore,  the  challenges  I
experienced in attempting to practice ethnographic techniques highlighted that
methodological  claims alone  would  provide  only  very  weak  epistemological
ground  on  which  to  distinguish  my  empirical  descriptions  of  the  Oramics
exhibition from those of other participants in the experimental setting.  While I
had envisioned myself as the observing ethnographer it seemed clear that my
background  as  an  amateur  musician  was  also  important  in  structuring  my
relation  with  the  setting  (as  a co-curator,  for  instance)  but  also  for  making
relations  with  informants  who  could  help  me situate  the  Oramics  Machine
within electronic music history. Rather, than putting aside my amateur interests
as irrelevant to the sociological study I wanted to conduct, it seemed that this
background  could  in  fact  help  me  appreciate  more  clearly  why  the
'rediscovered'  Oramics Machine  was such an interesting object to so many
different actors. Accepting the complexity of the ethnographic task, I therefore
chose to broaden the ethnographic focus and attend to what seemed like the
three most significant  modes of experiment that we find in  Oramics.  In this
way, I sought to collect data through which I might elaborate the proposition
that the exhibition can be understood as an experiment in relations between
science,  culture  and  the  public.  This  was  a  methodology  through  which  I
sought to give a social description of the experimental exhibition that was at
once  symmetrical  with  respect  to  the  different  modes  of  experiment  and
capable of describing the exhibition as material practice.
The empirical  material  collected in  the  empirical  research for  this  thesis  is
therefore  of  quite  different  styles:  field  notes  from  events  at  the  Science
Museum and interviews with staff working there sit alongside media publicity
about Daphne Oram and the Oramics Machine, archive materials,  recordings
of concerts, installations in other exhibitions, and notes about electronic music
histories. In the analysis that follows I have attempted to  construct thematic
analysis that addresses the central proposition of the thesis – how the Oramics
exhibition can be understood as an experiment in relations between science,
culture and the public – and in which I can bring together these very different
kinds of materials. The first theme is “participation” (Chapter Four) and is one
of the central concepts around which the  curatorial experiment  is organised.
Participation,  as  I  treat  it  here,  is  not  simply  a  question  of  techniques  of
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inclusion or of the competencies of a given group but  also about particular
issues in the role of culture in the Science Museum.  The second theme is
“exclusion”  (Chapter Five)  and  centres its analysis on  the  ways in which the
experimental  public  displays  can  be said  to  both  unsettle  and  to  reinforce
asymmetries in relations  between  science and culture.  Exclusion here is not
only a social problem for science to solve but, I suggest, is a more complex
problem of  the relations  between objectivity  and subjectivity, rationality  and
aesthetics. The final theme is “media” and addresses the  exhibition's subject
mater of experimental electronic music. Focusing on the staging of electronic
music  in  Oramics  as  experimental  collaborations  between  musicians  and
engineers,  the chapter  examines the particular capacities of  sound (such as
auditory  engagement)  as  an  experimental  medium.  These  themes  were
arrived at after the empirical data was collected, and they are designed to both
reflect the central concerns of the research and some of the ways in which the
Oramics exhibition might be said to be inventive as material practice.
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4.  Participation:  the  curatorial  experiment  and  the
'cultural turn' at the Science Museum 
Introduction
The front cover of the Science Museum Group's67 2011-2012 Annual  Review
(2012a) features one large slogan: “Five museums; world-beating collections;
one powerful  cultural  force”.  What connects the Group's science museums,
railway  museums  and  the  media  museum  is,  the  front  cover suggests,
“culture”.  The 2011-2012  Annual  Review  is  significant  insofar  as  it  is  the
vehicle  through  which the  Science  Museum's  new  director Ian  Blatchford
published a manifesto outlining a series of reforms for the family of museums
over a ten year period. The cultural offer of the Science Museum is elaborated
in Blatchford's manifesto, in which he writes:
“Ultimately, the Science Museum Group rejects the idea of science 
and culture leading parallel lives. Our kaleidoscopic collections 
show so vividly that science has always been part of culture. The 
collections are an epic story about civilisation and human ingenuity, 
as vital as anything on the walls of the British Museum or the 
National Gallery. And it is hardly surprising that planned 
partnerships with music, drama, dance, literature and film are very 
popular with scientists.” (4)
In this chapter I am going to argue that Blatchford's manifesto is one symptom
of a broader 'turn to culture' at the Science Museum. Blatchford's remarks tell
us both that science and technology have always been part of culture and that
the Science Museum is a cultural institution comparable with art and national
history museums. In this sense, Blatchford's manifesto might be said to bring
together two distinct ideas of culture that are important to distinguish between
for the analysis of the following chapter. In one version, which might be called
the  liberal  humanist68 version,  science  museums  are  considered  institutions
67 The Science Museum Group is the name given to the family museums under the Science 
Museum and includes the National Media Museum, the National Railway Museum, and the 
Museum of Science and Industry in Manchester. More information can be found at the 
following web page: http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/about_us/smg.aspx (accessed 21st 
August 2013) 
68 The association between Blatchord's statements on culture and those of nineteenth 
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that represent the progress of enlightenment. Science museums, on this view,
are repositories of those elements of culture that need to be preserved from
the churn of social life. Characterising museums as institutions of 'high-culture',
this view locates science museums within a hierarchical understanding of the
relations between science and  society.  The liberal humanist view of culture
has often been contrasted with the anthropological view of culture, a version of
culture as the totality of heterogeneous elements in a way of life. In this version
of culture, that we often find presented in social studies of science,  science
cannot be demarcated on a priori grounds as intrinsically more 'special' than
any other social activity. Science museums, in this view, are institutions that tell
us about the social activities of science, as one cultural practice among many
others. In these different traditions, the cultural offer of the Science Museum
looks very different and so too does the institution's relation with the public.
From the perspective of one tradition, Blatchford's remarks  might  appear  as
the elitist cultural politics of museology, to the other tradition they appear to as
a  democratic appraisal of  science.  We could plausibly read both versions of
culture into Blatchford's remarks, which in this sense embody well the tensions
of  the  cultural  turn  at  Science  Museum.  In  this  chapter  I  look  at  how the
tensions  between these different accounts of the relations between science
and culture play out in the curatorial experiment of Oramics. 
In this chapter, then, I discuss the curatorial experiment of Oramics in relation
to the 'turn to culture' at the Science Museum. I do so through the cross-cutting
theme  of  “participation”,  and  focus  specifically  on  the  question  of  public
participation  in  Oramics.  The chapter  foregrounds  a  conflict  between  two
accounts of public participation in Oramics, emerging in an unresolved dispute
between staff working on the exhibition.  Both sides of the dispute agree that
the curatorial  experiment of Oramics attempts to unsettle existing hierarchies
in  the relations  between science,  culture and the public  by  recognising  the
heterogeneity of these relations. Both sides of the dispute, I suggest, see the
century humanists like Matthew Arnold who argued the culture was “the best which has 
thought and said in the world” seems pertinent (see discussion of Arnold and nineteenth 
century liberal humanist accounts of culture in Williams, 1963). Blatchford's appointment 
from the V&A, a museum that holds 'art' objects in its collections that are historically and 
geographically expansive, and the comparisons he draws between science and the fine 
arts would suggest a version of culture not dissimilar to the nineteenth century liberal 
humanist tradition. As a museum of 'the arts' the V&A is often considered more cultural 
than the Science Museum. It is telling that, in the opening line of the above quotation, the 
idea of “parallel lives” between science and culture is one that the Science Museum has 
had to “reject”; the idea of their hybridity has clearly not always been considered the case. 
The very fact of the creation of the Science Museum and the V&A as separate institutions 
from a common origin in the Great Exhibition embodies well both the historical significance 
of the “parallel lives” thesis described above: located on opposite sides of Exhibition Road 
illustrate the separation of the art and science museum (or the “non-art” museum) is both a 
stark reminder of this parallel settlement. 
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'turn to culture' as a way to multiply the registers through which the public can
engage  with  science  and  technology,  and  also  to  change  the  kinds  of
relationships the public can have with science. Both sides agree, for instance,
that Science Museum exhibitions should not only be about technical pedagogy
and cognitive in their focus, but can also be displays that draw on registers of
aesthetics, gender and subjectivity. And, as I show, both sides of the dispute
agree  that  the  cultural  turn  at  the  Science  Museum  is  about  institutional
change with  a  view  to  engaging  those  'outsiders'  that  are  excluded  in
hierarchical accounts of the relations between science, culture and the public.
However, crucially, they disagree over the role of public participation that such
a turn to  culture would entail.  In  their  respective accounts of  the curatorial
experiment, the way in which the Oramics exhibition makes relations between
science, culture and the public appears considerably different. 
In this chapter,  I  analyse this dispute  between staff  working on  Oramics to
bring into view some of the tensions and limitations of the cultural turn, and to
highlight  that  culture  does  not  'solve'  the  problems  of  relations  between
science  and  the  public.  On  one  hand,  I  look  at  other  Science  Museum
exhibitions curated to emphasise the relations between science and  culture
and how these exhibitions multiply registers with which the public engage with
science  and  technology.  I  highlight  how  such  exhibitions  at  the  Science
Museum,  for  instance, blur  distinctions  between  insiders  and  outsiders  of
science. However, on the other hand, the curating of science and culture at the
Science Museum is also  often  bound within a hierarchical  ontology  in which,
for example, subjectivity, affectivity and aesthetics stand simply as the negative
of the objective,  rational  and technical.  Exhibitions  curated to emphasise the
relations between science and culture in the Science Museum, I suggest, are
not free of the  hierarchies.  The  curatorial experiment of  Oramics,  I suggest,
embodies similar tensions. An important question that emerges in the dispute
between the staff working on  Oramics is whether  and to what extent public
participation can 'solve' problems like social exclusion in science, or the extent
to which public participation simply reproduces the established hierarchies and
asymmetries  in  science. This  chapter,  then, discusses  the  curatorial
experiment  of  Oramics by  examining  the  role  of  public  participation  in
addressing problems in the relations between science and culture.
In what follows I first introduce the problem of public participation in Oramics
and the dispute between the two groups of staff over the curatorial experiment.
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In  this  chapter  I  situate  the  dispute  about  public  participation  and curating
science  principally  in relation to  literatures on the cultural politics of modern
museums. Social studies of museum have argued that they are institutions of
elite  culture  that  participate  in  the  politics of  population  governance  and
control. In these studies, the  cultural politics  of museums is hierarchical and
based on relations of domination. I situate the Science Museum's cultural turn
in  relation  both  to  these  museum  studies  literatures  and  science  and
technology studies (STS)  literatures discussed in previous chapters.  In doing
so, I highlight the complex ways these different accounts of culture intersect in
the Science Museum.  I  then return to the problem of public participation in
Oramics and look in depth at the different perspectives of the disputing groups
in relation to these literatures. I suggest that the dispute can be understood in
relation to procedural and issue-specific accounts of public participation. While
both sides of the dispute agree that there is an imperative to recognise that the
relations  between  science  and  culture  are  heterogeneous,  their  different
accounts of public participation highlight  the complexities involved in  such an
account.  What we see from this dispute, I suggest, is the ways in which  the
participatory displays  of  Oramics do  not  collapse the  problem of  hierarchy,
such as between 'insiders' and  'outsiders' of science. Rather, I argue that in
Oramics we  can  identify  new  kinds  of  'outsiders' and  zones  of  exclusion
produced through the curatorial experiment. The purpose of highlighting these
problems with the participatory displays of Oramics is not to suggest that the
curatorial experiment 'fails' to effect a 'turn to culture', but rather to make visible
some of the challenges, obstacles and tensions that characterise the relations
between science and culture at the Science Museum.
The public participation dispute: co-curation vs. co-creation
Public  participation  has  become  something  that  museums  'do',  it is  a
museological practice. Many museums now have specific public engagement
programmes  and  there  is  a  burgeoning  interdisciplinary  field of  museum
participation69. The Science Museum is no different from most museums in this
respect and indeed is considered by many of its staff to have pioneered some
of the public participation techniques that are common place in the sector. The
69 A key text in this field is Nina Simon's (2010) The Participatory Museum. This book was 
regularly discussed in my meetings with various staff at the Science Museum, and Simon 
herself took part in a conference hosted by the Museum in October 2010 called 'Co-
curation and the Public History of Science and Technology'.
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proposition of the curatorial experiment, however, appears to problematise the
Science Museum's existing approaches to public participation. On the first day
of my ethnographic engagement with the Science Museum, in mid-December
2010, I arrived to the first general meeting of the public history project involving
staff across the Museum, which formally marked the start of work on Oramics.
Three presentations were given at the meeting: an introduction by Tim Boon to
the concept of “public history”  (described in Chapter One), a talk by another
curator  about  developing  a  new  technique  called  “co-curation”,  and  an
overview from Boon of the planned  Oramics  exhibition. A fast and energetic
discussion  followed.  Some  staff  questioned  whether  the  public  history
proposals added anything  new to existing  practices of public participation at
the  Science  Museum.  Others  questioned  the  value  of  one-off participatory
exercises  and  the  reputational risks  associated  with  experimental  curating.
Some  highlighted the need to develop new audiences and engage currently
excluded  groups.  A number  of  staff  argued  the  problem was  principally  a
matter of developing new ways of displaying the vast number of objects in the
Science Museum's collections, currently languishing in storage.  The focus on
improving  the  relationship  of  the  Science  Museum  to  local  museums  and
historical groups was juxtaposed with the danger of the Museum becoming
provincial in failing to recognise that 40% of its visitors are from abroad. There
were  many  other  points  which  I  failed  to  follow or  record.  For  staff  at  the
meeting, the proposition of public experimentation of the kind proposed under
the  concept  of  public  history  and  the  Oramics  exhibition  both  seemed
problematic  in relation to  the  Science Museum's current  practices of  public
participation and clearly also linked to a broad range of museological issues. 
That the curatorial experiment problematises the Science Museum's practices
of public participation was further suggested in the evaluation of Oramics. The
evaluation of Oramics was conducted by the Museum's Audience Research70
team, based in the Museum's Learning department. Evaluations in the Science
70 In this chapter I attribute the team of Audience Researchers a particular position that differs 
from Boon's public history account of Oramics. Because Boon is represented here through 
an individual persona there is a risk that the presentation of this disagreement appears 
asymmetric, personalising and rationalising Boon's position while oversimplifying and 
homogenising the various views of individuals in the Audience Research team. However, 
what I hope to show in this chapter is that the position ascribed to the Audience 
Researchers, like the position ascribed to Boon, is not simply surmised from the 
individual's agent's contingent opinions. Rather it is intended that the positions ascribed to 
both are done so by showing how these positions are enacted in, and distributed across, a 
broad range of techniques, tools, models, publications (etc) as well as in the individual's 
views voiced in meetings, interviews, and other ethnographic encounters. The 
personalisation of Boon and the anonymisation of the Audience Researchers is in part a 
pragmatic decision because anonymising Boon would severely limit the analysis of 
Oramics (for example, see analysis of Chapter One). It is also a stylistic choice to limit the 
individual persona that appear in this thesis.
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Museum are carried out from the visitor's perspective on the premise that it is
to the visiting public that the Science Museum, as a public institution, should
be principally accountable.  In the meetings about the evaluation of  Oramics
there was strong disagreement  between Boon and the Audience Research
team about  of whom, or what, this public consisted or should consist. Boon
argued that  for  the evaluation  to  reflect the exhibition's experimental aims  it
needed to include the views of visitors who were interested in, or practitioners
of,  electronic  music.  The  Audience  Researchers,  on  the  other  hand,  were
adamant that, though experimental curatorially, the public for Oramics was not
fundamentally  different  from  other  participatory  exhibitions  in  the  Science
Museum  and,  hence,  that  the  evaluation  should  not  depart  from  existing
models. The Audience Researchers argued that while it was notable that  the
curatorial  experiment involved a range of different specialises, these people
were not  representative of  Science Museum visitors and should not be the
target of the evaluation. For the Audience Researchers, the notion of designing
an exhibition for such a niche audience suggests an exclusivity that conflicts
with  the  Museum's  commitment  to  its  core  non-specialist  audiences.  The
disagreement  between  Boon  and  Audience  Researchers  about  Oramics
extended to the use of terminology used to describe the participatory process.
Boon's description of the participatory process of Oramics as “co-curation” was
introduced at the initial public history meeting, described above, and is closely
linked to the public history account of the experiment; both co-curation and
public  history  are  new  concepts  in  the  Science  Museum.  However,  in  a
subsequent meeting about Oramics one of the Audience Researchers contests
the use of the term arguing that it is disingenuous for the Science Museum to
claim co-curation as an innovation when the techniques it describes have been
widely used for some time in the museum sector, not least in the practices of
smaller  local  history museums.  The Audience Researcher  instead suggests
they  use  a  more  widely  recognised  concept  of  “co-creation”,  a  term  used
across public and commercial organisations, which was subsequently adopted
for the evaluation. The Oramics evaluation is important for both Boon and the
Audience Researchers because it is a document that codifies the  successes
and  failures of  the  exhibition  in  relation  to  the  public.  The  disagreement
between Boon and the Audience Researchers about the evaluation of Oramics
is an issue not only about audiences and visitors but also about the nature of
the curatorial experiment and how it problematises the 'insiders' and 'outsiders'
of science. 
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Evaluations occupy a central place in the practices of exhibition-making in the
Science Museum. In an interview, one of the Audience Researchers described
to me the methodologies used for evaluating exhibitions. Currently, for a typical
exhibition  Audience Researchers  would undertake formative research  during
the  planning  stages  of  the  exhibition  to  understand  who  the  prospective
audiences  are,  followed  by  testing  the  exhibition  materials  with  these
audiences  during the design  phase  of the exhibition, and a final summative
evaluation  after  the  exhibition  has  opened.  In  evaluations  Audience
Researchers use qualitative research techniques such as interviews, guided
visits, and focus groups that  enable them to represent the public's  subjective
perceptions  of  the  galleries  and  other  projects  undertaken  by  the  Science
Museum. In collaboration with the Museum's marketing department, Audience
Research also uses descriptive statistical techniques to profile  and segment
visitors to the Museum  which in  more recent  work has informed the target
audiences in evaluations71. Audience Research also encompasses a practice
called Audience Advocacy72.  Audience Advocacy is, as the name suggests, a
practice that attempts to promote the views of audiences (collected through
research  practices)  in  the  Museum's  work. Operationally  based  within  the
Museum's Audience Research team, Audience Advocates are deployed on all
exhibition projects to ensure that the  Science Museum's  exhibitions address
the needs of its various audience groups. Where MacDonald's study (2002) in
the  late  1980s  argued  that  through  the  working  practices  of  the  Science
Museum the public was inscribed in the exhibition's representation of science,
this  inscription  of  the  audience  became  an  institutional  practice  with  the
establishment of the audience advocacy role.  Audience Research is thus not
simply a passive collecting of public opinion but, in its Advocacy function, is a
practice that explicitly attempts to transform the way other practitioners in the
Science Museum conduct their  work.  Evaluation is  a  research practice  that
71 One of the important tools shared by Audience Research and Marketing is the “audience 
profile” that specifies the relationship of a particular group of the public to the museum. 
One of the Audience Researchers sends me an early piece of audience profiling research 
from 2001 that dissects the Museum's audience. The report draws not only by the common 
demographic and socio-economic measures but also measures that specify the visitor's 
relationship to the Science Museum including the frequency and purpose of visiting the 
Museum. The data on audience profiles in this report is presented quantitatively: audience 
profiles are constructed on the basis on statistical data collected through an exit survey of 
visitors attending the Museum. The exit survey is now an annual feature, according to a 
senior Audience Researcher I interview, and provides a longitudinal perspective on the 
kinds of people visiting the Science Museum. As statistical constructs that are subject to 
annual revisions, audience profiles maintain a dynamism that reflects changes over time in 
the Museum’s visiting public. 
72 One of the Audience Research team I interview describes the development of Audience 
Research in the Museum as simultaneous and closely linked to the development of 
Audience Advocacy. The researcher explains that both advocates and researchers were 
employed to work on all of the Museum's exhibitions developed for the Wellcome Wing, a 
three storey exhibition space which opened in 2000 with a focus on public engagement in 
contemporary science issues. 
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also  informs this advocacy function.  The evaluation of  Oramics  is important,
then,  not least because it has potentially  practical  implications for museology
at the Science Museum. In short, the dispute between Boon and the Audience
Researchers  is  not  simply  abstract  theory  but  one  of  deeply  practical
significance.
One  way  to  understand  the  dispute  between  Boon  and  the  Audience
Researchers over the curatorial experiment and public participation is through
a caricature of the corporate structure of the Science Museum which, as it was
often relayed to me by staff, suggests there is a “front-end” and a “back-end” to
the organisation. At the front-end is the Learning Department, responsible for
outreach,  gallery  interpretation  and  education  programmes  among  other
functions, while at the back-end is the Curatorial and Collections Department,
responsible for maintaining objects and undertaking research. It is a split that
suggests  the  separation  of  the  concerns  of  subjectivity  (front-end)  and
objectivity  (back-end).  Audience  Research,  located  in  the  Learning
Department, is oriented towards the front-end and is where public participation,
as a museological practice, is  located  operationally.  Boon, as a curator and
historian, is located principally in the back-end of the Museum. Research is a
function  split  between  the  two  ends  of  the  Museum  by  its  concerns  with
audiences (subjects) and  history  (objects).  This  caricature  of  the  institution
would  offer  a  simple  way  to  explain  the  conflict  between  Boon  and  the
Audience  Researchers  as  the  conflict  between  professional  outlooks  that
accord to a series of dichotomies of each side of the back/front end.  It is a
caricature which provides us with a  kind of  structural-functionalist account of
the dispute – a perspective that I attempt to avoid falling into here – in which
the ideas of each side being understood as  determined by their position and
function within the corporate structure of the Science Museum.
The weakness of the structural-functionalist imaginary is, as many sociologists
have pointed  out,  that  it  can't  adequately  account  for  changes in  practice.
Though  a  useful  caricature  among  some  staff  I  met,  in  the  practice  there
appear many more 'ends' to the Science Museum that do not neatly reduce to
a  front/back  end  organisational  model73.  At  the  time  of  study  the  Science
73 In the late-1980s in response to a failed attempt to rationalise the exhibition space in the 
Science Museum, the then director invented the concept of the “multi-museum” 
(MacDonald, 2002), a term which is still used to describe the institution (Boon, 2010). The 
reflects the proliferation of different departments in the Museum, of which recent additions 
include the web and social media teams. For example, in the 1990s a separate private 
enterprise NMSI Enterprise was established as a revenue generating arm of the Science 
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Museum  was  undergoing  a  corporate  restructuring,  and  indeed continual
restructuring is characteristic of contemporary organisations  (Thrift, 2005).  In
fact,  many of  the corporate  developments  related to  Oramics  attempted to
reorganise the working practices in  the Science Museum and to  overcome
some of  the  corporate  “Divisions”  in  the Museum74.  The various  staff  from
across the Museum whom I encountered working on Oramics were well aware
of  the  exhibition's  experimental  aims,  and  many  saw  the  exhibition  as  an
opportunity  to  challenge  the  modus  operandi  for exhibition-making  in  the
Museum.  Moreover,  a  new  department  founded  by  Boon  in  2012,  titled
“Department  of  Research  and  Public  History”,  relocated  staff  from  both
Curatorial and Audience Research departments. More importantly perhaps, to
use a structural-functionalist approach would be to assume the composition of
the very object, the Science Museum, that this chapter seeks to interrogate. In
this respect,  I don't attempt here to explain  the  disagreement between Boon
and the Audience Researchers by appealing to a preconceived ontology of the
Science Museum but rather seek to use the dispute to show the ways in which
the  ontologies  enacted  in  and  with the  Science  Museum  are  problematic.
However,  as  I  will  show  below  in  the  discussion  of  museum  theory,  this
front/back end caricature is not unfounded and indeed might be said to reflect
a  particular  version  of  the  cultural  politics  of  museums.  Specifically,  the
caricature  is  not  dissimilar to  models of  the museum that  we find in some
museum  studies  which suggest  that objects  are  historical  in  character  and
internal  to museums while  the public  are the  external  subjects of  museums.
The museum studies I survey here are not structural-functionalist accounts.
However,  some  museum studies  have  nonetheless  theorised  museums as
institutions that engage in particular kinds of cultural politics.  In analysing the
dispute  between  Boon  and  the  Audience  Researchers about  the Oramics
experiment  I  therefore  seek  to  highlight  some  of  the  ways  this  exhibition
problematises  some  museum  studies  accounts of  cultural  politics.  In  this
chapter, then, I seek to analyse this dispute to clarify the heterogeneous ways
in which the Science Museum is enacted as a democratic cultural institution. 
The hierarchies of the liberal museum 
Museum. These departments and corporate arms of the Science Museum clearly do not 
neatly conform to the front/back end caricature.
74 Boon (2010) describes the divisive nature of the Museum's corporate reorganisation under 
the Thatcherite director Neil Cossons who established a series of “Divisions” in the 
Museum.
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Prior to the empirical work of this study I had regarded museum studies as only
a background literature with which I might need to lightly familiarise myself, but
not one that would shape my conceptual analysis of the Oramics exhibition as
a public experiment.  However, this separation between the museum studies
literature and the literatures of social studies of science became more difficult
to  maintain  during  the  empirical  research  as  various  staff  at  the  Science
Museum I  met  during  the  research  would  draw  from both  to  characterise
Oramics as a curatorial experiment. One of the curators, in particular, has been
trained in museum studies and would often draw references from this body of
literature to describe the public participation experiments.  And,  in interviews
with the Audience Researchers it seemed to me that I would need to confront
the museum studies literature in order to appreciate properly their position on
public participation.
From certain perspectives in museum studies, the proposition of the exhibition
as  an  experiment  in  the  relations  between  science  and  culture  is  highly
implausible.  In  many  museum  studies  the  museums  is  institutions  built  on
hierarchical relations that represent culture for ends of political domination. In
the exhibitions of  science  museums,  culture  is represented  as  consisting of
particular  values and discourses, access to which is unevenly distributed in
society.  Science exhibitions are  then  public displays from which the masses
are  excluded  and  which  function  to  reproduce  social  elites  (for  example,
Bennett,  1995;  Hooper-Greenhil,  1992).  Museums,  in  this  perspective,  are
public institutions from which the public is largely excluded. However, as public
institutions  museums  espouse  the  values  of  liberal  democracy  and
Enlightenment.  By  promoting  liberal  values  of  self-governance  through
education museums  participate  in  the  governmental  politics  of  population
control. Attempts by museums to democratise the way they publicly represent
knowledge  would,  according to these studies,  undermine the very basis  on
which  the  institution  is  founded.  Displays  of  popular  and  mass-culture  in
museum  exhibitions  rather  extend  the  hierarchies  of  the  institution.  The
proposition of the museum exhibition as an experiment in  relations between
science and culture  appears, in relation to these studies, as not only highly
implausible but a threat to the very institution of the museum. I will here briefly
survey some of these museum studies, drawn from a plurality of traditions. The
purpose  of  doing  so  is  not  to  close  down  the  distinctions  between  these
different  accounts of  the  hierarchies of  science  museums.  Rather,  it  is  to
highlight the diversity of traditions from the perspective of which the exhibition
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as a public experiment appears as an implausible proposition.
The  political ontology  of the  modern  museum,  according to museum studies
looked at  here, was formed  in  the  historical  period  of  modern  nation-state
formation  when it  is  realised as  an instrument  of  government75 (Anderson,
1991;  Hooper-Greenhil,  1992).  Exemplary  of  the  modern  public  museum,
according  to  Hooper-Greenhill, is  the  Louvre  which  was established in  the
immediate aftermath of the French revolution and played an important role in
the invention of a democracy (see also Duncan and Wallach, 1980). However,
the political  ontology of  museums is,  these studies suggest,  in  many ways
antithetical  to  the  ideals  of  democratic  culture  that  they  espouse.  Hooper-
Greenhill argues, for instance, that the Louvre participated in disciplining76 the
democratic  subjects  of  the  new  French  Republic. Fundamental  to  this
disciplinary function, Hooper-Greenhill argues, is the museum's establishment
of a division between the private spaces where knowledge is produced and
organised and the  public  spaces where  knowledge is  made visible  for  the
public. The public are, in this account, the passive subjects of an institution that
has  aristocratic  relations  of domination  inscribed  in  its  practices.  In  other
words, this division between private and public was not simply a division of
knowledge, but also one of power and advantage.  As  an institution derived
from royal power, the Louvre was repurposed to serve as an instrument of both
state control and surveillance. Hooper-Greenhill's study thus both specifies the
political ontology of the modern museum and the ways in which governmental
functions  of  surveillance  and  domination  are  inscribed  into  museological
practices  of  collecting and display.  This  account  of  the modern disciplinary
museum  is  extended,  and  importantly  qualified,  by  Bennett  (1995) who
describes the modern museum not only in terms of epistemology but also as
75 This governmental account of the museum was in fact often shared by staff at the Science 
Museum, in part an effect of the fact that the Museum used to be formally part of 
government. More importantly though, this governmental role often appeared as a 
resource to describe and legitimate different museological practices. For example, the 
Museum's legal status was often the most useful way for staff at the Museum to 
formalistically describe programmes of work: documents such as funding proposals, board 
briefings, and project summaries often presented as derived from the first principles of the 
Science Museum's statutory obligations defined in the UK's 1983 Heritage Act, according 
to which the Museum's object collection is held on behalf of the UK public. In this legal 
conception of the Science Museum as an instrument for the governance of heritage – 
albeit one that operates at arms-length from the departments of government as a non-
department public body – the “public” pertains to that governed by the British state which is 
reflected in public participation practices such as Audience Research (discussed below) 
which often model the Science Museum's public in terms of British population 
demographics. If the Oramics experiment attempts to unsettle the hierarchical cultural 
politics of the modern museum then it is also, as will be discussed below, likely to 
problematise these museological practices in which the public is simply derived from the 
idea of the Science Museum as an instrument of the nation-state. 
76 The concept of discipline in Hooper-Greenhill's account is, like Bennet's below, drawn from 
Foucault's analysis of the distributed practices of government. 
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an  instrument  of  for  promoting  a  particular  form  of  democratic  culture.
Bennett's study situates the modern museum in relation to other governmental
instruments,  including  parks  and  libraries,  which  attempt  to  civilise the
population  and replace those  forms  of  culture,  such  as  the  raucous
amusement parks, which represented a threat to bourgeois cultural values. In
Bennett's  account,  the  modern  museum  serves  a  particular  form  of  elite
culture:  the  public  is  disciplined in  bourgeois  cultural  values,  such as  self-
betterment  through  education, through  the  exhibitionary  practices  of  the
museum. The opening up of the museum to the public not only made museum
objects  publicly  visible,  Bennet's  argues,  but  in doing so  created  a cultural
spectacle of a visible public  which was civilized with the capacity for learning
and self-governance.  In this way, Bennett argues, museums can be seen to
'solve'  the  challenges  faced  by  modern  liberal  governments  of  population
control. 
In  Bennett and  Hooper-Greenhill's accounts,  the  claims  of  museums to
represent  the  public  masks the processes  through which elites dominate the
masses (see also Bourdieu, 1984). While the object collections held by modern
museum purport to represent public culture, museum studies have argued that
exhibitions  of  these artefacts  in  fact  represent  the  processes  of  elite
domination and control. An important theoretical antecedent to this account of
museum  culture is in the critical theory of the  Frankfurt School, in particular
Adorno  and  Horkheimer's  (1972) account  of  mass-culture  and  Habermas's
(1991) account  of  the  bourgeois  public  sphere.  Adorno  and  Horkheimer's
account  of  the “culture industries” emphasised how, under the conditions of
late capitalism,  culture was becoming homogeneous, its seeming diversity  to
consumers masking the centralisation and monopoly control of its production.
Cultural forms such as film, radio and popular music had become standardised
and  organised  as  industries  of  mass-production.  Culture,  for  Adorno  and
Horkheimer,  under  conditions  of  industrial  production  had  lost its  critical
political  function.  Individuality was becoming a  property  only realised in the
consumers' choices, a pseudo-individualism. This account of culture was later
extended in Habermas's  political history  of the public sphere.  In Habermas's
account, the conditions of  industrially  organised  culture  limited  the possible
development of critical forms of public expression and reduced publicity to a
mere  form  of  advertising.  The  emergence  of  institutions  like  museums  to
represent  public  culture  reflects  culture's  centralised  organisation  and  the
monopoly control its production. Museum exhibitions, in these accounts, do not
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democratise culture but rather extend existing relations of domination77. 
Though the above accounts of modern museums, as public institutions, are in
many ways quite different common to all is the idea that exhibitions are spaces
of representation that reduce museum objects to signifiers of particular forms
of  elite  culture.  Adorno  (1967),  for  instance,  argues that  museums  reduce
objects  to  mere  “historical  signifiers”,  to  representatives  of  history, and
therefore suggests that  the modern  museum is  like a “mausoleum”;  it  is  a
repository of (almost)  dead objects78.  Elsewhere,  Baudrillard  (1995) extends
this  idea of the museum, arguing  that  it  is not only museums but rather  all
practices of mass production that produce dead objects. This mass-production
of dead objects  is,  Baudrillard argues, a process of “museumification”79. For
Baudrillard, the  self-conscious  attempts by museums to become centres  that
reflect popular culture (rather than elite culture), such as the Pompidou Centre
and related museums in  the Beaubourg district  of  Paris,  are fundamentally
flawed because they continue to participate in the systems of mass-production
that produce dead objects. 
“Beaubourg could have or should have disappeared the day after 
the inauguration, dismantled and kidnapped by the crowd, which 
would have been the only possible response to the absurd 
challenge of the transparency and democracy of culture—each 
person taking away a fetishized bolt of this culture itself fetishized.” 
(49)
77 Where museum objects are used to represent other kinds of cultures, such exhibitions of 
indigenous objects in anthropology museums, they are nonetheless shown within the 
narratives and discourses of Western colonial elites (Ames, 1992; Stocking, 1988).
78 The museum, Adorno states, brings objects close to death by reducing them to signifiers of 
history. The museum absorbs the object into history by extracting it from the context of its 
existence and by bringing it into relation with other objects which have no immediate 
connection other than history. The role of the object in the museum is principally to 
illustrate history. History is thus a property that the museum attributes to the object, it is not 
innate to the object, and hence the museum can never entirely assimilate the objects it 
collects. For Adorno, then, museums are institutions that represent history. In this role, 
museums participate in the Enlightenment project in which man attempts to master objects 
and narrate history as progress; one effect of the Enlightenment project was the 
catastrophe of the Holocaust, according to Adorno and Horkheimer. The claim that 
museums bring objects close to death but never in fact 'kill' them is linked to Adorno's 
(1973) broader philosophy of objects in Negative Dialectics in which he argues: “objects do 
not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder” (5). In effect, objects never entirely 
reduce to the historical signifiers that they come to represent in museums.
79 Baudrillard (see also Baudrillard, 1993) situates the modern museum within what he 
describes as “the order of production”; the second of three historically progressive 
“symbolic orders”. The order of production was instituted by the industrial revolution. 
Baudrillard develops a semiotic analysis of the order of production to argue that this 
entailed the mass production of identical signs. The logic of production established signs 
as a pure series, in contrast to earlier hierarchical ordering of signs, and production was 
thus developed on a logic “equivalence” and “replication”. Baudrillard's analysis in many 
senses echoes Adorno and Horkheimer's analysis of mass-culture under the conditions of 
late-capitalism. Modern science and museums, Baudrillard argues, are of the symbolic 
order of production. 
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If Beaubourg really was about democratising culture, Baudrillard argues, then
it would have ceded control over the representation of culture entirely to the
masses: in doing so it would have failed entirely as a museum. Baudrillard's
argument makes clear why museums that claim to represent mass culture are
ontologically no different from the 'high culture' museums they seek to distance
themselves from. Museums, for Baudrillard, can never become institutions that
authentically  represent  the  public  because,  for  Baudrillard,  museums  are
institutions  that  belong  to  the  regime  of  industrial-capitalism  and  mass-
production: hierarchy and domination is intrinsic to the museum. 
The  above  critiques  of  the  modern  museum  as  a  public  institution  that
represents  democratic  culture  provide  a  good  framework  within  which  to
situate the  museological  challenge  of  the  curatorial  experiment  of  Oramics.
Politically, these accounts suggest that the modern museum participates in the
project of  population  governance and control.  It  does this by promoting  the
liberal democratic values of the modern nation-state  in order  to civilize  those
sections of the population, such as the working classes, that represent a threat
the  established  political  order.  In  these  accounts,  museums  are  highly
conservative  and undemocratic  institutions  that  embody  older  hierarchical
notions of  disciplinary  power.  In this political ontology, public participation in
museums is simply an extension of this disciplinary governmental function. The
modern  museum  participates  in  a  particular  form  of  mass  culture,  that  is
centralised and industrially  produced. The museum reduces objects to mere
signifiers, museums are where objects go to die.  Where  museum exhibitions
attempt to mimic  the heterogeneity of  democratic  culture, the museum only
further  extends  the  domination  and  homogenisation  of  mass-culture.  The
institutional  organisation  of  the  modern  museum  is  thus  antithetical  to
authentic public participation and experimentation that is the proposition of the
curatorial experiment in Oramics. From the perspective of the museum studies
surveyed,  the proposition of the experimental exhibition is highly implausible
without, as Baudrillard describes, the collapse of the museum. Or, to frame
Baudrillard's point  differently,  such  experimentation  would  entail  a  radically
different kind of institution  which would be entirely antithetical to that of the
modern museum. Critical studies accounts of the modern museum, drawing on
Foucault, the Frankfurt School and Baudrillard, therefore make clear that if the
curatorial  experiment  of  Oramics  is  authentic  then it  is  also  an experiment
more broadly with the Science Museum as a cultural institution.
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From hierarchy to heterogeneity
In the introduction I  introduced the notion of a 'turn to  culture' in the Science
Museum.  Underlying  the  disagreement  between  Boon  and  the  Audience
Researchers,  I  argued,  was  a  notion  that  the  relations  between  science,
culture and the public  should be understood as heterogeneous rather  than
hierarchical.  Culture,  in this disagreement, is a concept  that  unsettles, and in
some  cases  collapses,  the  demarcations  on  which  the  hierarchies of  the
modern museums is based. These include the  demarcations  (many of which
were discussed in previous chapters) between science and art, expert and lay,
objects  and  subjects,  men  and  women,  rationality  and  affectivity.  In  the
introduction  I  also  highlighted  the  tensions  within  Blatchford's  rendering  of
culture which, on one hand, suggested the anthropological position of 'science
as  culture'  while,  on  the  other  hand,  also  suggested  a  liberal  humanist
rendering  of  culture  as  the  accomplishments of  elite  specialists.  The three
accounts of the Science Museum's cultural turn, Blatchford's, Boon's, and the
Audience Researchers are clearly neither completely at odds with one another
–  since  Boon  and  the  Audience  Researchers  find  considerable  common
ground  from which  the  establish  a  disagreement  –  but  clearly  are  neither
entirely in agreement. In these different accounts we see some of the tensions
that are contained within the shared rubric of culture in the Science Museum.
In  this  section  I  look  at  how  these  tensions  between  hierarchy  and
heterogeneity  are  suggested  in  other  exhibitions  we  find  in  the  Science
Museum.
Though  the  Science Museum has recently  dropped its  long-held subtitle of
“National  Museum  of  Science  and  Industry”,  Blatchford's  manifesto  makes
clear that the presenting of science 'as culture' can also be compatible with an
older  idea  of  the  Science  Museum  as  a  governmental  instrument  that
promotes British industry. In Blatchford's manifesto, titled 'Moving up a Gear',
the  emphasis on culture  is accompanied by  a  distinctively macho80 rhetoric;
Blatchford writes:
80 This point is elaborated in the discussion of the gender politics of science and technology 
in Chapter Five.
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“It’s time for the Science Museum Group to punch its weight, 
because the nation’s future prosperity and quality of life depend on 
an urgent commitment to science and technology. The Group 
should flourish as a flagship for the best that a rational explanation 
of our world can offer” (4)
Emphasising the economic utility of science and technology to account for the
public function of the Science Museum has been commonplace in the rhetoric
of  the institution's  directors  at  least  since the 1980s when,  under  the neo-
liberal  reforms  of  Margaret  Thatcher's  government,  the  Museum  was
separated from state control,  becoming a semi-autonomous organisation  and
part of the market place of the emerging museum industries81.  The promotion
of  national  industry  has also  been  a  politically  powerful  resource  for  the
Science  Museum, and  science  exhibitions  remain  potential  vehicles  for
publicising British industry. This was perhaps most explicit in a 2012 temporary
exhibition  hosted by the Museum which was  curated by the Department for
Business Innovation & Skills (BIS) called Make it in Great Britain.  The gallery
of Make it... was plastered with Union Jack imagery and comprised a series of
stands, many of well known British manufacturers like Airbus and Rolls Royce,
which  showcased  shiny  and  sleek-looking products.  Described  on  the  BIS
website, the Make it... exhibitions was: “a celebration of the success of British
manufacturing, featuring some of the most exciting great British innovations of
today  and  firmly  dispelling  the  myth  that  Britain  'doesn’t  make  anything
anymore’.”82 The promotion of British industry  was  very nakedly the focus of
Make it...;  the exhibition was  publicity in the most commercial  sense of the
term.  In relation to exhibitions like  Make It..., the  idea of the museum as an
instrument  of  industry and  governance still  characterises  well  many  of  the
activities of the Science Museum.  
Clearly the industrial and the economic utility of science and technology for the
national political community of Great Britain is a significant focus of exhibitions
in the contemporary Science Museum (though there is perhaps also a sense in
which  their current  emphasis  in  Science  Museum  publicity  might  be
exaggerated  by  the  contemporary  economic  crisis  and  the  cuts  in  public
81 This was the result of the reforms contained in the 1983 Heritage Act. In this legal 
conception, the Science Museum operates at arms-length from the departments of 
government as a non-department public body. The entry of the Science Museum into the 
market place of the culture industries is described well in MacDonald's (2002) 
ethnographic account in the late 1980s.
82 See the Make it in Great Britain exhibition website: http://makeitingreatbritain.bis.gov.uk/ 
(accessed 30th April 2013)
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funding that the Science Museum Group is facing83).  And yet,  in many  other
ways  the brash commercialism of  the  Make it... exhibition  and Blatchford's
emphasis on the economic utility of applied science seems somewhat at odds
with  some  of  the  other  concerns  of  the  Science  Museum.  The  Science
Museum's recent institutional publicity, for instance, appears more obviously to
highlight  the  heterogeneity  of  concerns addressed by  the  Museum than to
push  a  single  institutional  narrative84.  Indeed,  the  most  recent  2012-2013
Annual  Review  (2013) prefers  to  emphasise  the  “global”,  as  opposed  to
“national”,  orientation of  the  Science  Museum  Group:  the  opening  page
charting “The Science Museum Group's (sic) influence around the globe”,  by
showing  on  a  map  of  the  globe  the  location  of  its  various  institutional
partnerships. Both globe and nation are clearly important but elsewhere in the
public history work of the Science Museum there is also a strong emphasis on
the “local”  histories of the Museum's objects85.  One of the challenges for the
contemporary Science Museum is clearly to make the connections between
these different  registers in  a  way that  enables  the institution  to  satisfy  the
imperatives of each. Or, put another way, it would require a lot of work for the
Science  Museum  to  maintain  the  limited  nexus  of  the  'national  industry'
museum  when  contemporary  publicity  for  science  increasingly  emphasises
heterogeneous  concerns  such  as  'local  knowledges'  or 'interdisciplinarity'.
Situating the  Oramics exhibition  in relation to a broader turn to culture  in the
Science Museum  is,  I  suggest,  one  way to  appreciate its  significance  as a
curatorial experiment.
Another version of the cultural display of science and technology can be found
in the Science Museum's flagship gallery Making The Modern World (MMW),
which opened in 2000. Occupying the spatial centre of the Science Museum,
MMW, subtitled “a cultural history of industrialisation from 1750 to the present
83 In many ways the narrative of Blatchford's manifesto echoes that observed at the Science 
Museum by Sharon MacDonald in the late 1980s with the appointment of the Thatcherite 
director Neil Cossons. Just as Cosson's directorship coincided with drastic cuts in public 
funding to the Science Museum, leading to an early decision by the director to introduce 
admissions charges, a similar crisis in public funding provides the backdrop both to this 
study and Blatchford's directorship of the Science Museum. At the time of writing, 
discussions are being had in public about whether the Science Museum Group will close 
one of its “northern” museums in order to address a funding deficit. See for example: 
http://www.museumsassociation.org/museums-journal/news/05062013-science-museum-
group-would-close-museum (accessed 21st August 2013)
84 For instance, corporate publications such as the Museum's most recently Strategic Plan 
(2012b) opens with a description of the Science Museum as “one of the most important 
cultural institutions in the world”1(2). 
85 The 'local' focus of the Science Museum was the focus of other “public history” projects 
that were developed during my study – although discussion of these are not included in the 
final version of this thesis, the local dimension comprised a significant focus of the work 
developed by Boon under the public history project..
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day”86, is a large gallery arranged in  chronological  ordered displays.  In many
senses, walking  into  the  MMW gallery  feels  like  entering  a  distinctly
hierarchical  celebration  of modern  industrial icons  that  would  be  expected
given the museum studies accounts of the relationship between museums and
the conditions of late-capitalism and mass-production. From this perspective,
the DNA Double Helix evidences the capacity of scientific modelling to explain
and predict individual lives; the Model T Ford is testament to the transformative
power  of  automation and  industrial mass-production;  jars of penicillin  remind
visitors  of the extent to which  they rely on  medicine to  cure or  relieve  them
from  pain  and  suffering; and  the  V2  Rocket  embodies  the  great  utility of
engineering  both  for enabling humans to escape the earth  and  to destroy it.
From this vantage point, MMW is a testament to a hierarchical and asymmetric
politics  of  the industrialisation of science  and technology. But,  MMW,  as its
subtitle makes clear, is  also  an exhibition deeply concerned with the cultural
'context' of modernity. To this end, case displays around the sides of the gallery
offer multiple historical narratives of the different ages of technological change
form which the icons are drawn, models of the iconic objects draw attention to
questions of their scale and diverse significations industrialisation, and vast
displays  of  'everyday'  domestic  products  address  visitors  as  a  public  of
consumers. These displays of cultural context of the icons in MMW here serve
to  qualify  what  might  otherwise  appear  a  text-book  gallery  display  of
industrialisation.  But, I suggest here,  there are  also  ambiguities  in  what the
cultural context of industrialisation, shown in MMW, includes and what it leaves
out. 
If we take just one of these versions of the cultural context of industrialisation
we can see that  there are some tensions in the way that  MMW  enacts the
relations between science, technology and culture. The focus of the displays
on consumption, which display mass-produced consumer objects and in this
sense address the visitor in part as a consumer, in particular bring out these
tensions. The exhibition of the icons of the modern world are staged alongside
cabinets filled with the  more  'everyday'  objects,  including many of domestic
significance: for example, a Sunbeam Ironmaster Model X21 electric dry iron,
Con  Edison's  Plan  Your  Kitchen  Kit,  and  a  Kenwood  Sodastream. The
inclusion  of  low-technology  domestic  objects  addresses  the  visitor  as
consumer of mass-produced artefacts. This focus of the consumption could be
86 See the Science Museum's webpage for Making the Modern World at: 
http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/visitmuseum/galleries/making_the_modern_world.aspx 
(accessed 20th May 2013)
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read a number of ways. In narratives of modernity, the consumer is a figure
that  has  often  been polemically  described as  either  the  cultural  “dope” or,
conversely, the “hero” of the modern world (Slater, 1997). There is a significant
question about the extent to which the cultural displays of  MMW  transgress
such modern narratives of consumption for the many other potential logics of
consumption  (for discussion of logics of consumption see Baudrillard, 1998).
For example, if the displays of mass-produced consumer objects in MMW are
an  attempt  to  represent  of  the  heterogeneity  of  the  consumer's  lived
experiences then these displays seem to depart little from those mass-culture
museums that are described by Baudrillard in Beaubourg, Paris. The display of
these everyday objects would, in this reading, suggest a curatorial imagination
in which these objects can be deployed to instrumentally 'affect' visitors, who
can relate to them experientially. In such an account, the icons of science and
technology,  being  'text-book', offer  visitors  largely  cognitive experiences
whereas  'low-technologies'  like  irons  can  engage  with  the  lived,  sensorial
experiences of visitors. In this sense, the displays of  MMW might be said to
simply instrumentalise culture in service of an asymmetrical and hierarchical
account of industrialisation as technological determined. We might ask, to what
extent the displays of culture as context which is populated by consumers and
not  producers  simply  reinforces the  “culture  of  no  culture”  for  science and
technology  described  by  Sharon  Traweek  (1992)?  These  tensions  in  the
different uses of culture in Science Museum exhibitions can help us, I suggest,
understand and elaborate some of the tensions that we find in the  Oramics
experiment, and specifically, in this chapter, the disagreement between Boon
and the Audience Researchers.
Procedures for representing outsiders
Not  long  after  the  opening of  Oramics  to  the  public,  one  of  the  Audience
Researchers gave  me  a  draft  of  a  forthcoming  “Co-creation  Strategy  for
Making Modern Communications”87, a strategy for the Museum's forthcoming
permanent exhibition that explains the concept of co-creation in greater depth.
The  Strategy  lays  out  a  series  of  public  participation  definitions  which  are
arranged  in  a  three  stage  hierarchy  from the  lowest  level “contribution”  to
87 “Making Modern Communications” is a new permanent gallery being developed in the 
Science Museum, now renamed Information Age. More information about the gallery can 
be found at: http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/about_us/masterplan/information_age.aspx
(accessed 28th August 2013)
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“collaboration” to  the highest level  “co-creation”.  The  Strategy specifies “co-
creation” as: “this means we give audience groups the tools and skills, then
support their activities”. Co-creation, the highest level of public participation, is
oriented to the activities of the outsider publics with the Museum attempting to
enable them to realise their own aims. The ends of co-creation, this definition
suggests,  are not  determined by the museum but  rather  by  the public;  the
museum simply  supports  the public's  activities.  Co-creation  is  experimental
because the Museum doesn't stipulate or control the end product that results
from the participatory process.  In a strange way, this definition “co-creation”
echo's  Baudrillard's assertion,  quoted  above,  about  the  necessary
dismantlement  of  the modern museum  by the masses  for  it  to become an
institution of  public  participation and democratic culture.  It is a logic of public
participation  which  taken to  its  extreme,  or  its  highest  level  in  co-creation,
might  seem  to  collapse  the  hierarchical  public  museum  into  radically
heterogeneous  “public  activities”.  Baudrillard  might  have  been  pessimistic
about the possibility of museums realising the  democratic  promise  of  public
participation but the Co-creation Strategy suggests that these aims are in fact
not so distant from the practical aims of contemporary museums. In this sense,
the Audience Research account of Oramics as a public experiment shares with
Boon's public history account (see description in Chapter One, also discussed
below) the aims of  curatorial  experimentation, but, as will become clear, they
differ in the assumptions they make about the public.
However, there is a sense in which the Audience Researchers idea of the co-
creating public is also derived from distinctly governmental concerns. The Co-
creation  Strategy makes clear that public participation activities should  target
particular  groups  which include “BAME  [Black,  Asian  and  Minority  Ethnic]
communities, deaf and disabled groups as well as families and individuals who
are less economically active”. These groups comprise very particular kinds of
minority  and  marginalised  communities  and  this  policy is  linked  to
governmental  concerns  with  what,  in  the  UK, has  been  called  “social
exclusion”.  The  socially  excluded  are  those  segments  of  the  governable
population that  are under-represented and marginalised in other ways from
democratic institutions. Indeed, recent governments in the UK have been keen
to  encourage  the idea that museums and other  cultural institutions  could be
instrumentally  useful for  addressing  social  exclusion.  This  governmental
discourse is often linked to the cultural policy  of  the post-1997 New Labour
government,  such  as  the  introduction  of the  free  admissions  policies  to
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national  museums  (Sandell,  2003).  In  one  sense,  the  discourse  of  social
inclusion  has translated the critique of  the political  ontology of  the modern
museum, in studies such as those of Hooper-Greenhill and Bennett described
above, into a project of institutional reform. This cultural reformist approach to
public participation was evident in a research report from 2002, sent to me by
a member of the Audience Research Team, which developed panels of “new
audiences”  comprised  of  groups  of  people  who  did  not  visit  the  Science
Museum. Titled 'Culturally diverse visitors – a report on work with a panel from
the  black  community',  this  report  documents  the  first  visits  of  the  panel
members  and  their  families  to  the  Science  Museum,  focusing  on  their
preconceptions  prior  to  visiting  and  their  subsequent  perceptions  of  the
Museum. The report's introduction summarises the research:
“The Science Museum is currently undertaking a research project 
looking at the needs, wants, and expectations of groups who are 
under-represented in our current audience or who may feel 
excluded if they do come to the Museum. The project has begun by 
looking at the black community. The purpose of this research was to 
explore why black people do not come to the Museum, what their 
experience is like when they do visit, and what we could do to 
attract them in the future.”  
The  aim of  this  piece  of  research,  the  introduction  summarises,  is for  the
Science  Museum  to  understand  why  particular  groups,  here  the  black
community, don't visit,  with the suggestion that such awareness can lead to
practical  change that  can  include  and  engage  these groups.  The focus  of
engaging  new  and  underrepresented  groups,  the  outsiders, suggests  a
political concern not only with making museums accessible to the public but in
reforming museums as public institutions
Six months after the opening of  Oramics, the Museum's Audience Research
team sent me  a  copy  of  the  evaluation  of  Oramics titled  “Oramics  to
Electronica:  The  public’s  perception  of  a  co-created  gallery”.  The  report's
executive summary states the following:
“Visitors were in general very positive about the idea of working 
collaboratively with non-museum members of the public to enhance 
the breath of knowledge and diversify the perspectives and stories 
told by the Science Museum in its exhibitions. They see this as a 
modern, inclusive and forward thinking way of working.  
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In the Oramics to Electronica exhibition the co-created elements of 
the gallery were quite subtly imbedded in the interpretation and the 
visitors were not able to readily access the differing voices and 
stories being told.” 
In the Audience Researchers' evaluation a firm demarcation is made between
the  Science Museum's 'insiders'  and 'outsiders'  in the concept of  the “non-
museum members of the public”. The suggestion is that the public is external
to the Museum and co-creation is a technique for including the public in the
work of the Museum. The evaluation is critical  of  Oramics  arguing that  it  is
largely  unsuccessful  as  a  co-created  exhibition.  The  “differing  voices  and
stories” are only “subtly embedded” in the displays which fail to represent the
heterogeneous perspectives of the Science Museum's visiting public.
Co-creation,  the  evaluation  makes  clear,  pertains  to  particular  exhibits  and
groups in the exhibition rather than being a general term that describes the
exhibition. In other words, co-creation describes the activities of only some of
the  groups  participating  in  Oramics,  rather  than  providing  an  overarching
classification  for  the  exhibition.  An  important  distinction  in  the  Audience
Researcher's  co-creation  account,  which  was  briefly  described  in  the
introduction, is between those groups who constitute the Science Museum's
core  audience  of  “non-specialists”  and  those  groups  who  hold  an  existing
interest in a subject. In the evaluation this distinction is manifest in the division
of the groups participating in the exhibition into “interested stakeholders” and
the “public”.  In the evaluation, the students from the National Youth Theatre,
the Women Writers, and the 12 electronic musicians are  considered as  the
public groups participating in co-creating the gallery. The report considers the
participants from the Radiophonic Workshop, the Electronic Music Studio and
the  academics  from  Oram's  archive  at  Goldsmiths  as  the  “interested
stakeholders”.  The term “interested stakeholders”  used in  the  evaluation  is
particularly  significant  because it  suggests a further  distinction of  particular
pertinence at  the Science Museum.  Chapter  One quoted  an early  Science
Museum director Henry Lyons, a director often credit with defining the Museum
as a public facing institution, who argued that in order for a visitor to a science
museum88 become “interested” they must  first  hold a technical understanding
of what they were looking at. In this account, Lyons outlined the basic tenet of
88 As noted in Chapter One, Lyons' drew a sharp distinction between science museums and 
art museums which pertained a broader conceptual separation between reason and 
aesthetics.
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a problem of which a later version in the public understanding of science (PUS)
is the “lay public”. The problem89 of the Science Museum's public, in the PUS
account, is that they are  principally  'outsiders' of the institution who hold no
immediate interest in technical objects. This problem is repeated, in a different
way, in the evaluation's separation between stakeholders and the public on the
grounds of “interest”. In the Audience Researcher evaluation, just as in Lyons'
account, the interested stakeholders are those groups who are unproblematic
for the Science Museum. Because the interests of “stakeholders” are already
clearly defined in relation to the concerns of Oramics it is easy to see why the
evaluation  does  not  consider  their  contributions  as  part  of  the  experiment:
there is, in this account, little that is experimental about the participation of the
Radiophonic  Workshop  and  the  Electronic  Music  Studios  in  Oramics.
Stakeholders are the 'insiders' whose participation is not experimental because
they  are  already  implicated  in  the  exhibition.  By  contrast,  it  is  precisely
because the public are 'outsiders'  that their participation is,  in this account,
experimental:  'outsiders'  will  challenge  and  expand  institutional  narratives,
'insiders' won't.  The Audience Researcher's  distinction  between stakeholders
and the public groups, as insiders and outsiders, therefore implies a particular
account of the Oramics experiment, one that differs considerably from Boon's
public history account (discussed below).
The Audience Research  account of co-creation  is of a procedure, or set of
procedures, that attempts to represent the diversity of public cultures that are
excluded  from  the  Science  Museum.  The problem  that  co-creation  in  the
Science  Museum  addresses,  then,  derives  from the  unrepresentative
character of the institution and the reduction of museum objects to signifiers of
the homogeneous culture of the museum.  In this respect, it is an account of
the  museum  that  is  not  dissimilar  to  that  given  by  the  museum  studies
literature,  described above. The  formulation of these  problems  assumes that
the cultural offer of the Science Museum is structured by hierarchical relations
of domination. In this account of the hierarchical institution, public participation
is a project of reforming the entrenched forms of elite domination. The role of
evaluation,  in  this  model,  is  to  determine the  relative  success of  failure  of
public participation experiments;  experimentation ends once the contributions
are  displayed  in  the  gallery.  The  problem  of  hierarchy  that  the  Audience
Research practices of public participation address are, in potential  at  least,
89 In PUS this lay public is considered a threat to institutions of science and technology, one 
proposed solution to which is science communication initiatives. See discussion in Chapter 
Two.
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presumed to be solvable  by devising the correct procedures for  representing
the  diversity of  the  public.  By contrast,  I will suggest in the following section
that  one  way  we  can  understand  the  contestations  between  the  Audience
Researchers and  Boon  is that where the former seek to devise the correct
procedures for representing public diversity which is already known, the latter
uses issues to amplify public diversity as a problem. 
From procedures to issues
The  Audience  Researcher's  account  of  co-creation  frames  the  problem  of
public participation as a question of insiders  (“interested stakeholders”)  and
outsiders  (the  public),  and  attempts  to  'solve'  the  problem  by  devising
techniques for  representing  the latter. By contrast,  Boon's argument that the
evaluation  of  Oramics should  consider  the  groups  termed “interested
stakeholders”  by  Audience  Research, does  not  principally  formulate  the
question of public participation in terms of  procedures but rather in terms of
issues. The concept of “co-curation”  that Boon develops appears unlike the
public participation procedures used by Audience Research because, linked to
the concern with “public  history”, it  appears more obviously premised on a
distinction between  issues:  between  historical  and  contemporary  issues  in
science and technology.  In purely procedural terms, it is easy to understand
the Audience Researcher's criticism that Boon's concept is 'nothing new' in the
museum sector. However, the public history accounts given by Boon, which I
will discuss here, suggest that what makes “co-curating” unique is its emphasis
on historical issues. In an oversimplified  summary, we can see the difference
between these accounts of the Oramics experiment as the conflict between an
issue-specific  and  procedural  accounts of public participation.  As  we saw in
the above discussion of Audience Research evaluation, procedural accounts
formulate  the  problem  of  public  participation  as  a  matter  of  'insiders'  and
'outsiders'.  By  contrast,  the  issue-specific  approach,  I  suggest,  formulates
public  participation  in  terms  of  different  groups' particular  relationships  to
problems  or  shared  concerns  in  which  insiders  and  outsiders  become
indistinguishable. I suggest here that one source of the disagreement can be
found in Boon's account of public participation which differs from the Audience
Researchers' in its emphasis on issues over procedures,  suggesting to some
extent  a dissolution of the problem of insiders and outsiders.  However, the
contrast between procedural and issue-specific approaches in the accounts of
123
the Audience Researchers and Boon is not absolute; their accounts are limited
in  detail  and  to  some extent  draw on  a  similar  vocabulary.  In  particular,  I
suggest  that  Boon's “co-curation” account of  Oramics still  appears to apply
demarcation  criteria  to issues  in  such  a  way  that  we  find  new  'outsiders'
appearing.
The specificity of Boon's idea of co-curation to historical issues was suggested
in  a  journal  article  just  prior  to  the  opening  of  Oramics.  In  the  journal's
introduction,  Boon  (2011)  describes  the relationship between public history
and co-curation as a “kinship of two phenomena”. He elaborates:
“In broad terms, ‘‘public history’’ can refer to the ways in which lay 
people pursue historical interests—whether that be family and local 
history, collecting, consuming historical magazines and television 
programs, or museum visiting—for fun. Co-curation and similar 
techniques gathered together under the umbrella of ‘‘participation’’ 
describe a range of practices in which lay people work to develop 
displays and programs within museums.” (383)
Though Boon makes clear that the concepts of public history and co-curation
are  related,  his  account  also  leaves  this  relationship  relatively  under-
developed,  and this is perhaps one source of the conflict with the Audience
Researchers. Public history and co-curation are clearly not concepts that Boon
has extensively theorised. Public history is equated with what “lay people” do
for “fun”;  where the concept perhaps suggests a playfulness in the project, it
does little to distance the concept of the public from the “non-specialist” public
of the Audience Research account. It is not difficult, for instance, to see how
'what  lay  people  do  for  fun' quite  easily  appears simply  as  the  negative
correlate  of  the  'experts  who  practice  serious  science'.  Moreover,  by
positioning  the concept  of  co-curation under  the  “umbrella  of  participation”,
Boon's  accounts  offers little  to  differentiate  co-curation  from  the  other
techniques of public participation deployed by the Science Museum. It is thus
perhaps easy to  see why, in relation to the well developed models of public
participation practice used by Audience Research, co-curation would appear to
add little to the array of techniques already used by the Science Museum. In
purely  procedural terms, there  appears  little  to  distinguish  public history and
co-curation from other concepts and techniques of public participation. 
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The way in which Boon distinguishes “co-curation” from the techniques of the
Audience  Researchers  is  in  relation  to  issues  in  science  and  technology,
specified  in  an  opposition  between  historical  versus  contemporary  issues.
Boon made this case in an introduction to a three-day international conference
hosted by the Science Museum in October 2010  titled Co-curation and the
Public History of Science and Technology90: 
“Our intention is that we will look back on today as the beginning of 
a revolution in how we engage our audiences in the history of 
science, technology and medicine similar in scale to what we 
achieved in contemporary science. We have always held and 
curated our collections on behalf of the public. This project is about 
developing better ways of doing this by working ‘upstream’ with 
audience groups.” 
In this introduction, Boon assumes a clear distinction between the participation
of audiences in contemporary science, which he suggests  is a very effective
practice in  the Science Museum, and the participation of  audiences in the
historical work of the Science Museum. This distinction between contemporary
science and the history of science thus allows Boon to suggest the uniqueness
of  developing  the  practice  of  public  participation  in  relation  to  curatorial
concerns  which  address  the  history  of  science.  However,  by  linking
participation to a specific set of issues, Boon's account also implies that public
public is not simply a concern with procedures. In this sense, we can see how
Boon's claim  might be said to  conflict  with the  approaches of the  Audience
Researchers that describe public participation as a concern with procedures. 
In  this sense, then,  Boon's  issue-specific  account  of “co-curation”  evokes a
similar  emphasis  as  recent  accounts  of  public  participation  in  science  and
technology studies (STS). These studies (see for example Callon et al., 2009;
Irwin and Michael, 2003; Marres, 2012a) have highlighted the inadequacy of
purely procedural versions of participation to account for the political relations
between publics and issues. They argue instead that publics are constituted in
relation to issues  and that  participation occurs by virtue of  a  publics being
entangled  in  complex  socio-material  relations  with  issues.  This  issue
perspective is also shared by political theory which has suggested publics form
a “community of the affected”.  The public as the “community of the affected”




spans a range of different political philosophies has a long history within liberal,
republican  and  materialist  accounts  of  the  public  (see Marres  2012  for  an
overview).  In  this  respect,  the  issue-specific  public  is  not  necessarily
incompatible with procedural versions of participation. Traditions like classical
liberalism have,  for example, long formulated 'being affected' as a condition
determining who should participate in a particular issue (such as JS Mill's harm
principle).  However,  recent  STS  accounts  depart  from  these  classical
procedural formulations of the community of the affected by  highlighting the
empirical difficulty of distinguishing between those who are inside or outside
the  community. Unlike insider-outsider formulations  of  the  public  (such  as
those  implied  in  concepts  like  “interested  stakeholders”) which  attempt  to
provide solutions to the problems of participation by reforming, extending or
inventing new procedures,  STS  accounts  of issue-publics suggest  that  such
clear cut  distinctions become blurred  when looked at from the perspective of
the actors' entanglement in issues  (Callon and Rabeharisoa,  2004).  Where
procedural  accounts of  participation  in  issues  purport  to  clearly  identify  the
public,  or those who are affected by an issue from those who are not, STS
accounts  have  suggested  that  the  issue-public  is  necessarily  problematic
(Marres,  2012).  The  idea  of  being  “problematic”  is  in  STS  accounts  not
considered  negatively  as  the  absence  of  a  solution,  but  is  rather  valued
positively  as a way of  'doing' politics. Problems are positively valued in STS
because they are considered sites for the invention of new forms of politics: as
Foucault notes (Foucault and Rabinow, 1997; see also discussion in Rabinow,
2002), the creation of problems is also the invention of new relations between
actors, discourses and infrastructures.  Problematisation, for Foucault and the
STS  accounts  following,  is  a  form  of politics  that  therefore  goes  beyond
procedural accounts of political action.  Public participation in  STS  accounts,
then,  is  a  mode of  problematisation  in  which  the  problem,  or  issue,  is
constitutive  of  the  public:  issue-publics  are  deeply  political  in  this  account
insofar as they are problematic.  From this perspective, the experiment is not
simply the procedural means which ends in the exhibition's displays, as it is in
the  co-creation  account  of  Audience  Research.  From an  STS perspective,
then, we might view the curatorial experiment of Oramics not as an attempt to
'solve' the problems of hierarchy in the relations between science, culture and
the  public  but  rather  seeking  to  amplify  this  problem  experimentally,  to
dramatise it so that it can be explored.
From the point of view of these studies,  we can see why  Boon's account of
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public  participation  as  issue-specific  would  problematise  accounts,  such as
those of Audience Research, that  assume  an  a priori  procedural  distinctions
between the public and interested stakeholders. One reason for this is that the
issue-specific  account  problematises the model of the Science Museum that
assumes a clear demarcation between insiders and outsiders. In a publication
distributed at the launch of Oramics, Boon describes participation in Oramics in
the following way:
“the project has been an exploration of how various groups think 
about the history of electronic music. Those groups have included 
at the most knowledgeable end of the spectrum, people such as 
those at the heart of Electronic Music Studios in the 1960s and 
1970s, and the BBC Radiophonic Workshop. We have also worked 
with the responses of women writers, and young people on an 
access course at the National Youth Theatre. In between has been 
an expert group of twelve current day electronic music practitioners 
and enthusiasts.”
Boon's public history  account of participation  is notable for not marking the
distinction between insiders (or stakeholders) and outsiders in its formulation of
all the groups contributing to the  Oramics as participants  in the experiment.
The  inclusion  of  all  the  groups  in  the  experiment  in  Boon's  public  history
account is qualified by some hierarchical distinctions between the participants.
Boon's  framing of  the  hierarchy  of  the  participants' in  terms of  knowledge
“spectrum”91 appears  consistent  with  the  issue-specific  approach  to
participation insofar as it  avoids the externalisation of groups  that occurs in
procedural  accounts  between  expert/lay and  stakeholder/public.  By  framing
the  participants  knowledge  in  relational  terms,  rather  than  absolute  terms,
Boon's  public  history  account  suggests an  assumption  that  the  public  is
defined relationally by historical and social proximity to the issues of Oramics,
here  framed  as  the  history  of  electronic  music.  The  curatorial  experiment
appears here not simply as the means through which these groups have been
involved in the exhibition, but more obviously the experiment seems to pertain
to the very proposition by which this range of groups are related by a common
issue.  If  Oramics is,  what  Boon  described  to  me  as,  a  “multi-viewpoint”
exhibition, then the experiment is in establishing the common concern from
91 Boon's focus on knowledge here suggests an account of the experiment which is in many 
ways unlike the 'cultural' version of Oramics I have argued for in this chapter. However, as 
the broader analysis of Boon's public history account in this chapter and others has 
argued, what is meant by 'knowledge' is clearly not the conventional cognitive category 
that is familiar to the Science Museum, since knowledge here pertains to a range of 
heterogeneous practices and experiences.
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which  multiple  view-points  can  obtain.  In  other  words,  the  curatorial
experiment, or at least an important part of the experiment, is in the proposition
that there is a common issue that unites these diverse groups in some way. In
contrast  to  exclusively  procedural  accounts  of  public  experiments,  Boon's
account  suggests that  it  is  the “issue-public”  of  Oramics which is  itself  the
curatorial proposition of the exhibition.
But,  Boon's  account  of  the  groups  participating  in  the  exhibition has  its
limitations  as an issue-public.  For example, notable  exceptions from Boon's
public history account are the artist Aura Satz whose video Oramics: Atlantis
Anew is exhibited in the gallery's cinema, and whose film strips painted in the
Oramics style are draped over the Oramics Machine in the display case, and
the film-maker Nick Street's92 documentary about the process of making the
exhibition.  The  contributions  of  both  of  these  participants  were  paid-for
commissions  for  the  exhibition.  Where  an  issue-public  would  make
distinguishing  between  'insiders'  and  'outsiders'  highly  problematic,  the
omission of these participants from Boon's public history account suggests  a
demarcation criterion about who are and who aren't participants in the Oramics
experiment. If Boon's public history account describes an issue-public then it
also  reproduces  insiders  and  outsiders  in  new  ways93.  In  the  case  of  the
omissions of Street and Satz,  we might speculate  that monetary transaction
has some impact  on their  omission as participants from Boon's account.  It
might  be  suggested,  for  instance,  that  where  money  is  involved  the
experimental  politics  can be economised,  or  shortcut, allowing the Science
Museum to specify the nature of the product to be delivered. Moreover, once
we begin to interrogate the  demarcation criteria  of Boon's account  we might
find many other participants who are rendered invisible in Boon's public history
account. Street and Satz are two highly visible exceptions because they are
named contributors to  the exhibition,  but there might  equally well  be many
others who participate in Oramics but who fail to meet the demarcation criteria
to  be counted as  co-curators.  In  this  sense,  Boon's  co-curation  account  is
limited  as  an  issue-specific  discourse  of  the  participants  in  the  Oramics
experiment. Where issue-specific approaches to participation purport to make
92 Street had previously been involved in documenting the Oramics Machine as it was first 
delivered to the UK to Goldsmiths' Mick Grierson from its previous owner in France. See: 
http://vimeo.com/21310959  (accessed 28th August 2013)
93 The chapters in this thesis draw on both Satz's video and Street's documentary in order to 
make connections between different contributions to the Oramics experiment. The 
inclusion of both Satz and Street's contributions within the Oramics experiment is one 
important point at which the account given in this thesis clearly departs from Boon's public 
history account; unlike Boon's public history and co-curation accounts, I don't exclude 
either of these contributions as participating in the Oramics experiment. 
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visible the complex entanglements in which publics form, in this case of Boon's
co-curation  account  it  seems  that  issue-specific  discourses  of  public
participation  can  also  render  invisible  or  exclude  particular  entanglements.
Though  Boon's  public  history  and  co-curation  account  of  participation  in
Oramics  appears  issue-specific  in  relation  to  the  Audience  Researcher's
procedural accounts, it nonetheless does not dissolve the problem of 'insiders'
and 'outsiders' in science. 
Conclusion
The curatorial  experiment  of  Oramics  attempts  to  create  ways  to  facilitate
public participation in science. Applying the concept of the “public experiment”
to Oramics I have attempted to avoid choosing between the different versions
of  the  curatorial  experiment  we  find  among  staff  in  the  Science  Museum.
Rather, I have suggested, the concept of the public experiment enables us to
examine some of these different versions of the curatorial experiment without
evaluating which is  a better  or more accurate account.  By  analysing  these
different versions of  the curatorial  experiment  I  have attempted to describe
some of the different ways in which public participation becomes significant in
the relations between science and culture. Specifically, I've focused here on
the  contestations between  Boon  and  the  Audience  Researchers  in  part
because both sides agree that the Oramics curatorial experiment is a response
to the problems of the hierarchies in the relations between science and culture.
Both  of  their versions  of  the  curatorial  experiment  present  the  relations
between  science,  culture  and  the  public  as  heterogeneous.  But,  in  their
disagreement  we  also  see  that  there are  potentially many  different ways in
which to account for the heterogeneous relations between science, culture and
the public. I have characterised the difference between these two positions in
terms  of  their  accounts  of  public  participation  in  Oramics:  the  Audience
Researchers' account of co-creation foregrounds procedures for representing
cultural  diversity  of  the public while Boon's co-curation account attempts to
give an  issue-specific  description  of  the  public.  These  are  not  absolute
differences, and the purpose of comparing them is not  to suggest that Boon
and the Audience Researcher's accounts fail to capture the true nature of the
curatorial  experiment.  Rather,  I  have  sought  to  show that  even  within  the
curatorial experiment we can find multiple versions of the relations between
science,  culture and the public,  and in this sense the curatorial  experiment
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does not 'solve' the problems of hierarchy in the Science Museum.
In the analysis of this chapter I've therefore attempted to situate the curatorial
experiment in relation to the Science Museum's 'turn to culture'. I've shown that
in  the  Science  Museum  “culture”  has  many  different  meanings  that  often
conflict in practice.  I've argued that  the cultural turn cannot  'solve' absolutely
the  problems  of  public  exclusion  or  the  hierarchies  between  science  and
culture. The purpose in highlighting the incomplete nature of the turn to culture
in  the  curatorial  experiment  of  Oramics  is  not  to  suggest  that  this  has
somehow 'failed'. The public participation initiatives developed for the Oramics
exhibition successfully problematise particular approaches to curating science,
such as those premised on 'deficit' models of the public. And,  in focusing on
the  disagreement  between  Boon  and  the  Audience  Researchers  I  am
suggesting  that  we  see  not  just  differences  but  also  a  series  of  shared
assumptions  about  the  importance  of  culture  in  the  Science  Museum. By
looking at the limitations of the cultural turn I have therefore attempted to make
clear not only its local challenges and limitations for these actors but also more
broadly  challenges for  the relations between  science,  culture and the public.
These  are  explored  in  more  detail  in  the  next  chapter  in  which  I  look  at
particular problem of exclusion from science.
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5.  Exclusion:  the  experimental  display  and  the
problem of 'outsiders' 
Introduction
As visitors enter the  Oramics  gallery they are confronted with signs alerting
them that what they are about to see is of an experimental character.  The
gallery displays of  Oramics  present  us with  an account  of  the invention  of
electronic music that shuns positivist and nomological explanation of invention,
as  a single  identifiable  'discovery',  in  favour  of  a heterogeneous  display  of
some of the many varied  musical and technological  developments that have
taken  place  between  the  1960s  and  present  day. In  the  Oramics  gallery
displays  we  find  amateur  musicians  mixing  with  professional  engineers,
artefacts from pop music and high art-music in the same cases,  technology
that has been hacked and repurposed by DIY electronics,  sub-cultural styles
like  acid  house  and  displays  about  the  “co-curators”  who  include  a  youth
theatre  group  and  a  group  of  “women  writers”.  As  I  described  in  the
Introductory chapter, for visitors of the Science Museum many of the displays
in the  Oramics  gallery might  seem equally at home in an art  museum;  the
displays  do  not  seem to  draw boundaries  that  would  obviously  demarcate
science  and  technology  as  culturally  extraordinary.  We might  say  that  the
Oramics  exhibition  presents  visitors  to  the  Science  Museum  with  a
heterogeneous  account of the invention of  electronic  music and  in so doing
stages the experimental gallery display as an 'inclusive' format. 
This chapter presents an analysis of the experimental gallery display via the
theme of exclusion. It  draws on the analysis of the previous chapter  which
described  how  different  versions  of  the  problem  of  public  participation  in
science  shaped  the  experimental  curatorial  procedures  of  Oramics.  In  this
chapter  I  extend  the  analysis  of  Chapter  Four  into  the  gallery  displays  of
Oramics.  I  suggest  that  like  the  experimental  curatorial  procedures,  the
experimental gallery displays  they do not solve the problems of hierarchies
and asymmetries  in  the  relations  between  science  and  culture.  But  in  the
staging of the gallery display we do see some of the key issues around which
exclusion from science has been organised, including art, amateur practices
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and gender. The question of curating an 'inclusive' exhibition about electronic
music history had animated several of the co-curation processes I participated
in  and  observed.  In  several  instances  with  the  musicians,  for  instance,  a
question was raised about the extent to which histories of electronic music we
curated  (for  a  series  of  case  displays)  should  'include'  female  artists.  The
(perhaps  tacit)  consensus  in  the  group,  however,  seemed  to  be  to  avoid
turning what seemed like a complex issue into an issue about gender. As one
of the musicians noted in an email: “By including things such as the Detroit and
early 80s New York scenes this would also fulfil the inclusiveness brief, getting
away from the 'white  male  with  a  beard'  image so closely  associated with
electronic music”.  However, in the analysis of this  chapter I  foreground  the
exclusion of women in part because throughout my research this appeared as
among  the  most  frequently  raised  issue  around  which  the  problems  of
'exclusion'  emerged,  and not  least because the gallery displays feature the
works of an explicitly gendered group of “women writers”. The “women writers”
written  works feature  as aural performances on a film loop  in the cinema of
Oramics. The exclusion of women has, of course, been a central problematic
for contemporary science and the staging of the work of the women writers, I
suggest in this chapter, provides an interesting insight into the subtleties of this
problematic.  Specifically,  I  look  at  how  the  experimental  gallery  displays,
though  inclusive  in  their  staging,  have  the  unfortunate  consequence  of
producing the women as 'outsiders' to the exhibition in new ways. In doing so, I
seek to show how exclusion provides a useful theme around which to analyse
the experimental displays of the Oramics exhibition.
Such an approach brings some risks:  this  chapter  might  being read as an
argument  that  the  Science  Museum  is  unable  to  successfully  assemble
experimental  gallery displays.  By contrast,  I  suggest  we can only focus on
exclusion  in  the  relations  between  science  and  culture  because  in  the
heterogeneous  displays in  Oramics we are invited to  treat  symmetrically the
practices  of  artists  and  engineers,  amateurs  and  professionals,  and  pop
musicians and trained Western art musicians in appreciating  the  invention  of
electronic  music.  In  other  words,  I  suggest  that  through  the  problem  of
exclusion that we are able to better appreciate the experimental public displays
we find in the Oramics gallery.
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The inclusion problem
Scheduled to close in December 2012, after a year and a half after opening in
October  2011,  the  Oramics  exhibition  is  extended  for  a  further  year.  The
Oramics Machine's Facebook page publicises the extension of the exhibition:
“Good news everyone: My exhibition is being extended for all of 
next year. There'll be a minor facelift in the Spring, but now you get 
an extended opportunity to come and see me...”94
The “minor facelift”  entails the removal of the cinema from the exhibition to
make way for a new  gallery entrance and  cafe in the adjoining space. The
cinema included contributions from the women writers and students from the
National Youth Theatre (NYT), along with two other films about the Oramics
Machine (both of which are discussed in Chapter Six). From the perspective of
the Oramics Machine,  in its anthropomorphic Facebook form,  the removal of
the cinema is largely insignificant, it is only “minor”. Indeed, the suggestion of
the Facebook publicity is that,  as a “facelift”, the removal of the cinema from
the gallery will in fact enhance the display of the Oramics Machine; it is after
all, according to the Machine, “my exhibition”. In the Machine-centred publicity,
the removal of the cinema from the Oramics gallery is of little consequence. 
The  Oramics  Machine's  “facelift”  publicity  reflects  a  view  found  in  other
accounts  of  Oramics  that  suggest  the  content  in  the  gallery's  cinema  was
particularly difficult to engage with. To many visitors it was not clear what the
contributions of the women writers and the NYT students added to the display
of the Oramics Machine. In particular, the contributions of the groups of women
writers appeared almost incomprehensible to some visitors.  One  blogger, a
sound  artist  and  DJ,  bluntly  questions  the  inclusion  of  the  women writers'
monologues in the exhibition:
“The museum’s curators, in their wisdom, appear to have decided 
that what is REALLY needed in an exhibition concerning said 
development of electronic music is in fact not music at all, but a 
handful of videos largely consisting of a number of plummy 
youngsters engaged in a ‘site-specific dramatization’ loosely 
94 See entry on December 10th 2012 at: https://www.facebook.com/OramicsMachine 
(accessed 28th March 2013)
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connected to the subject (though in another room on a different 
floor, which doesn’t strike me as very site-specific at all). There’s 
much histrionic shrieking and lots of ‘Am-Dram’ prancing, but it 
completely fails to answer questions or explain anything about the 
lady or her work. This is then followed by a series of completely 
spurious monologues apparently produced at workshops focusing 
on ‘sound, invention and oramics’, which in layman’s terms appears 
to be a polite way of saying sixth-form poetry, with very little 
invention and not a shred of Oramics in sight. Seriously, it’s teeth-
grinding stuff:
What do these things have in common with the work of Daphne 
Oram or the history of electronic music? Practically nothing, as far 
as I’m concerned.”95
To the blogger, the inclusion of the content produced by the women writers and
NYT students  in  the  Oramics  exhibition  is  a  poor  curatorial  decision.  The
blogger's  critique  is  scathing:  the  monologues,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  the
performance, have practically nothing to do with Daphne Oram, the Oramics
Machine  or  the  invention of  electronic  music.  There  is  at  best  a  'loose'
connection  between  the  NYT  students  performance  and  these concerns,
whereas in the women writer's monologues there is “not a shred of Oramics in
sight”.  The title of the blog 'Righting a Radiophonic Wrong' makes clear  the
interests of the blogger, as a sound artist and  DJ, and the perspective from
which  the  NYT  students  and  women  writers  appear  as  'outsiders'  in  the
exhibition. 
In  relation  to  the  cinema  content  a  division  appears  between  the  different
modes of  experiment  in  Oramics96. From the perspective of the  blogger,  the
performance and monologues  fail to engage with  the issues of  Oramics and
reflects an arbitrary curatorial decision to include these groups. On the basis of
the performance and monologues displayed, it is clear to the blogger that the
inclusion of the work of the NYT students and the women writers has nothing
to do with the invention of electronic music but was rather related to concerns
about curating science and technology.  Here, a divide appears between the
curatorial experiment and the experimental gallery display: the blogger invites
95 See: http://robinthefog.com/2012/01/15/righting-a-radiophonic-wrong/ (accessed 4th March 
2013)
96 It is notable that the blogger's critique is not simply a quality judgement about the 'bad' 
cinema content, although this is clearly an important part of the blog post, but rather is a 
critique that foregrounds the question of 'inclusion' as a decision made by the Science 
Museum's curators. 
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us to purify the experimental exhibition into discreet concerns of curating and
display. For  the  blogger,  the  experiment  is  simply  a  parochial  curatorial
concern that involves the women writers and NYT students and hence appears
divorced  from  the  concerns  of  the  invention  of  electronic  music.  In  this
account, the gallery displays of Oramics appear to produce new demarcations
and divisions between the modes of experiment.
The Museum's  Audience  Research  evaluation  of  Oramics (discussed  in
Chapter  Four),  which  analyses  the  responses  of  different  visitor's  to  the
exhibition,  also  reported the general difficulty visitors had engaging with the
content in the cinema. The evaluation's executive summary notes:
“The cinema space which delivered a number of the co-creative 
outputs [the women writers' monologues and the NYT students' 
performance] was confusing and little engaged with by the visitors 
who felt it lacked a clear context and framework within which they 
could make sense of the content.”  
To visitors surveyed by the Audience Researchers,  then, the cinema displays
of the women writers monologues and the NYT students performance lacked a
“context  and  framework”  with  which  to  engage.  The  difficulty  visitors  have
making  sense of  the  cinema  content  is,  according  to  the  Audience
Researchers, a failure in the staging of the content contributed by the women
writers and NYT students. Unable to understand the context within which the
women writers' and NYT students' contributions “make sense”,  these groups
appear  to  visitors  as  separated from the other  displays of  Oramics.  In  the
Audience Researchers' evaluation, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with the
women writers or NYT students contributions. Rather, the appearance of these
groups as  the  outsiders in the exhibition is an effect of  their  staging in the
gallery which fails to adequately contextualise and frame them.
The  Audience  Researcher's  evaluation  further  confirms  the  blogger's
observations  that  it  is  the  women  writers'  monologues  in  particular  that
appeared disconnected from concerns about the invention of electronic music.
The evaluation notes:
 
“The monologues were particularly confusing for the visitors. They 
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were not aware that these were produced by a group of women 
writers and that they were a response to the Oramics machine and 
the themes being put forward in the gallery – knowing this, they 
claimed, would have allowed them to engage properly rather than 
trying to make connections and links that weren’t there.” 
The analysis suggests that visitors were forced to invent connections and links
between the monologues and the other displays that in fact “weren't  there”
because they were a “response”. As a “response”, the monologues operate at
one  remove  from  the  object,  simply  interpreting and  representing the
exhibition's  concerns  rather  than  engaging  and  intervening  in them.  The
evaluation's classification of the women writers' monologues as a “response”
can  be  seen  as  consistent  with  the  distinction  made  by  the  Audience
Researchers  between “interested stakeholders”  and the excluded public,  of
which the women writers comprise the latter. 
Other  sources  of  publicity  for  the  Oramics  exhibition  further  complicate the
staging of  the women writers'  work. Unlike the NYT performers, the women
writers  do  not  feature  anywhere  on  the  Oramics  Machine  Facebook  page
through which the exhibition is publicised: from the perspective of the Machine
the  women  writers  are  largely  insignificant.  Elsewhere  on  the  exhibition's
webpage97 the  women  writers  are  excluded  from  those  groups  that  “co-
produced”98 the exhibition and instead their contributions are simply listed as a
statement of fact at the bottom of the page, lacking any justification for their
inclusion. Surveying some of the many sources publicising Oramics leaves us
with a highly ambiguous staging of the women writers works.
What follows is an attempt to understand why the staging of the women writers
works appear so problematic in an experimental display which is presents us
with an 'inclusive' account of the invention of electronic music.  One reason, I
suggest in the analysis that follows, is that the relations between objectivity
and subjectivity are deeply asymmetrical in a setting like the Science Museum.
97 The exhibition's webpage states: “This exhibition has been co-produced with a group of 
musicians and with the help of people who made electronic music in the 1960s”. It can be 
found at: www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/oramics (accessed 13 March 2013)
98 The use of the term “co-production” on the website is interesting since it is not found in any 
of the other discussions of Oramics. Co-production differs from both “co-curation” and “co-
creation” which, the analysis of Chapter Four argued, are terms that pertain to particular 
orientations in the Science Museum to museology. In Science and Technology Studies it is 
a term that is used in science and technology studies to describe the production of 
knowledge as mutually implicated in social and scientific practices (see for example 
Jasanoff, 2004). 
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Exhibitions in the  Science Museum  are necessarily  an object-centred.  And,
though the experimental  displays in  Oramics clearly show that object-centred
exhibitions do  not  necessarily  exclude  the  concerns  of  subjectivity,  they
nonetheless do not stage subjectivity in and for itself. The monologues of the
women writers, I suggest, appear problematic because they appear to stage
displays of subjectivity without object.
The argument made in this chapter is structured in two broad sections. In the
first, I contextualise the problematic staging of the women writers' works as a
problem of gender and subjectivity in science. In the second section, I look at
how  the  experimental  gallery  display  of  the  Oramics exhibition  includes
subjectivity,  but  how  this  experimental  staging  produces  new  asymmetries
between objectivity and subjectivity. In this first section, I look at the particular
problem of subjectivity in science and why subjectivity 'in-itself' is problematic
for a science exhibition. I survey feminist and cultural studies that locate such
asymmetries  between  objectivity and subjectivity  in science  within  a broader
gender politics of androcentrism. I show how from this perspective the women
writers'  monologue  contributions  might  appear  as  'feminine';  that  is,  as
symptomatic of everything that an androcentric science is not e.g. subjective,
partial, situated and so on. I then look at how the experimental gallery displays
of Oramics unsettle many of the asymmetries implied in androcentric accounts
of science and technology, not least in the displays of Daphne Oram and the
Oramics Machine. In the second part of the argument, I examine the question
of 'inclusion' in science via some feminist debates: specifically, those between
standpoint feminism and “post-gender” feminism. Subverting traditional gender
asymmetries,  “post-gender”  critiques  of  science  provide  one  lens  through
which  to  appreciate  the  experimental  displays  of  Oramics  as  'inclusive'.
However,  I  also  show  how  the  post-gender  interpretation  of  the  Oramics
gallery displays also has the paradoxical consequence of excluding the women
writers,  as  a  gendered  group.  I  argue  that  the  problematic  staging  of  the
women  writers  works  in  Oramics  points  to  some  of  the  ways  in  which
experimental  display can  reproduce  androcentric  asymmetries.  I  close with a
discussion of the possibility of 'inclusion' in science through feminist literatures.
The women writers and the problem of subjectivity in science
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The  group  identity  of  the  women  writers  is  unique  within  the  groups
participating in the exhibition both because it is the only gendered group in the
exhibition and because it is a group comprised of anonymous individuals. Each
member of the group women writers has contributed a monologue, all of which
are screened in the gallery's cinema, interspersed between a range of short
films  that  play  on  a  repeating  loop.  The  monologues  are  performed  by
unnamed actors and only the first name of each writer is shown (e.g. Corinna).
Nothing is displayed about their prior writing, backgrounds or interests of the
individual  writers.  The  women  writers  standout  from  the  other  groups  on
display in Oramics because they are gendered, anonymous99 and individuated.
Unlike the other groups participating in  Oramics I was unable to observe the
workshops in which the women writers created the monologues. I was told by
various Museum staff involved that the women writers were a vulnerable group
and that the workshops would be women-only environments run by an external
agency. In the very terms of their involvement the women writers a divide was
constructed  between  the  group and the  Science  Museum.  It  was  not  only
myself who was excluded from the engagement with the women writers but
also the Museum's male staff  involved in  Oramics.  The vulnerability  of  the
group  was  here  constructed  in  relation  to  men  but  also  in  relation  to  the
Science  Museum  as  an  institution  of  science  and  technology.  During  the
workshops the women writers themselves were not, in the first instance, told
that  the  workshops  were  a  collaboration  with  the  Science  Museum.  In  an
interview  one  of  the  Science  Museum's  associates  who  facilitated  the
workshops with the writers, described to me the dilemma of when to tell the
writers  that  their  writings  were  being  developed  for  an  exhibition  at  the
Museum. The vulnerability  of  the group of  women writers here was clearly
constructed in relation to both masculinity and to science and technology. The
safe space of the workshops, in which the gendered vulnerable group could be
realised as  writers,  is  defined here  principally  as  the  absence of  men  and
science and technology.  The gendered vulnerability  of  the group is,  in  this
sense, a relational construct which in its formulation, and in the displays of
Oramics,  enacts a  particular  relation  between  the  group  and  the  Science
Museum.
99 It could be argued that the NYT students are also largely anonymous. However, this is 
quite a different form anonymity: the students are visible in the performance and images of 
them in workshops appears on the Oramics Machine's Facebook page. Unlike the women 
writers, the NYT students may not be named or individuated.
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The  monologue  format  through  which  the  women  writers  participate  in
Oramics dramatises  the individual  member's subjectivity.  The monologue is
most  commonly  a  dramatic  form  through  which  the  inner  experience,  the
subjectivity, of a character is externalised for an audience, and the monologues
contributed by the women writers by and large conform to the conventions of
the  format.  In  dramatic  settings  the  monologue  is  a  technique  for  staging
entirely  individualised  forms  of  expression.  Through  a  monologue,  the
individual  disentangles  themselves  from the  other  characters  and  dramatic
situation to articulate something that is otherwise unable to be voiced in the
interactive setting of performance. The use of  the authors' first names as the
credit for each monologue enables members of the group of women writers to
participate in  Oramics preserving the anonymity of the women writers while
also acting as a marker for the individuation and subjective expression of each
of the group's members. Whether or not the monologues in fact reflect  the
individual  writer's  own subjective  experiences  is  irrelevant  because in  their
display  in  Oramics the  monologues  are  staged  as  vehicles  for  personal
expression. This personalisation of the anonymous participants of the group
through their  contributions  makes  them unlike  the  other  participants  in  the
exhibition. Where the contributions of the other groups tend to emphasise the
collective  identity  of  the  group  and  downplay  the  individuality  of  their
members100,  the women writers' contributions are intended to distinguish the
individuals from the collective identity which is gendered and anonymous. The
staging of the women writers as a group of gendered individuals is therefore
not  simply innate to  the group but  at  least  in part  an effect  of  the group's
relation to the other groups in the Oramics display.
As a technology for the presentation of personal experience, the monologue is
a format that is very different to conventional presentations of subjectivity in the
Science  Museum.  In  science,  personal  expression  is  often  conceived
negatively as an absence of objectivity. By contrast, displays of subjectivity in
science  exhibitions  usually  hold  a  necessary  relation  to  objectivity.
Asymmetries  between  objectivity and  subjectivity  are  apparent  from  the
moment visitors enter the Science Museum where an exhibition titled  James
Watt  and Our World is  located on the Museum's main entrance concourse
directly below the  Oramics gallery. Subtitled “the workshop, the man and the
100I am not claiming here that individuals from other groups do not appear in the exhibition, 
because they do. For instance, there are interviews with the electronic musicians and the 
case displays of the BBC's Radiophonic Workshop and Electronic Music Studios Ltd 
include quotations from individual members. However, in these instances, the focus of the 
displays is on the collectivity rather than the individual members.
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new  industrial  age”  this  exhibition  shows  Watt  in  his  workshop  which  is
positioned next to a number of enormous steam engines, including the most
famous  Boulton-Watt  engine,  that  are  specifically  designed  to  demonstrate
Watt's  engineering  principles.  The  image  publicising  the  James  Watt...
exhibition which is simply a bust of Watt's head against a black background;
the bust making clear the importance of “the man”. James Watt and Our World
in many ways  appears  the paradigmatic modern science exhibition. Science
and  technology  can  be  seen  enacted  in  entirely  different  frames  and  at
different scales: a small and simple idea made by a lone man in the workshop
has a practical technological application which revolutionises ...Our World. In
this display, James Watt, “the man”,  could be seen as  an ideas man made
heroic through technological application. Though many other exhibitions in the
Science Museum foreground men, these exhibitions do not stage gender in
any significant sense. And indeed, in the gallery displays of  James Watt and
Our World  Watt's gender is not a significant factor in the presentation of his
engineering principles. Though Watt is gendered in the publicity, the gallery
displays,  like  most  other  Science  Museum  exhibitions  foregrounding  men,
suggest  that  gender  is  not  an  important  factor  in  accounting  for  Watt's
accomplishments. And indeed, the display of Watt's subjectivity is also like the
displays of male subjectivity in other exhibitions in the Science Museum insofar
as the significance of subjectivity derives from  a necessary relation with  an
object.  Watt's  thoughts  are  presented  as  significant  in  their  relation  to  the
steam engines in the gallery displays.  In  science exhibitions,  subjectivity  is
conventionally  exhibited in object-centred formats of display; subjectivity for-
itself is not part of the world of the Science Museum that visitors enter. 
From the perspective of science exhibitions like James Watt and Our World, it
is easy to see why the women writers monologues would appear as displays of
subjectivity liberated from the concerns of objectivity;  as  simply accounts of
personal experience with no bearing on the objective concerns of science. The
monologues' focus on personal experience is well illustrated in one called I’m
free, I’m free, I’m free by a member of the group named Corinna. The first half
of Corinna’s monologue is quoted here:
“The calmness of nature on this beautiful land. Feeling safe, secure, 
loved and adored. 
Mentalness, mentalness, you CAN’T catch me! I’m free of your 
shackles, suffering and darkness.
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I thought I was mad, I thought I was crazy, but … it was always you. 
You who forced me into a relationship with the black dog, seeking 
solace for too long with that enemy.
Married to you, married too long. But, now you are gone you can’t 
hurt me any more. I feel. I live. I’m adored and I love. No more time 
shall I waste being used and abused, trodden down till I know not 
who I am.
Peace and serenity wrap me in your arms, I’m free, I’m free, I’m 
free.”
The monologue is, as its title “I'm free, I'm free, I'm free” makes clear, a work
about individual freedom. The protagonist of the monologue, the text suggests,
has been liberated from a traumatic and abusive marriage. Personal freedom
is here presented in relational form, as self-realisation free from the domination
of  another  person:  “I'm  free  of  your  shackles,  suffering  and  darkness”.
Madness is a key theme in the narrative and is again relational in character: “I
thought I was crazy but ... it was always you”. With the end of the relationship
that  dominated  her  and  made  her appear  mad,  the  protagonist  is  free.
Corinna's  monologue  is  a  deeply  personal  account  of  a  woman  who  is
liberated  from  an  abusive  relationship.  In  many  senses,  the  domination
described  in  the  monologue  serves  as  a  reminder  of  the  asymmetric
distribution of the capacity for action; the agency to act is attributed principally
to the male actor who dominates the woman. It echoes feminist critiques about
the invisibility of gender  in conventional accounts of political action and thus
the importance of the  feminist demands for symmetry, embodied in  slogans
such as “the personal is political”.  In the  Oramics  exhibition, the monologue
appears  an  important  statement  of  forms of  subjectivity  that  have  typically
been excluded in object-centric science exhibitions.
It  is in this respect that  we can understand why the  staging of the  women
writers'  work  might  appear  problematic  to visitors of the Science Museum. In
relation to object-centred displays of science, the women writers' monologues
might appear 'merely subjective'. However, in an inclusive display of Oramics
we  might  expect  that  the  displays  of  the  women  writers'  monologues  of
personal experiences would demonstratively connect or create relations with
other  displays  in  the  exhibition. Indeed,  reviews  such  as  the  blogger's,
discussed above, paradoxically provide some of the connections which might
justify their inclusion. For example, though the blogger suggests that he fails to
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comprehend how the group's monologues could in any way connect with the
“common”  concerns  of  the  Oramics  exhibition,  the  criticism  also  makes
connections that are not apparent in the gallery displays:
“It’s impossible to work out how a...few disembodied voices 
speaking of their attempts to avoid ‘MENTALNESS’ relate in any 
way to Daphne Oram’s life of strange audio adventures beneath the 
respectable facade of a converted Oast House in Kent.” 
There is a paradoxical dualism to the blogger's observations. On the one hand,
the  blogger  argues  there  is  no  relation  between  the  women  writer's
monologues  and  Daphne  Oram's  work.  However,  on  the  other  hand,  the
blogger  also  seems  to  provide  a  clear  link  between  women  writers'
monologues Daphne Oram's own subjective experience that would plausibly
justify  the former's  inclusion in  the exhibition.  This  connection between the
women writers and Oram, which the blogger suggests isn't a connection, is
constructed  on  the  basis  of  the  common experience  of  both  as  gendered
subjectivities.  Though  the  blogger  argues  that  he  fails  to  find  the  relation
between the women writers monologues Daphne Oram's life, he nonetheless
implies  a  plausible  relation  based  on  the  lived  experience  of  gender.  The
blogger's connection with the domestic space of Oram's Oast House here is in
this respect  particularly significant; domestic space being highly significant in
traditional constructions of femininity. However, though the blogger appears to
suggest  a  relation  between  Oram and  the  women  writers  on  the  basis  of
common  gendered  experience,  he  nonetheless  rejects  this  relation  as
irrelevant.  
Gender and the invisible culture of science
Where visitors to  the Oramics gallery struggle to perceive a relation between
the women writers  and  Oram on the basis of gender, for  other participants
gender clearly  appeared  an important lens through which to understand the
significance of  Daphne Oram.  In the  National  Youth Theatre  students' “site
specific”  performance, which took place before the opening of  Oramics,  one
important  theme that  recurred throughout  the performance was the idea of
“female  pioneers”.  The  first  appearance  of  the  female  pioneer  in  the
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performance was the pilot Amy Johnson with the focus shifting later to Daphne
Oram.  Performed  in  the  Science  Museum’s  Flight  gallery,  the  performers
pointed out that one of the two planes suspended from the ceiling of the gallery
was the first used by Johnson to fly solo from Britain to Australia. Next to the
plane is  a large wall display detailing Johnson's achievement. In the Science
Museum, Johnson’s achievement of solo flight is exceptional  because it  is  a
gendered  achievement; other people, men, had already made the solo flight
before Johnson but their gender is not a significant part of the display. In the
NYT performance,  Johnson and Oram are made comparable on the basis of
their gender as “female pioneers”.  In the NYT students' performance, Oram's
gender is foregrounded as significant  and comparable with other displays of
women in the Science Museum.
The NYT students'  highlighting of  the significance of  Oram's  gender  in  the
setting of the Science Museum reflects an asymmetry that is commonly found
in science exhibitions. Feminist studies of science exhibitions have shown how
gender is an asymmetric category that gets applied to women but not to men
(Haraway, 1984). Science  exhibitions about  women tend to  emphasise  their
exceptionalism in science, marking them by their gender. The gender of men,
by contrast, is rarely, if ever, a significant factor of museum displays; in science
museums, masculinity is largely invisible101. In this respect, gendered displays
in  science  museums  can  be  seen  to  reflect  the  broader  asymmetries  in
scientific  and technology. Cultural studies of science have widely noted what
Traweek (1992) coined as the “culture of no culture” of science, and similarly
the invisibility of masculinity in the displays of science museums can be seen
in this way as  the gender of an ungendered science.  Traweek's study of the
culture of high energy physics showed that the ways in which the practices of
physicists were gendered – such as in the division of labour in laboratories –
they did not appear as such in the physicists own accounts of their practices.
Elsewhere, Wajcman (1991) highlights that while technology is often presented
101The James Watt exhibition is one an exception insofar as it raises Watt's gender. However 
in the exhibition itself gender is not presented as in anyway a significant or determining 
factor in Watt's scientific and technological achievements. In most other respects, James 
Watt and Our World is an exhibition that conforms to the asymmetries of gender in 
scientific culture. Another exhibition that was notable for its foregrounding of gender issues 
during the period of research was called Codebreaker and was about the life of Alan 
Turing, the mathematician who broke the Enigma code during the second world war. The 
was exhibition was noted for its treatment of Turing's sexuality, featuring, for example, 
displays about his boyhood relationship with Christopher Morcum, and since its staging a 
posthumous pardon was granted for his conviction under anti-homosexuality legislation. 
However, a more critical account of the exhibition might argue that the focus on Turing's 
sexuality is a minor part of what is otherwise a relatively uncritical celebration of another 
heroic male scientist in the Science Museum. The explicit presentation of gender issues 
does not necessarily subvert the broader gendered asymmetries in scientific culture.
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as  “socially neutral”  its  social  organisation and  structuring  reflects  gender
inequalities  and forms of patriarchy.  In Wajcman's analysis, there is nothing
inevitable  about  the  construction  of  technology  as  masculine,  however  its
presentation as socially neutral serves to render invisible the gender politics of
masculine  dominance  inscribed  in  technology.  Indeed,  feminist  analysis  of
technical  systems  of  organisation,  variously  described  by  Lucy  Suchmann
(1995) and  Susan Leigh  Star (for  instance,  Star  and Strauss,  1999),  have
highlighted the ways in which the forms of  technical  work  that has typically
been  done  by  women  is  made  “invisible”  and  “silenced”.  The  marking  of
women  as  exceptional  is the effect of  an  implicit  androcentric structuring of
science and technology. In this respect, the gendering of Oram  in the “site
specific”  performance  of  the  NYT students  can  be  seen  to  reflect  Oram's
exceptionalism in the Science Museum.
It  is  perhaps  unsurprising  that  feminist  accounts  of  science,  which  are
principally  concern  with  issues  of  gender, have  tended  to  also  be  cultural
studies. Haraway  (1997) highlights  how  the  invisibility  of  masculinity  is
fundamental to the 20th century culture of science. Paradigmatic, in Haraway's
account, is the “modest witness”, a figure who is  integral to the founding of
modern  science.  The  modest  witness  is  the  man  present  at  the  public
demonstration,  whose  presence  and  testimony  gives  the  experimental  fact
being demonstrated  the virtual  mobility  to detach  from the conditions of  its
production (see also Shapin and Schaffer, 1985). The figure of the witness is
modest  precisely  because  he  participates  in  the  project  of  making himself
invisible and is thus  a figure through which  the invisibility of  techno-scientific
culture was written as masculine. Masculinity  and femininity  correspond, in
Haraway's  account,  to  respective  regimes  of  the  invisible  and  visible  in
science. These asymmetries in gender and science are further elaborated in
Harding's  (1986) The  Science  Question  in  Feminism in  which  the  author
describes the “androcentrism” in science's gender symbolism, gender structure
(division of labour), and in its construction of individual gender. The masculinity
of  science is also addressed historically by  Fox Keller  (1985) who  gives an
account of  the mutual construction of the categories of gender and science.
Fox  Keller argues  that  the  asymmetries  of  scientific  culture arise  from  an
historic  conjunction  between  science  and  masculinity  and  an  historic
disjunction  between  science  and  femininity.  Gendered  presentations  of
Daphne  Oram  in  the  Science  Museum,  such  as  in  the  NYT  students
performance, in many respects reflect the feminist accounts of the asymmetric
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culture of science.
And yet, in other accounts of Daphne Oram such asymmetries in science are
unsettled.  We  can  see  this,  for  example  in  the  publicity  for  the  Oramics
exhibition.  Two months prior  to  the opening of  the exhibition the  Guardian
Women's  Blog  runs  a  story  called  'Daphne  Oram:  An  Unlikely  Techno
Pioneer'102.  The  Women's  Blog  is  concerned  with  contemporary  women's
issues and is hosted on the website of the left-leaning British newspaper the
Guardian. The post about Oram is in part the result of the Science Museum's
public relations drive to promote the exhibition in the months leading up to its
official  opening.  The  Oramics exhibition's  appeal  to  a  female  audience  is
clearly an important publicity angle. As the title of the blog post suggests, the
trope  through  which  the  exhibition  is  publicised  to  women  is  the  seeming
implausibility  that  someone  like  Daphne  Oram  could  be  the  founder  of
contemporary forms of electronic music. But why is Oram's status as a pioneer
of techno so “unlikely”? If  Oram’s gender is removed as a consideration, it
seems,  in  fact,  relatively  plausible  that  a  person  who  builds  an  early
synthesiser would have influenced those who produce its contemporary forms,
e.g. “techno”, in the present day. The blog post elaborates it’s “unlikely” claim:
“Next to a pile of transistors and exposed metal, a woman with a 
pinroll hairdo tilts her head to one side and offers the camera a 
tight, prim smile. This is Daphne Oram, who, according to Science 
Museum curator Tim Boon, looked "like Margaret Thatcher . . . with 
a cut-glass accent", but helped lay the foundation for techno music.”
The opening lines of the blog post, quoted, make clear that Oram's gender is
hugely  significant  to  the  claim  that  she  is  an  “unlikely  pioneer  of  techno”.
Oram's gender and class are specified through her appearance as pertaining
to a particularly conservative mid-twentieth century image of femininity. This
conservative femininity of Oram's appearance makes for a stark contrast with
the radical “pioneering” nature of her work, symbolised by the disorganised
and rustic image of the Oramics Machine. The deliberate precision of Daphne
Oram's  feminine  aesthetics  –  the  “prim hairdo”  –  is  juxtaposed with  crude
technological materials – the “pile of transistors and exposed metal” – from
which  the  Oramics  Machine  is  comprised.  Oram's  conservative  feminine
appearance is reinforced by the quote from the Science Museum's Tim Boon:
102See: http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/the-womens-blog-with-jane-
martinson/2011/aug/07/daphne-oram-oramics-electronic-music (accessed 22 March 2013)
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Oram looks like Britain's first female prime minister “Margaret Thatcher”. The
comparison with Thatcher implicitly suggests that Oram's gender and class are
legitimate comparative factors for contextualising the significance of her work
e.g. Oram's place in the history of electronic music as potentially comparable
with Thatcher's in the history of British politics. Both Oram and Thatcher were
female pioneers in worlds dominated by men. However, the comparison with
“Thatcher” is not naïve, it is not simply a comparison of two pioneering women,
but is – particularly in the context of a left-leaning blog – deliberately ironic.
The  comparison  between  Oram  and  Thatcher  makes  an  implicit  cultural
juxtaposition  between  the  latter's  political conservatism  and  the  artistic
radicalism  of  the  former.  This  contrast  is  intensified  in  the  blog  post's
positioning of Oram as the founder of “techno”,  not only a music genre that
takes  its  name  from  the  aesthetic  of  technology  but  also  a  genre  most
commonly associated in Britain with youth sub-cultures and to the late 1980s
rave culture which  the Conservative government attempted to shut down by
legislating  against  it.  In  short,  Oram's  conservative  feminine  appearance
provides  an  important  symbolic  register  which  the  Oramics  exhibition
deliberately subverts.  By  gendering Oram in this particular way  the  Oramics
Machine  is  staged  in  Oramics as  a  radical  and  innovative  invention,  both
technologically  – through the aesthetic  contrast  of  the conservative woman
and the radical technology – and artistically – by subverting the conservatism
of  Oram's  appearance,  associating  it  to  the  radicalism  of  contemporary
electronic music's sub-cultures. Oram is only an “unlikely pioneer of techno” to
the  extent  that  her  gendered  appearance  symbolically  conflicts  with  the
aesthetics of being both a technological pioneer and an artistic radical.
The gendered staging of Oram in such publicity for Oramics is heavily ironic,
subverting the asymmetries of science. The “unlikely” claim that Daphne Oram
is the founder of techno is premised on gender and cultural symbolism that is
deliberately subverted e.g. Oram's conservative appearance is simply a means
to  highlight  radicalism of  her  work.  This  ironic  use  of  gender  and  cultural
symbolism in the blog post is a resource for the left-leaning Guardian Women's
Blog to highlight Oram's radicalism technologically,  artistically,  and, perhaps
latently, politically. In other words, there is in fact  little that is  “unlikely” about
the claim that Oram is a pioneer of techno, or at least this claim is no more
unlikely  than any other  claim about  Oram's influencing  other  contemporary
forms  of  electronic  music,  but  this  particular  staging  of  Oram  as  the
'godmother' of techno is a particularly effective way to subvert the  symbolic
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registers of gender in culture. In this sense, the common ironies in both Boon
and the Guardian Women's Blog's treatment of Oram's gender can, I suggest,
be seen to reflect broader changes in  the  cultural associations within which
femininity, technology and art are enacted. It is only “unlikely” that Oram was
the  pioneer  of  techno  from  the  perspective  of  an  androcentric view  of
technology. 
It is not only in the Guardian Women's Blog's staging of Oram, as a feminine
technologist, that Oramics unsettles gendered asymmetries. The presentation
of  electronic  and  experimental  music  in  Oramics also  indirectly  unsettles
cultural  asymmetries  through  which  gender  is  constructed.  Specifically,
Oramics is  an exhibition that  appears  to thrive on  transgressing notions of
domesticity;  the  domestic  being  a  space  which  is  highly  determined  in
gendered  divisions of  labour  and  gender  symbolism  (see  on  this  Harding,
1986;  and Wajcman, 1991). In the gendered division of labour, femininity is
conventionally  allied with domesticity;  the home being a place of  mundane
action  and consumption or reproduction, as opposed to production  which is
constitutively  masculine.  We  find  this  gendered  version  of  domesticity  in
Science Museum displays such as the 1990s exhibition The Secret Life of the
Home in which mundane domestic space is made interesting by virtue of its
“secret” technological ontology beneath the surface of the appliances used for
the execution of banal housework tasks. In contrast, the  Oramics  exhibition
presents the domestic as a necessary space for innovation, for the invention of
electronic music. A “do-it-yourself” trope characterises the exhibition's narrative
about  the  invention  of  electronic  music.  Electronic  music  composers,  the
exhibition tells  visitors,  worked “with whatever  came to hand”  and included
explicitly domestic items such as “kitchen gadgets”. In this narrative  the  self-
reliance and craft  of  electronic  musicians  could be said to  be  cognates  of
economisation and more obviously attributes of domesticity103 than qualities,
such as leadership and professionalism, that are more readily associated to
professional science and technology.  In other words, in these displays about
the  invention  of  electronic  music  the  domestic  is  staged  as  a  sphere  of
technical  innovation.  Oram's  development  of  a  high-tech  electronic  music
studio in an old “oast house” perfectly complements this symbolic subversion.
What once was the location of an historic craft – oast houses being the places
where the hops used to make beer were dried out – was repurposed by Oram
as  both  a  place  to  live  and  a  space  for  musical  experimentation  and  the
103The link between economic matters and household life being a very ancient one that was 
central, for example, to Aristotelian ideas about politics (see discussion in Arendt, 1958).
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technological development of the Oramics Machine. Moreover, the subversion
of this domestic trope extends to the display of the Oramics Machine itself. The
Oramics  Machine  is  very  literally  'home  made'.  The  gallery’s  Computer
Information Point (CIP), for example, describes Oram's brother John playing a
“vital” role in the Machine's early construction. Moreover, a sign next to the
Machine's  wave-scanners  notes  that  these  are  contained  within  an  old
“commode”104 -  a  piece  of  furniture  which  served  as  convenient  domestic
storage is,  in  this  display, the  necessary container  of  the  sound producing
components of  the Oramics Machine.  The power of  the symbolic  tropes of
domesticity  within  the  exhibition's  narratives  of  the  invention  of  electronic
music rest  on  subverting  the tacit  assumptions of  the gendered division of
labour in which the domestic stands in opposition to science and technology,
household life is opposed to productive work.  Just as the  ironic  publicity of
Oram as a feminine technologist directly unsettles gender asymmetries, so too
the broader categories through which gender is indirectly constituted, such as
domestic  space,  are  also  transgressed  in  the  displays  of  electronic  and
experimental music in Oramics.
Oramics as cyborg display
The  ironic  staging  of  gender  is  one  of  the  ways  in  which  the  Oramics
experiment  unsettles  other asymmetries  associated  with  androcentric
objectivity in science. On the wall behind the display of the Oramics Machine is
an  image of  Wendy  Carlos  sitting  in  front  of  an  enormous  early  Moog
synthesiser.  Wendy Carlos is famous in electronic music for  her  1968  album
called  Switched-on  Bach,  reproducing  Bach's contrapuntal  music on  the
monophonic  Moog  synthesiser,  as  the first  classical  record ever to achieve
Platinum record sales. Wendy Carlos is also famous for changing her gender,
having been born a man, Walter Carlos. The image of Wendy Carlos embodies
well many of the cultural mixtures we find in the displays of Oramics: classical
and pop music become hybrid in electronic music  and gender positions are
unsettled  (see discussion in Pinch and Trocco, 2004).  In the gallery displays
we see other examples of this unsettling of asymmetric cultural categories of
science and technology. We saw this for example in Chapter One's discussion
104Boon tells me that shortly after the exhibition opened a visitor wrote to correct the Museum 
that this was in fact not a “commode” but rather the container of an old HMV record player. 
Though this fact does not undermine the cabinet's domestic connotations, it is interesting 
that the Museum left the sign with the word “commode” in the case display of the Oramics 
Machine long after the error had been noted.
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of the staging of the Oramics Machine as a “boundary object”105. The Oramics
Machine  appears  a very different  kind of  object  from the closed objects of
galleries  such  as  James  Watt  and  Our  World  where  objects  univocally
represent single ideas, principles or models. In Oramics the Oramics Machine,
I  argued in Chapter One, is staged as an  object  which  is “multivalent”  and
which  “co-articulates”  many  different  registers  which  would  normally  be
excluded from exhibitions of science and technology. Indeed, it is not only the
Oramics Machine that is staged in this way but also other displays in Oramics
that  unsettle  many  of  the  other  asymmetries  such  as  high/low culture,
science/art,  which  would  normally  be  correlated  with  masculinity/femininity.
Elsewhere  in  the  gallery  images,  pop  stars  like  the  Pet  Shop  Boys  sit
alongside  those of  art-music composers like  Karlheinz  Stockhausen.  In  the
case themed “sonic frontiers”,  the pop star Bjork's latest app-album Biophilia,
an album which is generated by users' interaction with mass-produced touch-
screen  technology  like  smart  phones  and  tablets,  shares  a  case  with  the
Triadix Muse, a high-tech and limited edition algorithmic music generator built
in the  1970s by digital physicists at MIT.  Elsewhere,  a  case display themed
“make do and mend”,  shows a  children's  Speak & Spell  toy  that  has been
circuit  bent into a  noise instrument by  a member of  the group of electronic
musicians (participating in the public history project); a display of contemporary
amateur,  DIY,  sub-culture,  it  contrasts  strongly  with  the  professionally
produced, historic synthesisers on display in the Electronic Music Workshop
and  BBC  Radiophonic  Workshop  cases. The  unsettling  of  androcentric
asymmetries  in  Oramics  is  also  enacted  more  broadly  in  the  exhibition's
displays  that  mix  together  categories  correlated with  the  asymmetric
object/subject ontology of science.
One way to describe the kind of inclusive displays found in Oramics is in the
vocabulary  of  cybernetics.  Cybernetics  is  a  reference  that holds  particular
significance in Oramics.  One obvious reference to cybernetics is found in the
work of Peter Zinovieff  from the Electronic Music Studio  who was one of the
participants in the 1968 Cybernetic Serendipity exhibition. Held at the Institute
of Contemporary Arts in London, Cybernetic Serendipity was an exhibition that
brought together a range of contemporary artists and scientists  and  featured
luminaries such as John Cage. In the catalogue to Cybernetic Serendipity, the
105 Star and Griesemer (1989) describe boundary objects as: “abstract or concrete. Boundary 
objects have different meanings in different social worlds but their structure is common 
enough to more than one world to make them recognizable” (393). It is notable that the 
concept of the boundary object was developed in relation to Star's studies of gender 
politics of science and technology (Star, 2010).
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exhibition's curator Jasia Reichardt described its aims in the following way: 
“The aim is to present an area of activity which manifests artists' 
involvement with science, and scientists' involvement with the arts; 
also to show the links between the random systems employed by 
artists, composers and poets, and those involved with the making 
and use of cybernetic devices” (Reichardt, 1968: 5)
 
Reichardt's description  of  the  aims  of  Cybernetic  Serendipity  suggests  a
“systems”106 perspective  on  the  exhibition's  staging  of  interactions  between
science  and  art  (for  broader  significance,  see  discussion  of  cybernetics  in
Turner, 2008). The mixing of science and art in  Cybernetic Serendipity bears
comparison  with  the  premise  of  Oramics.  In  Chapter  One,  I  argued  that
Oramics appeared as an experiment in what Born and Barry (2010) described
as “art-science”; a hybrid field in which scientific and artistic objects, practices,
and ideas mix together with the aim of producing novelty which is reducible to
neither art nor science. In Oramics the mixing of science and art is one of the
ways in which experiments with new forms of interactivity between science and
the public is  accomplished.  The link between cybernetics and experimental
interactivity  is  highlighted  by  Barry  (1998) who  notes  that one  important
accomplishment  of  Cybernetic  Serendipity, and  cybernetics  more generally,
was to complicate the hierarchical and asymmetric accounts of interactivity in
science that accorded the capacity for interaction exclusively to humans, and
rendered non-humans as inert. In Barry's account, cybernetics is one approach
which  offers  a  potential  symmetry  in  the  treatment  of  interactivity between
humans  and  non-humans.  In  an  historical  account  of  British  cybernetics,
Pickering  (2010) argues that  the symmetrical  treatment of  the capacities of
humans and non-humans by cybernetics constituted a critiques of the ontology
of  modern  science.  Pickering  argues  that  cybernetics  replaced  modern
science's  ontology  of  knowing  and  control  with  an ontology  which,  in
transgressing  the asymmetric  object/subject  divide of  modern science, was
performatively democratic  (what  Pickering  describes  as  a  “nonmodern”
ontology)107.  What I suggest here is that the  cybernetic  emphasis on  mixing,
106One of the legacies of cybernetics is the development of “systems theory” which in the 
social sciences in most closely associated with the work of Niklas Luhmann (see, for 
example, Luhmann, 1989).
107I have here principally considered recent social studies of cybernetics, as opposed to the 
texts from which the terms originates, because I'm principally interested in the 
contemporary translation of cybernetics as a culturally significant phenomenon. It is worth 
noting that though cybernetics in this literature is widely presented as a symmetrical 
approach to techno-science, that historically this was not necessarily the principal aim that 
informed the development of cybernetics. Indeed, as a historical event cybernetics is quite 
culturally asymmetric in many ways as, Pickering's study of British male cyberneticians 
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found in  the  experimental  art-science of  Cybernetic  Serendipity,  offers  one
framework within  which to  understand the significance of  the way in which
gender is staged, or isn't staged, in Oramics.
Significantly,  the  influence  of  cybernetics has  been  translated  into  feminist
approaches to gender politics.  Haraway's  (1994) Cyborg Manifesto:  Science,
Technology  and  Socialist-Feminism  for  the  late 20th Century108 is  highly
significant for its invention of the “post-gender” figure of the “cyborg” that has
been  crucial  in  the  way  that  the  social  sciences  and  humanities  have
reappraised the relations between science and culture. Haraway describes the
cyborg as a “cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism” (117)
and argues that cyborgs are everywhere and everyone is a cyborg: “the cyborg
is our ontology” (118).  For Haraway, the cyborg is a critique of the ontology
shared by both politics and epistemology in feminist thought. Haraway argues
that an essentialised construct of “women” has been at the centre of feminist
politics  and  epistemology.  By  focusing  on  one  half  of  the  male/female
dichotomy, Haraway argues, feminist politics and epistemology has relied on a
binary ontology of gender that essentialises the category of women. Haraway's
cyborg  is  a  critique  of  this  essentialising  of gender  difference which  limits
feminist  politics  to  an  oppositional  stance  to  male-domination  and  feminist
epistemology to policing the construction of “women's experience”. In contrast,
the cyborg is Haraway's attempt to develop a new basis for feminist politics
and  epistemology.  In  polluting the  purity  of  gender  categories,  Haraway's
cyborg also collapses the ontological foundations of other related asymmetries
between organism and machine, nature and culture, materialism and idealism
etc. Haraway describes the cyborg ontology in the following way:
“The cyborg is resolutely committed to partiality, irony, intimacy, and 
perversity. It is oppositional, utopian, and completely without 
innocence. No longer structured by the polarity of public and 
private, the cyborg de   nes a technological polis based partly on a 
revolution of social relations in the oikos, the household. Nature and 
culture are reworked; the one can no longer be the resource for 
appropriation or incorporation by the other. The relationships for 
forming wholes from parts, including those of polarity and 
hierarchical domination, are at issue in the cyborg world.” (119)
highlights.
108Originally published as Manifesto for cyborgs: science, technology, and socialist feminism 
in the 1980s, I am using Haraway's updated version for the purposes of this analysis.
151
In Haraway's account, the cyborg gives feminism a new ontology based on the
interconnectedness of networks and processes of translation as opposed to
the  politics  of  hierarchical  and  essentialised  gender  categories.  With  little
respect for boundaries, the cyborg is a construct that establishes connections
between  heterogeneous  and  distributed  groups  of  actors  and  fields  of
endeavour. Cyborgs are resources through which to conceive the way in which
gender politics and epistemology are entangled within the complex issues and
networks that characterise advanced industrial societies. By rendering visible
these  complex  entanglements,  the  cyborg  opens  up  new  and  different
possibilities for feminist thought and action. 
Post-gender cybernetics appears a compelling lens through which to interpret
the staging of  Oramics.  There  is  in the exhibition's publicity, for instance,  a
fundamental  ambiguity  with regard to  whether  the exhibition is foregrounding
Daphne Oram or the Oramics Machine. Oramics is an exhibition in which the
concerns of  the Oramics Machine and Daphne Oram appear to  collapse into
one another:  the exhibition's publicity image, for instance, displays Oram at
work with the Machine with neither obviously foregrounded over the other. The
name “Oramics” – in the exhibition's title  Oramics to Electronica: Revealing
Histories of Electronic Music – therefore appears as a hybrid term that pertains
both to Daphne Oram and the Oramics Machine109. This coupling of Machine
and female pioneer through the shared name of Oramics weaves together the
concerns of objectivity and biography each of which is integral to the other. In
its idiosyncrasy, the Oramics Machine needs Oram's biography to situate it in
history. In the exhibition this is achieved by bringing the Oramics Machine into
relation  with  the  inventions  of  Oram's  contemporaries  with  whom  she
collaborated  and  critically  responded.  The  inventive  work  of  Oram's
contemporaries  are  displayed  in  the  cases  immediately  adjacent  to  the
Oramics  Machine  featuring  the  BBC  Radiophonic  Workshop  –  the  studio
founded by Oram which is credited with revolutionising the use of sound in the
broadcasting corporation  (Niebur, 2010) – and the Electronic Music Studios
(EMS) – founded by Peter Zinovieff  who Oram had taught to cut tape and
create  music  concrete  (which  Zinovieff  subsequently  rejected  in  favour  of
computer music). These case displays are both significant of Oram's personal
and professional relationships with the people who worked in both studios and
therefore brings the Oramics Machine into a comparative relation with their
109And indeed, the term “Oramics” has other referents, including her studio and philosophy, in 
its usage in Oram's (1972) only published book An Individual Note of Music, Sound and 
Electronics.
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inventions  and  impact  in  electronic  music.  It  is  as  an  effect  of  Oram's
biography  that  the  Oramics  Machine  is  brought  into  relation  with  these
particular inventions as opposed, for example, to inventions of Bob Moog (the
Moog synthesiser). Just as Oram's work in the BBC and in relation to EMS
establishes the Oramics Machine as an invention worthy of comparison with
the more established inventions of these studios, so too Daphne Oram as a
biographical personality attains legitimacy in the Science Museum through the
machines surrounding her in the gallery's images and in the cases.  Oramics
appears  inseparably both  a display of the  Machine and  of  Oram  and at the
same time is irreducible to either. In this cybernetic staging of the exhibition
“Oramics” appears the name of a cyborg.
We can see therefore how Oramics could be interpreted through post-gender
cybernetic  theory  as  an  inclusive  exhibition  exhibition.  Unsettling  the
demarcations  of  androcentric  models  of  science,  we  might  see  how  the
cybernetic  displays  of  Oramics propose  new hybrid  relations  and  forms of
interactivity between science  and culture. In other words, it allows us to see
how those previously excluded from science exhibitions – such as the public,
women,  art,  pop  music and so on – could  be included in  an experimental
gallery display.  Through a cybernetic  post-gender  lens,  the gallery  displays
could be interpreted as an attempt to stage the relations between science and
culture as heterogeneous. However, as I will argue now, such an interpretation
of Oramics does not 'solve' the problem of exclusion from science. If Oramics
is interpreted as a cybernetic post-gender displays of science then, I suggest,
it nonetheless reproduces some of the asymmetries that Haraway's  figure of
the cyborg was invented to critique.
Discontinuities  between  curatorial  experiment  and
experimental display
The  interpretation  of  the  Oramics  gallery  displays  as  cybernetic  and post-
gender offers one explanation for why the women writers appear as outsiders
and not participants in the experiment: in relation to the “post-gender” cyborg
staging of the Oramics experiment, the women writers' monologues appear as
displays of the “women's common experience”,  as a staging of gender that
concepts like Haraway's cyborg critique. In contrast to the cyborg displays that
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unsettle and  mix  together  categories  like  art/science,  high/low  culture,
masculine/feminine  (etc),  the  women  writers'  monologues  appear  as
expressions of pure gendered subjectivity. Where a cybernetic interpretation of
the Oramics exhibition would blur the asymmetric demarcations of androcentric
science, the monologues appear to  confirm  these asymmetries  by inhabiting
the categories belonging to latter side of the male/female dichotomy: femininity,
subjectivity  and vulnerability  appear mutually  constitutive of  the asymmetric
ontology  that  the  cybernetic displays  critique.  From the  perspective  of  the
cybernetic post-gender interpretation of Oramics, we can see why the women
writers' monologues  might  appear  to  enact  asymmetric  relations  between
science and  culture  that  the  cyborg  critiques  and,  as  such, present  the
inclusion of the women writers works as a separate curatorial concern. 
A version of this explanation was offered to me by Boon who suggested that
the  problematic  appearance  of  the  women  writers  work  was  a  procedural
failure  in  the  experimental  curatorial  collaboration  with  the  group.  In  a
conversation,  Boon  tells  me  that  the  women  writers  monologues  were  an
“incompletely realised and risky experiment”;  their failure to  engage with  the
concerns of  Oramics are,  for  Boon,  principally  a  failure  in execution  in  the
curatorial experiment. The decision to involve the women writers, Boon says,
was because he considers Oram's gender to be a significant issue. The groups
the  Museum  had  invited  to  participate  in  curating  the  exhibition,  were
overwhelmingly male dominated and Boon therefore describes the decision to
involve the women writers as a political choice. The logic of the women writers
participation,  sketched by Boon, was therefore a logic of identity politics.  The
involvement  of  the  women  writers  was  both  “risky”  and  “an  incompletely
realised  experiment”  because  it  was  conducted  at  arms  length  from  the
Science Museum through associates.  It was a process from which Boon and
others were excluded on the basis  both of their gender, as men, and, in part
also, their institutional affiliation to the Museum. However, Boon suggested to
me  that if the techniques of involving the women writers had been different
then  they  could  have  made  important  contributions  to  the  experimental
exhibition. If  there had been more workshops, more time and more contact
between those in the Museum  staff  working on the  Oramics  exhibition and
those  running  the  workshops,  the  women writers  could  have  contributed
materials that really engaged with the exhibition's concerns about the invention
of electronic music. Had the curatorial experiment with the women writers been
executed more effectively by the Museum they could have produced 'cyborg-
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like'  contributions  in  which  the  women's  concerns  could  be  demonstrably
related with the Oramics Machine. However, the exhibited monologues are an
“incompletely  realised”  experimental  curatorial  procedure and,  as  such,  the
women  writers  works  appear  problematic  in  the  experimental displays  of
Oramics.  
Boon's  account of  the  “incompletely  realised”  curatorial  experiment can be
understood as a procedural explanation for why the women writers appear as
'outsiders'  in the Oramics gallery displays. This procedural account maintains
the integrity  of  the  curatorial  intentions informing the  collaboration  with  the
women writers and attributes the problematic display of the monologues to the
technicalities  in  the  procedural  execution. In  this  account, the  gendered
women writers'  could  have  been  made cyborg-like through  the  process  of
collaborating with the Science Museum's curators:  the vulnerable subjectivity
of the writers could have been synthesised with the curators'  concerns about
science and technology. Instead, in the incompletely realised monologues, the
women's subjectivity is simply left hanging, unattached to an object. Without an
object to attach to,  monologues  like Corinna's  appear  more like  displays  of
“women's  common  experience”;  in relation to the cybernetic interpretation  of
the Oramics gallery displays the monologues appear as the very thing that the
post-gender cybernetics critiques.  In relation to the cybernetic  displays in the
exhibition,  the  monologues  appear as  pure  expressions  of  subjectivity  and
vulnerability,  the  women  writers  appear  disconnected  from  the  issues  of
Oramics and as “incomplete” participants in the  curatorial  experiment.  From
the  perspective  of  the  cybernetic,  post-gender  interpretation  the  gallery
displays, the procedural account gives a simple explanation of the problematic
staging of the women writers' work.
In  the  procedural  account,  the  gendered  women  writers  monologues  are
judged by the extent to which they assimilate to the  post-gender staging  of
Oramics.  In  this  respect,  the procedural  explanation  is  also  a  highly
asymmetric account of the place of gender in  the  curatorial  experiment.  On
one hand, gender is said to be significant enough in the exhibition of Daphne
Oram  that  the women writers' gender alone qualifies them as participants in
the  curatorial experiment. On the other hand,  in their “incomplete” realisation
the displays of  the women writers monologues appear  problematic;  gender
alone is insufficient to establish connections with the other displays in Oramics
gallery. The curatorial experiment and the experimental display appear here as
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discontinuous activities, on of which is concerned with gender while the other
isn't.
Partial objects and situated knowledges
The  problematic  appearance of  the  women  writers'  work  can,  I  have
suggested, be  seen  as  an  effect  of  discontinuities  between  the  curatorial
experiment  and  the  experimental  display.  In  establishing  a  discontinuity
between these two  modes of experiment, it also fragments the object of the
Oramics exhibition. One account of objectivity in science that perhaps offers a
'partial' solution to the problems of the gallery displays in Oramics is found in
feminist standpoint theory. The relationship between feminist standpoints and
concepts of objectivity in science has, as Sandra Harding's (2004) overview of
standpoint  theory since the 1970s makes clear,  always been  controversial.
One account of the relationship between objectivity and feminist standpoints is
found in Haraway's (1988) concept of  “situated knowledges”.  The concept of
“situated knowledges” was an attempt by Haraway to respond to tensions  in
feminist  accounts  of  objectivity  identified  by  the  feminist  scholar  Sandra
Harding. In The Science Question in Feminism, Harding (1986) had critiqued
the  limitations  in  the  contemporary  feminist  accounts  of  science.  Where
feminism had  highlighted  the  androcentrism of  science,  Harding  sought  to
extend feminism from the “Woman Question” –  asking how women could be
equitably treated by science – to the “Science Question” – asking  whether  a
masculinist science could still be used for the emancipatory ends of feminism.
In  The Science Question...  Harding therefore sought  to develop  a “feminist
epistemology”. Harding argued that the tensions and dissonances of feminist
critique were not counter to science but rather embodied the same tensions
and dissonances within science. Harding therefore called for feminists both to
maintain a critique of science while also constructing a “successor science”.
Haraway's “situated knowledges” was a response to the tensions of Harding's
dual aims which sought both to realise the radical contingency of all knowledge
claims  while  also  maintaining  a  feminist  critical  empiricism.  In  Haraway's
cultural  account,  objectivity  has  never  been  opposed  to  either  radical
contingency  or  empirical  criticism;  in  effect,  Haraway  argued,  Harding's
problematic  dualism  is  unfounded.  Objectivity  in  Haraway's  conception  is
partial and situated:
156
“Objectivity turns out to be about particular and specific 
embodiment, and definitely not about the false vision promising 
transcendence of all limits and responsibility. The moral is simple: 
only partial perspective promises objective vision. All Western 
cultural narratives about objectivity are allegories of the ideologies 
governing the relations of what we call mind and body, distance and 
responsibility. Feminist objectivity is about limited location and 
situated knowledge, not about transcendence and splitting of 
subject and object. It allows us to become answerable for what we 
learn how to see.” (1988: 582-583)
For  Haraway,  feminist  objectivity  as  “situated  knowledge” is  not  an
epistemological solution  to  the  dual  concerns  of  feminism  and  objectivity.
Instead, the concept of “situated knowledges” offers a cultural re-description of
objectivity as always partial and limited; these are the only conditions in which
objectivity is possible. Feminist standpoint theory thus offers one model for the
inclusion of subjectivity in science.
The problems of the experimental gallery displays of Oramics to accommodate
the work of the women writers can, I suggest, be better appreciated from the
perspective of standpoint feminism. Though gender is clearly important in the
staging  inclusive gallery displays,  both in  the presentation  of  the gendered
women  writers  and  the  ironic  staging  of  Daphne  Oram  as  a  feminine
technologist,  it  is  notable  that  references  to  feminist  concerns of  the
experimental curatorial process – such as the reasons for including the women
writers  as  participants  –  appear  largely  absent  from  the  gallery  displays
exhibition. Given the significance of feminist analysis of science, which identify
gender as one of many conceptual asymmetries in science, it is surprising that
Oramics does gender but not feminism. As Chapter Four made clear, the turn
to culture at the Science Museum is  more often  formulated as a critique of
epistemology, of text book histories of science, and of demarcationist accounts
of  science.  Hence, for all  the discussion of the  importance of gender in the
Science  Museum's  “cultural  offer”,  feminism  is  not  explicitly  included  or
referenced at  any point.  For  instance,  in  the  same corporate  publicity  that
celebrates  the  cultural  offer  of  the  Science Museum  also  makes  clear  the
importance of gender issues in science but makes no reference to feminism. A
section of the Museum's (2013) Annual Review 2012-13 is, for example, titled
“Celebrating  Women  Who  Excel”  and  emphasise  the  importance  of  more
women  entering  careers  in  science.  However,  without  situating  this  as  a
feminist approach, the publicity appears more obviously like the assimilation of
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women  into  science.  If  it  is  not  a  feminist  approach,  then  the  publicity's
championing of the participation of women in science seems more obviously to
repeat the same asymmetries in publicising the relations between science and
culture.  The  absence  of  feminism as  a  reference  point  in  Oramics can,  I
suggest, give  us  insight  into  why  the  work  of  the  women  writers  appears
discontinuous  between  the  curatorial  experiment  and  experimental  gallery
display. 
From  the  perspective  of  feminist  standpoint  theory,  the  problematic
appearance of the women writers in  Oramics  gallery displays would appear
less  the failure of the women writers' monologues to make connections with
the objective concerns of the exhibition – the machines, technologies etc – and
more  the  failure  of  the  experimental  display  to  be  sufficiently  inclusive  to
encompass the lived experiences described in the women writers' works. The
problematic  appearance of  the women writers  is  dramatised in  the  various
publicity  for  the  exhibition  which presents  different  and  conflicting
characterisations  of  the  women  writers  as  participants,  respondents,  co-
curators, co-creators, co-producers. The  'problem'  of  this gendered group is
perhaps in  part  that  their  works  of  subjective  expression  remind  us  of  the
demands of equity feminism for gender symmetry. Harding (1986) summarises
the symmetrical challenge of equity feminism as the following:
“Until both the “emotional labour” and the “intellectual and manual 
labour” of housework and child care are perceived as desirable 
human activities for all men, the “intellectual and manual labour” of 
science and public life will not be perceived as potentially desirable 
activities for all women” (53)
In many respects, the challenge of equity feminism is much greater for the
Science  Museum  than  the  challenge  of  the  cultural  turn.  For  the  Science
Museum to acknowledge the symmetry of equity feminist arguments, it would
also  have  to  recognise  its  inadequacy as  an institution  to  address gender
issues  in  science.  The  challenge  of  equity  feminism  is  not  simply  about
assimilating  more  women  into  science  but  rather  the  much  bigger,  almost
totalising, challenge  of  changing  gender  structures,  symbolism,  and  the
gendered division of labour. In short, the challenge of equity feminism could
seem to  require  nothing  short  of  the  complete  dismantling  of  the  Science
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Museum  in its contemporary guise110.  And in this sense, it also makes clear
why  asymmetries  between  objects  and  subjects  in  science  are  not  easily
'solved'.
The  problematic  appearance  of  the  women  writers  in  the  Oramics  gallery
highlights a discontinuity between the treatment of objectivity and subjectivity
in  the  curatorial  experiment  and  the  experimental  displays.  If  we  were  to
interpret these discontinuities through feminist theory we can see the tensions
between standpoint approaches and cybernetic post-gender approaches to the
question of gender in science. 
With  the  removal  of  the  women writers,  and the  other  contributions in  the
cinema, from the Oramics gallery, the exhibition is comprised solely of cases
displays of objects. From the perspective of the Oramics Machine's Facebook
page this may be an improvement to the experimental gallery display but from
the curatorial perspective the removal of the cinema would seem to suggest a
problem in the experimental curatorial procedure.  By looking at the problems
caused by the experimental displays of the women writers' works we see some
of the complex empirical  obstacles to  'solving'  asymmetries in the relations
between science and culture. 
Conclusion
This  chapter  has  looked  at the  experimental  Oramics  gallery  displays in
relation to the problem of exclusion. I've focused here on the display of work by
the women writers in the Oramics gallery which I have discussed in relation to
the more  complex problem of  the exclusion of women from  science.  In the
chapter I have highlighted some of the ways in which the display of the women
writers' work becomes empirically problematic. To explain the problems of the
display of the women writers' work, I have spotlighted debates within feminist
theories  of  science,  specifically  between  standpoint  theory  and  the  'post-
gender' cyborg theory. In these debates we see different ways in which gender
is  a  problem  for  science.  The  display  of  the  gendered  women  writers  in
110It is not too hard to find parallels between the equity feminist perspective and that, 
discussed Chapter Four, of Baudrillard's critique of the capacity of museums to function as 
democratic cultural institutions. For Baudrillard, the proposition of the democratic museum 
would entail its dismantlement as an institution.
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Oramics,  and  the  responses  they  stimulate  in  the  curators,  Audience
Researchers  and  reviewers  poses  the  question  of  gender  in  science as  a
practical problem. In discussing feminist theory I have tried to show that how
these debates affirm the  problem of gender in science.  This does not mean
they  simply  admit  failure  in  identifying a solution  to the exclusion of women
from science but instead affirm the value of  this  problem for  unsettling  many
very  different  kinds of  exclusion  in  science.  I've attempted to  highlight  this
empirically by describing the displays of the women writers' works not only as
a problem that is particular to this group, but which is linked to much broader
asymmetries  in the relations between science and culture. For instance, the
criticisms of  the women writers  highlight  problems  concerning  the relations
between objectivity  and subjectivity,  technology and art,  and  rationality  and
affectivity.  Using the problem of the women writers as a way into discussing
the  asymmetries  in  the  relations  between  science  and  culture  importantly
enables  us  to  better  appreciate  the  accomplishment of  the  experimental
displays in Oramics which bring together musicians and engineers, amateurs
and professionals, and so on. When we recognise the scale of the challenge of
exclusion  from  science,  we  appreciate  better  the  accomplishment  of  the
experimental displays of Oramics.
By  applying  the  concept  of  the  public  experiment  to  Oramics,  we find  the
problem  of  the  women  writers  reveals the  challenge  of  assembling  the
exhibition as an experimental apparatus. As a public experiment, the Oramics
exhibition can be seen to bring together very different modes of experiment: of
which  in  this  thesis  I  foreground  curatorial,  display  and  music.  In  the
problematisation of the display of the women writers we also see the problem
of  maintaining  continuity between the different  modes of experiment.  In the
responses to  the  women writers'  works we find criticisms that  they  neither
relate to  the  subject  matter  of  experimental  electronic  music  nor  are  they
experimental enough to fit with the cyborg-like displays in the gallery.  In the
curator's  response  we  find  the  women  writers  as  too  challenging  for  the
experimental  procedures  devised  to  facilitate  their  participation  in  the
exhibition.  In  different  problematisations  of  the  women  writers  we  find
discontinuities  emerge between  the  various  modes of  experiment:  was  the
women writers' participation just tokenistic part of the curatorial experiment, in
what ways does their writing address experimental electronic music, and how
does their experimental display relate to science and technology? Highlighting
the appearance of these discontinuities enables us to appreciate more clearly
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the  work  involved  in  making relations  between  the  different  modes of
experiment  we find in  Oramics as well as the fragility of the exhibition as an
experimental apparatus. 
It might be objected that by presenting gender as a problematic in Oramics it is
actually  me who is  'gendering'  the  experimental  setting,  not  only  forcing  a
problem  artificially  onto  the  exhibition  but  also  reinforcing,  rather  than
challenging, the  exclusion  of  women from science.  This  has  not  been  the
intention  of  the  analysis  in  this  chapter,  but  I  accept  that  it  is  a  risk  that
accompanies  the  analytical  choice  to  foreground  gender  and  the  issue  of
exclusion.  In the analysis  I have attempted to  show empirically how  gender
becomes  problematic in relation to the experimental  gallery displays  and in
doing so to  discuss more broadly  both  asymmetries in the relations between
science and culture, and the challenge of continuity in assembling Oramics as
a public experiment. To affirm that the Oramics exhibition does not 'solve' the
problem of the exclusion of women from science is not to say that it fails as an
inclusive exhibition.  Instead, highlighting the absence of a solution serves  to
affirm that multiplicity and heterogeneity of the relations between science and
culture  in which asymmetries and exclusions are problems. In other words,
rejecting the notion of the experimental experiment as a solution to the culture
problem of science enables us to be attentive empirically to the ways in which
the  multiple  modes of  experiment  in  the  Oramics  exhibition  and  the  very
different kinds of work involved in bringing them together.  I discuss the work
involved in making relations between science and culture in the next chapter in
which I focus on the work of experimental electronic musicians like Daphne
Oram in mediating relations between music and electro-mechanics.
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6.  Media:  the  Oramics  Machine  as  electronic  music
experiment 
Introduction
The  use  of  music  in  experimental  exhibitions  is  not  new,  not  least  in  the
Science  Museum.  Music  has  often  been  used  both  in  exhibitions  that
communicate experimental results, and in interactive exhibitions as a means of
engaging the public with science.  Indeed, we arguably find both of these uses
of music in the Oramics gallery in which a track titled 'Introduction' composed
on  the  Oramics  Machine  by  Daphne  Oram  is  played  on  loop  from
loudspeakers,  and  a  touch-screen  interactive  installation  simulates  the
Oramics  Machine  allowing visitors to  experiment with  composing their  own
sounds. Experimental science  exhibitions  have  often  drawn clear
demarcations  between  sound-science  and  art-music:  science  can  explain
sound to the public as vibration physics while music is presented for public
appreciation.  In  Oramics, by contrast, electronic music is staged as  a  hybrid
medium that  is part  art-music and  part  sound  physics111.  In  other words, in
Oramics  we find  that  electronic  music is  staged as  an  experimental medium
itself:  the Oramics Machine,  for instance, is  the material evidence of Daphne
Oram's experiments with “drawn-sound” composition techniques. This chapter
address the theme of electronic  music as an experimental  medium and in so
doing explores further the ways in which the Oramics exhibition might be said
to address the 'culture question' in the Science Museum. 
Visitors to Oramics are told that electronic music experiments like those staged
in the gallery displays lead to the invention of new sounds that revolutionised
the  public  soundscape.  As  an  exhibition  about  the  invention  of  electronic
music,  Oramics  foregrounds  the  experimental  collaborations  between
111 In this chapter I focus the analysis around the concept of sound rather than music. This is 
both to emphasise the fact that the electronic music we find in Oramics is staged as sonic 
invention and because unlike the concept of music, which is highly loaded, sound is less 
determined as a sociological analytic and therefore more amenable to the analysis of 
experimental things.
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musicians and engineers through which new sounds were created.  This  is
exemplified in the exhibition's centre-piece, the Oramics Machine  which was
developed in  a collaboration between the composer  Daphne Oram and an
electronic engineer Graham Wrench. In Oram's home-studio at Tower Folly the
composer collaborated with Wrench (and other engineers) throughout the early
1960s  in  an  attempt  to  build  a  machine  that  could  realise  Oram's  aim  to
develop  graphical  composition  techniques,  or  “drawn-sound”.  Though  the
Oramics  Machine  was  never  demonstrated  as  a  technological  or  artistic
innovation  in  Oram's  lifetime,  it  is  nonetheless  staged  in  Oramics as  the
invention  through  which  Oram  created  drawn-sound  compositions.  Having
never  left  the  studio  where  it  was  developed,  the  Oramics  Machine  is  an
invention in which we find many traces of the collaboration between Oram and
Wrench; in the Oramics Machine, Oram's drawn-sound is staged as the result
of  complex  and  difficult work  that  brought  together  musical and  electro-
mechanical  practices.  In  Oram's drawn-sound experiments  electronic  music
appears a highly 'impure' medium that is part music, part electro-mechanics.
In the Oramics exhibition visitors do not have to look hard to see some of the
traffic between the different modes of experiment I have identified in this thesis
so far (i.e. curatorial and musical experiment, and experimental display). In the
documentary film show in the Oramics gallery the curator Tim Boon enthuses
about the Oramics Machine and Daphne Oram's sound experiments:
“The discovery of the Oramics Machine has been one of those great 
events in a curator’s working career. It's a real bit of home brew. 
Just by looking at it you can tell that it was always work in progress, 
that it was always being modified, and it's unique. Daphne Oram is 
an absolute gift to an exhibition-maker. What was going on in her 
head was a sort of unbounded musical imagination, where she was 
thinking in terms of pure sound.” 
Boon  tells  viewers  that  one  of  the  reasons  Oram  is  such  a  “gift”  to  an
experimental  curator like  himself  is  her  highly  experimental  approach  to
musical practice, her thinking as “pure sound”. Indeed, during my ethnographic
fieldwork in the Science Museum I came across many other examples of how
music and sound were  used as mediums with which to  experimental  curate
displays of science. For instance, at the launch of Oramics, Boon announced a
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public contest112 to remix some of Daphne Oram's compositions113. During the
period of my research, the Science Museum  also  hosted an interdisciplinary
conference  on  sound  called  Supersonix114,  bringing  together  very  different
kinds  of  academics,  artists,  musicians,  and  technologists115.  On  other
occasions  the  Museum  hosted  two  separate  performances  of  the
contemporary  experimental  music  group  Icebreaker  –  a  hybrid  group  of
orchestral  and electronic  instruments  –  performing songs from Brian  Eno's
album  Apollo:  Atmospheres  and  Landscapes  and  Kraftwerk's  back
catalogue116. And during the period of study, the Science Museum employed its
first  ever  “sound  artist  in  residence”,  the  composer  and  academic  Aleks
Kolkowski who performed at various events using early mechanical recording
and  amplification  technologies,  such  as  the  auxetophone117,  an  early
phonograph,  from  the  Museum's  collection.  Indeed,  in  numerous  informal
conversations Boon would discuss with me the ways in which electronic music
and experimental sound permitted curatorial experimentation, even going so
112The remix contest is in many ways another example of some of the tensions of the 
'cultural' logics of experimentation that are enacted in different Science Museum staff's 
accounts of Oramics. A celebrity judging panel, which included luminaries such as Brian 
Eno and DJ Spooky, were convened to choose a winner from the many entries to the 
contest. The remix contest suggests a cultural logic of participation in which multiple 
translations of the same object, the Oramics Machine's audio samples, are produced by 
heterogeneity and distributed individuals/groups. The audio samples constitute a means of 
assembling a range of heterogeneous individuals and groups from which a winner 
emerges. In many ways, the format of experimental contestation invoked by the remix 
contest is not dissimilar to the forms of experimental contestation through which early 
modern science developed (for discussion of experimental contest in early modern science 
see Shapin and Schaffer, 1985). For more information see: 
http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/about_us/press_and_media/press_releases/2012/03/Wi
nner%20announced%20for%20OraMIX%20remix%20competition.aspx (accessed 5th 
February 2014)
113The Museum subsequently released online several tracks of audio recorded by Oram on 
the Oramics Machine, with an open invitation for anyone to remix these samples into 
contemporary tracks. The remixing of audio here became a practice that extended the 
experimental curatorial and museological logics informing the Oramics exhibition. Oram's 
digitised audio tracks here invent a new material means through which the Museum could 
facilitate mass participation from groups with heterogeneous knowledges and practices. In 
contrast to procedural or instrumental accounts of experiment, the remix contest makes 
clear how media are indissociable from the modes of experimental practices we find in 
Oramics.
114See the Supersonix conference website: 
http://www.exhibitionroad.com/supersonix/conference (accessed 20th September 2013).
115The conference's subtitle, “celebrate the art and science of sound”, makes that sound was 
considered an object of interdisciplinary concern and in this sense the conference evinces 
a particular experimental form that Born and Barry (2010) have called “art-science”. As 
discussed in Chapters One and Two, art-science, Born and Barry argue, is a form of 
interdisciplinarity that seeks to multiply the interactions between science and society. In its 
experimental form, art-science can create new forms of interactivity – in objects, practices, 
discourses – between science, art and the public.
116Performing the concert in the Science Museum's lecture theatre, the Icebreaker 
performances enacted a mix of cultural dichotomies, most obviously perhaps the genres of 
popular and classical music. A short essay by Boon discussing the Icebreaker performance 
in relation to the Apollo space mission makes clear its curatorial and museological 
significance. This can be found at: http://www.icebreakerapollo.co.uk/content/tim-boon-
chief-curator-science-museum (accessed 5th February 2014)
117More information about Kolkowski's use of early recording and amplification technologies 
can be found at: 
http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/smap/collection_index/aleks_kolkowski_sound_artist_in
_residence.aspx (accessed 9th September 2013)
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far  as  to  suggest  that  it  was the  “easy case”  for  curating  an experimental
cultural display.  Such examples  highlight some of the diverse  traffic between
experimental sound, curatorial  experiment  and experimental display that we
find  in  the  Science  Museum,  and  would  seem  to  pose  quite  clearly  the
questions of 'relations' between science and culture.
Indeed,  culture is a particularly  important  category in the field of  electronic
music.  Electronic  music  has,  for  instance, often  been associated with  both
counter-cultural  movements  and their subversive  uses of  technology.  From
synthesiser and tape music events in the  US  counter-culture scenes of the
1960s  (Bernstein,  2008;  Pinch  and  Trocco,  2004;  Turner,  2006)118,  to  the
multimedia “happenings” of the 1960s New York down town art scene (Turner,
2008)119; to sub-cultural exchanges that took place in UK “sound-system” clubs
and dance halls  (Hebdige, 2002; Henriques, 2010)120; to the 'moral panics' in
newspapers generated by large scale rave events in the late 1980s and early
90s (Reynolds, 2013; Toop, 2001)121: such diverse studies  illustrate some of
the ways in which electronic music innovations have often developed around
new cultural movements that respond critically to developments in science and
technology. While such studies make clear the case for why electronic music
experiments  are  interesting  in  terms  of  relations  between  knowledges,
technologies  and  social  identities  they  largely  do  not  address  how  these
relations are negotiated in electronic music innovations, instead focusing more
on the effects of musical and technological developments (Pinch and Trocco,
118During the 1960s and early 70s experimental sound exhibitions were key sites through 
which the counter-culture movement emerged in the US and UK. Pinch and Trocco's 
(2004) account of synthesiser demonstrations discusses the significance of these events in 
the establishment of counter-culture scenes. For instance, they discuss how the San 
Francisco Tape Music Centre served as the venue in which artists, composers, political 
dissidents, engineers, and entrepreneurs mixed (Bernstein, 2008).
119Fred Turner (2008) describes how the experimental “happenings” and other experimental 
electronic music events in the 1960s downtown scene New York, involving musicians like 
John Cage and David Tudor, repurposed cybernetic technologies and techniques of 
“automation” for a counter-culture political imagination. In opposition to the top-down, 
rationalised bureaucracies of cold-war corporate America, Turner shows how the chance 
interactions central to Cage's experimental sound displays created interconnected spaces 
which liberated individual participants from such political hierarchies. Turner argues that 
these were important events in the popular imagination of contemporary “cyber-culture”.
120Hebdige (2002) describes how the sound-system club nights were introduced into Britain 
by the West Indian migrants and began as an institution of the black working-class youth 
sub-culture. Hebdige argues it was fundamental to British reggae culture and influenced 
the development of punk in the 1970s, through a dialogue between these different working-
class youth sub-cultures. Elsewhere, Henriques (2010) describes the ontological 
significance of sound-systems and dance-hall culture in the formation of Jamaican 
diaspora. 
121Reynolds (2013), for example, describes the 'moral panics' created in the UK press by the 
“folk devils” of the drugs acid and ecstasy during the development of rave culture in the 
1980s. Reynold's describes the how, in their conspicuous consumerism and ideologies of 
individualism, rave events subverted the Thatcherite politics. Reynold's discusses how the 
introduction of anti-rave legislation transformed rave into a highly organised leisure 
industry.
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2004; and, Turner, 2006, 2008 are clearly exceptions here). 
In  order to better appreciate the  Oramics  exhibition as an experiment in the
relations between science and culture  I  want  to  explore  approaches to  the
study of musical invention that open up the division between the technical and
cultural.  The approach that gives the theme of this chapter focuses on how
musical inventions can be said to be processes of “mediation” (for an overview
see Hennion, 2003). Mediation, is in these studies, describe as the processes
of material exchange, modification, distortion and translation that reorder the
relations  between  people, things,  knowledges  and  practices.  Such  studies
have described the ways in which music can be said to mediate relations, for
example, between computing and art-music (Born, 1995) or elsewhere shown
how such an approach can create associations between groups as diverse as
drug users and amateur musicians (Gomart and Hennion, 1998). Approaching
musical invention as a process of mediation, I suggest in this chapter that the
electronic music experiments we find in  Oramics are not only bring together
music and electro-mechanics as  discreet  formalisms, but rather reveal  their
complexity  as  practices.  By looking  at  the  electronic  music  experiments  in
Oramics as mediations between practices we can appreciate better the ways
in  which  the  exhibition  could  be said to  be  an experiment  in  the  relations
between science and culture.
In this chapter, then, I'm concerned with how the electronic music experiment –
of which Oram's experimental  work in developing drawn-sound composition
techniques and building the Oramics Machine  to realise them  are staged as
exemplary  –  can  be  said  to  raise  the  question  of  culture  in  the  Science
Museum. To describe the  electronic music experiment as  mediating relations
between  music  and  electro-mechanics  is  to  offer  an  account  of  electronic
music  as  a  medium that is  materially  complex.   In this chapter I'm going to
contrast  this  complex  “media-specific”  approach  to  the  electronic  music
experiments  of  Daphne  Oram  with  what  I  describe  as  “audition-centric”
accounts.  Audition-centric  approaches  are  concerned  principally  with  the
auditory perception and experience of sound. In audition-centric models, the
concerns of materiality – the 'objective' character of sound – are the concerns
of  sound production and are considered to  some extent  separate from the
'object-less'  experience  of  auditory  perception,  the  consumption  of  sound.
Audition-centric approaches to experimental sound,  I suggest,  propose very
different  relations  between  science,  culture  and  the  public  than  do  media-
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specific approaches. In this chapter, then, I seek to demonstrate what we gain
from media-specific  approaches to  the  experimental  sound with  the aim of
appreciating how  Oramics  might be said to experimentally mediate relations
between science and culture. 
This chapter first looks at Daphne Oram's experiments with “drawn-sound” and
the  collaboration with the electronic-engineer,  Graham  Wrench, to build the
Oramics  Machine.  In  Oram's  drawn-sound  experiments I  suggest  that  the
relations  between  music  and  electro-mechanics  cannot  be  grasped  if  we
reduce their practice to simple formalisms but only if we accept that they are
“multivalent”.  I suggest this enables us to see how Oram's experiments with
drawn-sound blurred the lines between technical and artistic practices and in
this  sense  can  be  see  to mediate  relations  between  science  and  culture.
Following this account of Oram's drawn-sound experiments, I then address an
important critique that focusing on the material mediations of sound 'objectifies'
sonic invention and participates in the domination of culture  by science and
technology. This criticism argues of the need to construct a cultural account of
sound based on its auditory perception; that is, the ways in which people listen
to, are affected and engage with sound aurally. In the following section I then
compare media-specific  and auditory-centric approaches to the experimental
sound exhibition using a case study of another exhibition featuring the work of
Daphne Oram alongside contemporary sound artists.  I  argue that  auditory-
centric approaches to the experimental sound exhibition, like the interactive
public understanding of science model,  risk  “black-boxing” the materiality of
sound and offer us only a very limited account of  what is experimental about
the electronic music we find in  Oramics. In concluding, I  specify some of the
ways in which the exhibition of the Oramics Machine in the Science Museum
can be said to an experiment in relations between science, culture and the
public. 
'Drawn-sound' as mediating between music and electro-
mechanics 
In this section I'm going to discuss the Oramics Machine built by Daphne Oram
through which  the composer  attempted to realise her  aspiration to  develop
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“drawn-sound” composition techniques; a  vision to control  all  parameters of
sound using  graphical forms.  In the analysis below I discuss Oram's drawn-
sound experiments drawing on an approach to sound developed in the sound
studies of Pinch and Bijsterveld (2012) who describe sound as “thing-like”, as
something  materially  complex.  Pinch  and  Bijsterveld  argue  that  by
foregrounding the materiality of sound we gain an appreciation of how sonic
inventions  from  synthesisers  to  noise  campaigns  produced  new  kinds  of
relations between science and culture  (see also Bijsterveld, 2008; Pinch and
Trocco, 2004).  Being attentive to the materiality of drawn-sound, I suggest
here, enables us to similarly describe some of the ways that Oram's drawn-
sound  experiments  mediated  heterogeneous  relations  between  music  and
electro-mechanics. In the analysis that follows I'm going to look at how electro-
mechanics and music are staged as “multivalent” mediations of drawn-sound.
Where music and electro-mechanics might be considered separate formalisms
that offer aesthetic and technical explanations of electronic music experiments,
I show how the drawn-sound experiments of Daphne Oram can be appreciated
as more complex practices in which the making of relations between these two
spheres were often frustrated in practice and a long time in the making.
Daphne Oram was a musician at the heart of developments in electronic music
in  Britain.  As  an  electronic  musician  and  an  employee  at  the  British
Broadcasting  Corporation  (BBC),  Oram  founded  the  Corporation's
Radiophonic Workshop in 1958 with the aim of creating an electronic music
studio comparable to others in Paris and Cologne and to experiment with the
respective  musique  concrete  and  elektronische  musik  techniques  they  had
developed (Niebur,  2010).  Beginning largely  with creating sound effects for
radio dramas, the Workshop subsequently also became renown for the music
and jingles  it  produced for  flagship BBC radio  and television  programmes,
such as the theme tune for the cult British television series Dr Who. In the
BBC's own history of the Radiophonic Workshop (from which Oram is largely
absented122),  the studio is celebrated as the setting in which engineers and
composers worked together, often on tiny budgets, to innovate musically and
technically,  inventing  new kinds of  sound  and  music  for  consumers  of  the
broadcast media (Briscoe and Curtis-Bramwell, 1983). Entering the BBC in the
1942 as a junior programme engineer, for which she gave up a place to study
at the Royal College of Music, Oram continued to pursue her music by using
122Oram's absence from the BBC's formal history of the Radiophonic Workshop has been 
discussed by several authors (Marshall, 2008; Niebur, 2010).
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empty  radio  studios  to  work  on  electronic  music  compositions  outside  of
working hours. According to recent biographers  (for example, Hutton, 2003),
Oram's particular interest in drawn-sound developed while at the BBC where
she encountered an oscilloscope for the first time, an instrument that visualises
a sonic  frequency, and inquired whether  the  process could be reversed to
create  sound  with  graphical  techniques.  However,  Oram's  vision  for  the
Workshop differed greatly from the BBC's leading to her departure after less
than a year working there. Leaving the Corporation behind, Oram sought to
pursue her ambition to create a machine that could control sound graphically,
setting up her own studio in a converted oast house called Tower Folly in the
British countryside. After receiving a grant from the Gulbenkian foundation to
build the Oramics Machine, Oram later employed an electrical-engineer named
Graham Wrench. Despite having few sources of funding for her work – beyond
the Gulbenkian grant Oram received a handful of commissions for advert and
film soundtracks – Oram nonetheless pursued the development of the Oramics
Machine with Wrench in order to realise her drawn-sound ambitions. Beginning
work on the Oramics Machine in the early 1960s, the first composition to be
recorded  using  the  Machine,  called  Contrasts  Essconic,  was  completed  in
1968 (Grierson and Boon, 2013). The Oramics Machine's slow realisation now
appears perhaps even more exaggerated within a decade of electronic music
history that saw the invention of the synthesiser and a new intensity of artistic
experimentation in an emergent counter-culture (Pinch and Trocco, 2004).  
The Oramics Machine is  unique – there are no others Oramics Machines –
and is an invention that never made it out of Oram's home-studio. As such, it is
an  artefact  in  which  we  find  distinctive  traces  of  the  collaborative  work
undertaken between Oram and the electronic-engineer Wrench.  The Science
Museum's  exhibition  stages  the  Oramics  Machine  as  an  instrument  that
mediated an experimental collaboration between a music composer and an
electro-mechanical engineer. In the display the Oramics Machine is comprised
of  two  central  components123:  (1)  its  programmer124,  and  (2)  its  wave-form
scanners125. The programmer was designed so that Oram could draw shapes
123This account of the Oramics Machine as comprised principally of a programmer and wave-
scanners is that presented in the Science Museum's exhibition, but it is also found in 
Oram's and other accounts of it (Manning, 2012; Oram, 1972).
124The programmer is the most iconic of the two components, comprising the film-strips onto 
which Oram is pictured drawing (above). Like the black and white keys of a contemporary 
keyboard synthesiser, Oram used the programmer to control the pitch, the volume and the 
application of vibrato to the sound that the wave-scanners produced. 
125The wave-scanners were designed specifically to read the idiosyncratic shapes that Oram 
drew onto them: Oram's graphical approach an attempt to bring precision to the definition 
of the wave shape that was lacking in the geometrically defined sine, square and triangle 
waves of standard oscillators used in electronic music. 
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onto  35mm film strips  running across it,  each strip  assigned to  a different
parameter  and  processed  with  photoelectric  sensors.  The  frame  of  the
programmer  is  made  from  repurposed  Dexion,  an  industrial  system  for
producing light  metal  shelving.  Both of  35mm film and Dexion were mass-
produced materials and relatively cheap to acquire, and (in contrast to Oram's
account in which design followed artist specification) their use in the Oramics
Machine has been subsequently characterised as more likely the use of an
expedient material which met Oram's immediate practical needs rather than a
prior design choice  (Mullender, 2011). A similarly resourceful inventiveness is
suggested  by  the  Machine's  electro-mechanical  design  which  evidences
Wrench  the  bricoleur  as  much  as  it  does  the  engineer.  The  photoelectric
sensors  that  read  the  shapes  Oram  drew  onto  the  film  are  particularly
conspicuous in the case display of the Oramics Machine as they hang limp
and corroded from the programmer's Dexion frame. In an interview for a music
technology  magazine,  the  engineer,  Wrench,  describes  the  unorthodox
engineering  practice  of  repurposing  ordinary  transistors  to  create  the
Machine's photoelectric sensors: 
“We had so little in the way of components in those days. 
Transistors had only recently appeared on the general market, so 
they were still pricey. I needed to use light-sensitive photo-
transistors but they were far too expensive, at almost a pound each. 
This was at a time when a good wage was about £25 a week! But I 
started experimenting and discovered that I could take apart the 
ordinary transistors. Scraping off their covering of paint turned them 
into photo-transistors, so I made my own.”  (Marshall, 2009)
Wrench's description of the choice to repurpose ordinary transistors to create
the Oramics Machine's photoelectric sensors makes clear that this was not
only a theoretical determination of electro-mechanics but also a consideration
of home-economics. In Wrench's account thrift in consumption, the budgeting
of income and reusing existing materials were all significant considerations in
building the Oramics Machine's programmer.
Traces of the particular biographies of Oram and Wrench also appear in the
particular assemblage of other main component of the Oramics Machine, its
“wave scanners” which were designed to read hand-drawn wave-forms that
Oram  drew  onto  glass  slides.  The  wave  scanners  are  comprised  of  two
cathode ray tubes that scan the shape of the drawn wave-forms, controlling
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both the pitch of  the Machine's  oscillators and producing the timbre of  the
sound. This very particular electro-mechanical design of the wave scanners
was in large part an effect of professional background of the engineer, Wrench,
who had worked with radar technology in the British airforce126. And, what is
perhaps most striking about the wave scanners, certainly when we see them
somewhere like the Science Museum, is the faded white wooden container,
formally  a  piece  of  storage  furniture  in  Oram's  house,  used  to  house  the
electrical  components.  The  contrast  is  stark:  the  once  stylish  and  delicate
piece of home furniture is presented with its doors and top open to reveal the
bright yellow cathode ray tube scanners and corroded circuitry. The cabinets
open top section makes visible the exposed circuitry that tuned the oscillators
below which are Oram's handwritten notes E, A ,D, G: “it's tuned like a guitar”
one sonic artist noted127. The unique electro-mechanical design of the wave-
scanners and their casing in a piece of furniture at once material traces of the
particular social identities of Oram and Wrench, the setting and the economic
necessities the shaped their collaboration in the pursuit of drawn-sound. 
The exhibition of the Oramics Machine at the Science Museum stages drawn-
sound in a way that, I suggest, makes experimental particular styles of practice
that are conventionally considered proper to science and technology.  Drawn-
sound is presented in  the display of the Oramics Machine  as  a  multivalent
invention:  it was  a  composition technique  which Oram sought to realise,  an
electro-mechanical  design of the Oramics Machine,  and a concept  within a
broader philosophy about the 'vibrational universe' outlined  in Oram's  (1972)
only published book  An Individual Note of Music, Sound and Electronics.  By
looking at the experimental display of drawn-sound I suggest we can elaborate
further ways in which the exhibition of the Oramics Machine can be said to be
an experiment in relations between science and culture.
126On the influence of Wrench's background in the British airforce see Marshall (2009) and 
Manning (2012). The notion that sound technologies are shaped by earlier advances in the 
military existence of modern societies was perhaps most forcefully argued by Kittler 
(1999), who advanced a kind of military-technological determinism in his discussion sound 
media. That the Oramics Machine was developed by Oram in collaboration with an airforce 
engineer repurposing radar technology could very easily be interpreted as further 
conformation of Kittler's thesis. However, in this chapter I argue that such determinism 
would leave us poorly equipped to account for the Oramics Machine as an experiment of 
the home-studio, since we would have already determined that its inventiveness lies in 
technology. By contrast, in this chapter I argue that once we consider the home-studio as a 
domestic experiment then the question of technical practice is no longer easily separable 
from the other modes of practice that we find there. In this sense, the juxtaposition of 
Wrench's military background with Oram's imaginative compositional background marks 
the particularity of the Oramics Machine as an artefact that mediates not only between 
different practices but also between different biographies.
127See video of the sonic artist receiving the Oramics Machine as it is delivered to the UK 
from France: http://vimeo.com/21310959 (accessed 20 September 2014)
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At its opening, the exhibition of the Oramics Machine included a recent copy of
Wire magazine, open at the pages where a feature article describes Daphne
Oram's work with “drawn-sound”.  The article,  titled 'The Woman From New
Atlantis' (Wilson, 2011), describes at length Oram's philosophy of drawn-sound
(the title of the article reflecting Oram's fascination with Bacon's description of
the sound-house), its abstract summarising the piece: 
“Best  known  for  her  co-founding  of  the  Radiophonic  Workshop,
Daphne Oram was more than just a pioneer of electronic music.
Developed in  the 1960s her  Oramics  machine and drawn-sound
technique  were  components  in  a  radical  holistic  philosophy  that
synthesized multiple strands of New Age thought in an attempt to
unlock the mysteries of the vibrational universe.” (29) 
The article outlines Oram's interest in spiritualism from an early age and its
application in the drawn-sound techniques Oram developed for the Oramics
Machine. The article also discusses at length the forms of New Age thought
that later culminated in the publication of  An Individual Note  (Oram, 1972).
Both the  Wire article  and  An Individual  Note  suggest  that  the drawn wave
forms  are  central  to  understanding  Oram's  aspirations  for  the  Oramics
Machine. Drawn sound was not simply a subjective preference that informed
the  machine's  electro-mechanical  design  or  the  development  of  a  new
compositional technique, although it was also these, but in these publications
the concerns of machine design and composition technique are synthesised in
Oram's own idiosyncratic philosophy which sought to reconfigure the relations
between musicians and machines.  In these texts Oram attributes particular
significance to particular shapes suggesting that drawn-sound is far from an
arbitrary aesthetic preferences128. Indeed, we see this further in the gallery's
cinema where  a  film of  the  Oramics  Machine by  the  artist  Aura  Satz  was
accompanied by Oram reading from An Individual Note:
“We’re  going  to  enter  a  strange  world  and  we’re  going  to  find
composers will be mingling with capacitors, transistors are going to
be transmuting triplets, and, perchance, metaphysics may creep in,
to  mate  memory, music  and magnetism in  some strange sort  of
eternal triangle.”
128See discussion of “CELE” and “ELEC” shapes in both the Wire article and Oram's book
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As  Satz's  camera  moves  over  the  body  of  the  Oramics  Machine,  Oram
describes  drawn-sound  in  relation  to  the  concerns  of  electronics,  music,
metaphysics  and  human  psychology,  which  are  entangled  within  Oram's
idiosyncratic “Oramics” philosophy129. 
In the gallery information, the Oramics Machine is described as a “mechanical
system”130 built in the 1960s which Oram later abandoned in the 1980s in order
to develop the system on an Apple II computer131.  Mechanical philosophies,
129The hybridity of these different concerns about sound are discussed at length in An 
Individual Note which provides an account of what Oram calls the “Oramics philosophy”. 
Like texts written by other experimental composers of the mid-twentieth century (such as 
John Cage and Pauline Oliveros), An Individual Note is a highly eclectic and idiosyncratic 
mixture of influences: combining, amongst other things, contemporary music criticism, 
didactic explanation of electronics theory and musical theory, and a highly idiosyncratic 
metaphysics that draws on sources from Western classical tradition (Greek myth, Latin 
etymology) and Eastern spiritualism (ancient Chinese symbolism, for example). By 
synthesising all of these aspects into a coherent philosophy is Oram created the blue-print 
for a “machine-with-humanising-factors” that could enhance, rather than diminish, the 
composer's individuality (for broader discussion of the text’s cultural relevance see 
Henriques, 2010). An Individual Note is structured in such a way that the Oramics Machine 
is presented as though derived from these problematics (although it was published 
considerably later than the Machine was built), the text specifically emphasises the 
importance of its graphical control system in maintaining the composer's control over all 
parameters of the sound produced by the Machine. Oram's sonic experiments with 
electronic music thus entailed a particular approach to technology, locating its central 
concern in the relation of the human composer to the machine.
130This is the phrase used in the gallery's Computer Information Point positioned in front of 
the Oramics Machine. 
131The idea that the Oramics Machine was a forerunner of computational developments in 
electronic music was a common view among some of those working at the Daphne Oram 
Trust who worked with the Science Museum to create the display.
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Daphne Oram's drawn wave forms, displayed in the Science 
Museum
which have occupied a central  position in the knowledges and practices of
modern science and technology (see Shapin, 1998; Whitehead, 1926)132, offer
accounts of the materiality of experimental machines as aggregates of their
component parts. As we saw in Chapters One and Two, machine displays in
science  and  technology  exhibitions  have  often  emphasised  the  need  for
rational understanding of mechanical components, often established in direct
contrast to the aesthetic appreciation of an object. A mechanical explanation of
the  Oramics  Machine's  drawn  sound  would  relegate  the  status  of  Oram's
drawn  shapes  to  an  arbitrary  aesthetic  preference  i.e.  that  the  Oramics
Machine's drawn sound can be reductively explained simply by looking at the
mechanics  of  the  object.  However,  in  the  gallery  displays  of  Oramics,  the
Oramics machine's electro-mechanical functioning does not appear reductively
explained but rather staged as one mediation of drawn-sound. It is a display in
which the aesthetics and mechanics of drawn-sound are not easily separable.
In the Science Museum, this staging of the Oramics Machine as a “mechanical
system” is distinctly heterodox in comparison with many other exhibitions of
mechanical  science and technology133.  In  Oramics,  the concerns of  electro-
mechanical design are staged in hybrid relations with a range of concerns to
which  they  are  typically  antithetical.  The  staging  of  the  Oramics  Machine
suggests that, far from being an arbitrary aesthetic preference, drawn sound is
a significant factor in accounting for what was inventive about the Oramics
Machine, as a machine. 
On the wall of the case housing the Oramics Machine displays the quotation
from  Bacon's  New  Atlantis  described  as  “Oram's  favourite  passage”.  The
quotation describes “Sound-houses” where sonic experiments take place:
“Wee have also Sound-houses, wher wee practise and demonstrate
all sounds and their Generation. Wee have harmonies and lesser
slides of  sounds. Wee make diverse tremblings and Warblings of
Sounds […] Wee have also diver Strange and Artificall Eccho’s. We
have also means to convey Sounds in Trunks and Pipes, in strange
Lines and Distances.” 
The passage of Bacon's text was pinned to the wall of the BBC Radiophonic
132Of course, the Oramics Machine was an electronic device, but the analogy with 
mechanical philosophy – as a philosophy that seeks to explaining the functioning of a 
system as an aggregate of its smaller elemental parts – still holds as the philosophy 
informing its display.
133See, for instance, Chapter One's description of the presentation of steam engines in the 
Science Museum's Energy Hall
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Workshop by Daphne Oram: several accounts suggest that the text embodied
Oram's aspirations for the Radiophonic Workshop, which she later sought to
realise in the Oramics Studio and in the invention of the Oramics Machine (see
Niebur, 2010). The sound-house, described by Bacon, is a space in which the
experimenter  can  “practise  and  demonstrate  all  sounds”;  the  quotation
describes  a  space  that  is  specifically  organised  for  sound  experiments134.
Though  Bacon  is  widely  recognised  as  a  pioneer  of  experimental  natural
philosophy, the display of the  New Atlantis  here is  also a display of Oram's
subjectivity, sonic imagination and biography135.
134In Bacon's New Atlantis, the sound-house is just one space of experimentation among 
others and in this sense the quotation above can be situated within a broader account of a 
civilization organised around the practices of experimental science. The New Atlantis is a 
novel that describes the discovery of a remote island civilization called Bensalem by a 
European ship voyaging in the Pacific Ocean. The central institution of organisation 
described in the book is “Soloman's House” and which is ordered by intellectual 
specialisation to serve the interests of its imperial rulers.  Shapin (1998) locates the New 
Atlantis at the intersection of Bacon's natural and political philosophies; as well as being a 
natural philosopher Bacon was also a highly successful politician at the turn of 17th 
century England, serving as both Attorney General and Lord Chancellor. Shapin argues 
that the New Atlantis makes the link between Bacon's natural and political philosophies: 
the symbiosis of knowledge and political order depicted in the New Atlantis is the utopian 
imagination on which the institutions of modern science are founded. Solomon's House in 
the New Atlantis, Shapin suggests, provides a “blue print for the formal organization of 
scientific and technical research in 17th England” (Shapin, 1998: 68); it is a model of 
coordinated specialisation that anticipated the bureaucratic arrangement of science within 
the modern state. The quotation about the “sound-houses” can, according to Shapin, be 
situated more broadly within Bacon's utopian imagination of a society in which scientific 
research is politically co-ordinated through bureaucratic structures. In the utopian unity of 
Bacon's respective natural and political philosophies knowledge and order enacted a 
symbiotic and mutually reproductive relationship. Though the display of the quotation from 
the New Atlantis appears in one sense as a display of Oram's personal influences, 
although clearly not a claim that Oram was in any way advancing a Baconian agenda, the 
display nonetheless makes clear that both Oram and Bacon found sound significant as a 
media of experimentation. 
135See also Boon's blog about the Bacon quotation on the Science Museum's website here: 
http://blog.sciencemuseum.org.uk/collections/2011/03/25/we-have-also-sound-houses/ 
(accessed 10 May 2013)
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In the gallery displays, Oram's drawn-sound technique is presented as a form
of  “programming”  staging  the  Oramics  Machine  as  an  early  computing
instrument. In the gallery information, for instance, we are told that the display
of  the Machine was “co-curated”  with  computer  scientists  from Goldsmiths.
And yet,  in the Science Museum the Oramics Machine appears a distinctly
heterodox  computing  instrument.  The  publicity  image136 for  the  exhibition
shows Oram programming the Oramics Machine by drawing onto the 35mm
film strips that run across it. The programmer is the most iconic of the two main
components  of  the  Oramics  Machine,  the  other  being  the  wave  scanners
(discussed above)137. The programmer, the text tells us, controlled the pitch of
the sound, the volume and the application of vibrato to the sound. The text
describes  a  binary  system on the  Oramics  Machine's  programmer  through
which Oram could very precisely specify the pitch of the sound. However, there
are  notably  no  images displayed in  the gallery  of  Oram doing this  kind of
precise binary programming. Instead, and in contrast to the dominant image of
machine programming associated with the submission of the programmer to
the machine, in the gallery's images Oram's programming is presented as a
form of drawing. Oram does not sit to programme but rather stands over the
Oramics  Machine.  It  is  an  image  of  programming  that  emphasises  the
136Publicity as a concern with the spread of ideas and information that has been highly 
influential in Western notions of political action, and in this respect the image of Oram and 
the Oramics Machine is highly significant.
137The difference between the programmer and the wave-scanning components of the 
Oramics Machine was often characterised by Museum curators and researchers as the 
difference between the white and black keys on a keyboard synthesiser (the programmer) 
and the pre-set buttons (the wave-scanners) that change the sound from, for example, a 
horn to a violin. 
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Publicity image for the Oramics exhibition, courtesy 
of the Daphne Oram Trust. 
movement  of  the  programmer's  body  and  aesthetic  form  which  contrasts
strongly with the conventional displays of machine programming that appear in
the Science Museum's computing gallery. The male programmers displayed in
the computing gallery appear seated or in another position in which they are
physically subordinated by the enormous early computing machines such as
ERNIE138 with  which  they  work.  Women appear  in  the  gallery's  images  of
programming,  predominantly working in punch card offices.  In a particularly
striking image, a woman sits punching cards in the foreground while a man at
the back of the room stands to stare intently at the switches and lights on the
machine.  In  contrast  to  the  displays  of  the  computing  gallery  that  present
programming as a practice of submitting to the machine's demands for order
and discipline, Oram's programming appears a form of compositional liberation
in  which  human gesture  and  aesthetic  intuition  are  used  to  discipline  and
control the Oramics Machine. The display of Oram's approach to programming
is not, as we might consider it today, principally a cognitive or linguistic practice
but  rather  an embodied  material  practice that  is  aesthetically  intuitive.  The
staging of Oram's drawn-sound technique as “programming” thus allows us to
appreciate a broad range of concerns that are left out of singularly mechanical
explanations of programming. It is a display that does not explain drawn-sound
as “programming” – that is, programming is not simply a technique of electro-
mechanical  control  – but  rather  allows us to  appreciate programming as  a
multivalent practice that is historically situated, gendered and embodied.
By  focusing  on  both  Oram's  experiments  with  drawn-sound  and  the
experimental display of the Oramics Machine in the Science Museum gallery, I
suggest,  we  gain  an  appreciation  of  the  ways  in  which  electronic  music
inventions can be said to be experimental in terms of the relations between
science and culture. By describing some of the mediations of drawn-sound we
see  how  musical,  electro-mechanical and  programming  practices  appear
difficult to disentangle from the setting of invention at Tower Folly, Oram and
Wrench's  biographies,  Oram's  philosophical  writings,  and  the  display  of
machines  in  science  exhibitions.  In  the  exhibition  of  Oram's  drawn-sound
experiments,  conventionally  technical  styles of  practice  such  as  electro-
mechanics are “co-articulated”  with a range of other concerns (Marres, 2011)
which  include  musical  composition,  philosophy  and  human-machine
interaction.  In  the  displays  of  the  Oramics  Machine  we  find  that  music,
electronic  engineering  and  programming  appear  much  less  easy  to
138Information about ERNIE can be found at the Science Museum's object-wiki: 
http://objectwiki.sciencemuseum.org.uk/wiki/ERNIE_1 (accessed 02 August 2013)
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disentangle  than  technical  pedagogy  and  aesthetics  have  often suggested
they are. In the exhibition of the Oramics Machine in the Science Museum we
see the work of  mediation:  the struggles,  frustrations and DIY approach of
Oram and Wrench over many years and the collaborative work of computers
scientists  and curators  in  staging  the  Machine in  the  Science Museum.  In
short,  we  see  some of  the  very  different  ways  in  which  relations  between
technical and musical practices were mediated in Oram's invention of drawn-
sound.
Objectifying culture? An auditory critique of sonic mediation
It might be objected that by foregrounding the material mediation in the above
account of  Oram's  “drawn-sound”  experiments that  I've paid little attention to
drawn-sound as auditory experience. This is to some extent true, and it is not
the intention of this chapter to present an account of sound as media without
listening.  But  it  is  nonetheless  true  that  in  treating  sound  as  materially
mediated we risk overlooking the fact that most cultural appreciations of sound
are experiential. Critics might argue that sound is material in its production but
becomes culturally significant when it is consumed as auditory experience. At
worst,  it  might  be argued that focusing on the material  mediation of  sound
'objectifies'  sound  as  a  technological  form;  extending  and  legitimating  the
domination of culture by science and technology. Certainly it is true that in the
social  sciences and humanities there are many approaches to the study of
sound that are concerned principally with auditory experience, foregrounding
the ear and practices of listening as the means to apprehend sound. Examples
of  such  approaches  include  auditory  culture  (Bull  and  Back,  2003),
anthropology of the senses  (Ingold, 2000),  soundscape studies  (Thompson,
2004), and music criticism  (Toop, 2001). In approaches centring on auditory
experience, the study of sound is concerned with the particular ways in which
we come to know and interact with the world. What might be loosely called
'audition-centric' approaches – that is, approaches whose principal concern is
with the auditory perception and experience of sound – are concerned with
different modes of sense perception, the various social meanings of sounds,
and  the  ways  in  which  sonic  phenomena  are  used  by  different  actors  to
achieve political ends. From the perspective of these cultural approaches to
sound, it might be argued that by failing to foreground the lived experiences of
178
sound the materially mediated account gives an inadequate account of sound
as  a  cultural  phenomenon.  By  'objectifying'  sound  in  particular  material
mediations,  this  critique  suggests  that  sonic  culture  is  here  reduced  to  a
technological issue.
Social  theories including  critical  theory,  cultural  studies  and  public
understanding  of  science  (PUS)  have  widely  highlighted  the  risks  of  the
'objectification of culture' by science. I focus here on PUS because it arguably
the most empirically  significant in the context of the Science Museum (in the
sense that it informs the categories and narrative of the curators, see Chapter
Two's  discussion).  In  PUS  models,  culture  forms  the  context  into  which
experimental inventions produced by science are introduced139. To avoid the
objectifying and dominating culture, PUS researchers argue that we need to
correct our understandings of the relations between science and culture. One
model of these relations that has been particularly influential for experimental
sound exhibitions is “interactivity”, as described by Andrew Barry. As discussed
in  Chapter  Two's  literature  review,  Barry's  (1998) account  of  the  Science
Museum's  LaunchPad exhibition,  the  'hands-on'  children’s'  exhibition
developed in  the 1980s,  argues that  the  experimental  interactive exhibition
created particular kinds of relations between science, technology and culture.
Though the visitor's free experimentation with their “untutored body” enacts a
spectacle of the active and self-governing citizen – an act that embodies liberal
ideas of progressive enlightenment and the realisation of individual autonomy
through participation – the interactive exhibition in fact serves as a vehicle for
the diffusion of science. For Barry, the interactive exhibition helps 'solve' the
problem  of  population  governance  in  advanced  technological  societies.
Indeed,  in  the  contemporary  LaunchPad gallery  we  find  several  'sound'
exhibits that aim to teach children about physical principles through interactive
engagement.  Exhibits  in  LaunchPad such  as  the  “Vibration  Station”140 and
“Sound Patterns”141 use sound as a medium for this particular didactic form of
interactivity.  In  interaction  with  these  LaunchPad exhibits  the  materiality  of
sound is made knowable to visitors haptically as vibrations; sound in these
139 See discussion in Chapter Two's literature review. In critical PUS accounts like Wynne's 
(1992b) study of the Lake District sheep farmers, we see how undervaluing the cultural 
context of technical practices and the lived experience of the individuals they concern risks 
undemocratic and technological domination of lay cultures. 
140Further information about the Vibration Station can be found at: 
http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/objects/interactives/launchpad/vibration_station.aspx 
(accessed 9th September 2013)
141Further information about Sound Patterns can be found at: 
http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/objects/interactives/launchpad/sound_patterns.aspx 
(accessed 9th September 2013)
179
exhibits is reduced to a basic physics and knowledge is transmitted through
individual sensation and cognition142.  Following Barry's account, we can see
how in  exhibitions  like  LaunchPad,  sound is  used instrumentally  to  enable
interaction between science and culture.
In the interactive PUS-inflected model of the experimental sound exhibition,
the individual's experience of sound is largely unmediated by objects; it is first
and foremost auditory or haptic. In the PUS models there is implied, then, a
distinction  between the 'objective'  production  of  sound and the 'object-less'
auditory perception of the consuming listener. In PUS models, sound is valued
principally for its capacity to affect individuals experientially; it is what might be
described as a “diffusion model” of sound143. MacDonald's (2002) study of an
experimental PUS exhibition in the late-1980s, for instance, notes how Jean-
Michel  Jarre's  electronic  music was pumped through the Science Museum,
conveying “a sense of the dramatic mystery of science” (45). In MacDonald's
account, Jarre's music is used instrumentally by the Science Museum for its
capacities for affect and assemble a public of consumers for science. Indeed,
as Supper (2014) discusses, practices of “sonification” have often been used
for  the  public  understanding  of  science;  the  experimental  sound  display,
Supper  suggests,  has  the  power  to  grip  the  public  with  the  promise  of
“sublime” experience. In PUS approaches, then, the cultural account of sound
focuses  on  the  affects  of  the  public's  auditory  experiences  and  how  this
facilitates particular kinds of interaction with science. From the perspective of
these  interactive  models,  the  focus  on  the  material  mediations  of  sound
appears to unnecessarily diminish the centrality of auditory perception in sonic
culture  and,  in  doing  so,  risks  'switching  sides'  and  participating  in  the
'objectification' of sound, and the domination of culture by science. In the PUS
models,  paying  attention  to  the  role  of  auditory  perception  in  exhibitions
enables  us  to  give  an  account  of  the  ways  in  which  interactive  relations
between  science  and  the  public  as  also  interactions  between  science  and
culture. 
In  contrast  to  the  material  complexity  of  approaches  to  mediated  sound,
described  above,  the  PUS model  of  interactive  sound  offers  us  a  'dualist'
account  of  sound  which  can  be  both  produced  objectively  and  consumed
142Though the LaunchPad installations are haptic rather than audio installations, they 
nonetheless fall within the auditory culture model which privileges sensation as the locus 
through which sound is known.
143See discussion of the “diffusion model” in Chapter Two.
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subjectively. In this dualist account, I suggest, we find that audio installations in
exhibitions  'sound  twice':  aural  sound  is  translated  into  two  registers  of
perception that I will call here the 'idealist aesthetic' register, sound as genres
of music, and the 'reductive materialist' register, which rationally understands
the material  properties of sound as vibration physics144.  In both the 'idealist
aesthetic' and the 'reductive materialist' versions, sound is a neutral medium
through which music  and physics  are perceived interactively  by the public.
Though they are related through sound, the purity of the concerns of music
and  physics  are  at  the  same  time  maintained  in  public  understanding  of
science exhibitions as entirely separate and distinct. These two accounts of
sound are not mutually exclusive but rather can be seen as the complementary
sides of the philosophies of mechanics and aesthetics that we find in accounts
of modern science (see, for example, Shapin, 1998; Whitehead, 1926): music
can be subjectively appreciated as aesthetic sound and objectively explained
as  physical  principle  without  implying  a  necessary  contradiction.  In  public
understanding of science exhibitions which use audio sound, the public is able
to interact with music and physics without the mediation of objects. Displays of
music  may not  teach the  public  anything  about  science but  they have the
capacity to affect the public aesthetically and therefore to assemble a public to
which science can be demonstrated as complete, accountable and applicable.
We might summarise the PUS model of sound in the following four related
ways:  (1)  in  PUS  sound  is  an  instrument  of  science  communication  and
engagement, (2) sound is valued for being 'object-less', (3) PUS holds a dualist
model  of  sound  as  comprising  both  'idealist  aesthetic'  and  'reductive
materialist' components, and (4) the experimental sound exhibition facilitates
interaction between science and culture. In PUS models, then, the auditory
perception  of  sound  in  public  is  valued as  an instrument through which to
accomplish experimental interaction between science and culture.
Indeed,  we can further  specify  this  PUS model  of  the  experimental  sound
exhibition by looking at an empirical example of an interactive music exhibition
that was held in the Science Museum during the period of my research called
Universe of  Sound.  The exhibition comprised a vast  interactive installation,
spread across a number of gallery spaces, of a virtual Philharmonia Orchestra
playing Gustav Holst's 'The Planets'. The Universe of Sound was an exhibition
that contained precisely no objects from the Science Museum's collections but
144I use the term “physics” here in the sense used by the philosopher Isabelle Stengers 
(1997) to refer to the concern for “fundamental laws” of reality rather than the “merely 
phenomenological” domain of appearances.
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was an exhibition that  was highly  conspicuous in  its  deployment of  cutting
edge interactive technologies. The press release for the exhibition describes
how the technological  design of  the exhibition attempts to  give visitors the
experience of being part of a symphony orchestra:
“Using  giant  screens,  unconventional  projecting  surfaces,  touch
screens,  movement-based  interaction  and  planetarium-style
projection,  visitors  can  step  inside  the  heart  of  a  symphony
orchestra  taking  on the  role  of  a  musician,  conductor  or  even a
composer.”145 
Through the use of cutting edge interactive technology, the Universe of Sound
exhibition  facilitates  the  immersion  of  the  visitor  in  the  experience  of  the
symphony orchestra. In interaction, the individual is facilitated to adopt a range
of “roles” within the symphony orchestra. Unlike the media-specific approach,
describe above, the interactive approach locates the multiplicity of sound not in
its materiality but in the individual's experience of it. In Universe of Sound the
flexible individual is able to experience the plural practices through which the
sound of the symphony orchestra is produced. In this sense, the materiality of
sound is limited to one side of  the production and consumption divide; the
interactive experience of sound is not mediated by objects but is 'object-less'.
Indeed, a version of the dualistic account of sound described above is given in
the  press-release  for Universe  of  Sound,  in  which  the  Science  Museum's
director Ian Blatchford enthuses about music as an ideal:
“Music  conquers  all  the  boundaries  between  art,  science,
technology and medicine and this incredibly imaginative project will
surprise and delight our audience.”
Music, in Blatchford's statement, is not reducible to the bounded  spheres of
art,  science,  technology  or  medicine.  The  experience  of  being  moved,  or
affected, by music is to be 'surprised and 'delighted'; distinctly mental forms of
affect in contrast to the spectacle of bodily movement with which interaction
presents us. The individual experimenter's body interacting with the exhibition's
advanced technological displays produces sound for the mind to appreciate.
Approaching  the  experimental  sound  exhibition  through  the  lens  of  PUS
models of the interactive exhibition, we can see how Universe of Sound can be
145See press release for Universe of Sound at: 
http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/about_us/press_and_media/press_releases/2012/05/U
niverse%20of%20Sound.aspx (accessed 12th September 2013)
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said to enact the divide in which material interaction is put in the service of
intellectual  and aesthetic diffusion;  and in this sense reminiscent  of  Barry's
observations about the way in which the interactive exhibition participates in
'solving'  the democratic issues of science and technology. The  Universe of
Sound doesn't  simply  bring  visitors  to  the  Science  Museum to  appreciate
Holst's  “Planets”  but  also  to  marvel  at  the  technological  infrastructure  (the
applied  science)  facilitating  their  interactivity.  In  the  PUS  model  of  the
experimental sound exhibition, then, we gain an understanding of the way in
which sound is used instrumentally to facilitate particular modes of interaction
between science and the public, and in this way, it is suggested, we avoid the
trap of 'objectfying' sound and simply extending the domination of culture.  
The PUS models therefore offer an account of how the experimental sound
exhibition facilitates interaction between science and culture. The interactive
model shows how experimental sound can be used instrumentally to affect and
assemble the public  in  relations with science.  Through auditory sound,  the
individual  is  facilitated  to  experimentally  interact  with  science,  which  can
demonstrate  their  accountability  and  social  utility.  The  model  of  interactive
sound, however, only works if the auditory perception of sound is accounted
for as distinct from the concerns of the material production of sound. In the
PUS model, materiality is a concern with the production of sound, and for this
reason the concerns of the media-specificity of sound alone fails to account for
the ways in which sound creates interactive relations between science and
culture. To be concerned with the materiality of sound alone, the PUS models
suggest,  is  to risk 'objectifying'  sound and participating in  the technological
domination  of  culture.  Auditory  perception,  the  consumption  of  sound,  is
therefore central to the interactive model of the experimental sound exhibition.
Foregrounding the auditory experience of sound, its 'object-less' consumption,
the experimental  sound exhibition 'solves'  the problem of  the separation of
science  and  culture  by  constructing  a  socio-technical  interaction  in  which
information can be exchanged between these domains.
Mediated and interactive sound in exhibition
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When applied to Oramics, the PUS models of the interactive sound exhibition
seem to offer only a very limited account of the exhibition. There are only a
couple of audio installations in the Oramics gallery displays that might be said
to conform to the PUS model  of auditory interaction. Displayed next to the
Oramics Machine's case is a sign explaining why the Oramics Machine itself
will  never work (discussed in Chapter One) but telling visitors that they can
nonetheless 'experience' the Machine via an interactive emulator that permits
individual  experiments  with  a  touch-screen,  a  computer  that  simulates  the
drawn-sound of the Oramics Machine; visitors are facilitated to create their
own “drawn-sound” by touching the screen and to hear the experimental audio
resulting  through headphones  attached.  Elsewhere  in  the  gallery,  an  audio
installation  plays  a  composition  Oram  produced  on  the  Oramics  Machine.
Titled  “introduction”,  the  composition  plays  on  loop  from  speakers  on  the
Machine's case; the audio animating the object and enabling visitors to aurally
engage with the Machine that is otherwise separated from them by a glass
case. From the perspective of a PUS model we can see how in both of these
audio installations in the Oramics gallery, sound is diffused from the Oramics
Machine to the visitor, facilitating the unmediated interaction between science
and  culture.  However,  the  interactive  account  of  the  experimental  sound
exhibition appears limited in the case of Oramics because it decouples notions
of  sonic  experimentation  from  materiality.  In  other  words,  as  long  as
experimental sound is only an auditory phenomenon then the interactive model
of the exhibition effectively excludes all material mediations of sound from its
account of sonic experiment. In what follows, I'm going to argue that audition-
centric  accounts  of  the  experimental  sound exhibition,  like  interactive  PUS
models,  risk “black-boxing” the materiality of sound and in doing so  limit the
account of the electronic music experiment that we find in Oramics.
I want to begin by separating out the concepts of “mediation” and “interaction”
as offering two very different accounts of the relations between science and
culture,  and  also  as  suggesting  contrasting  accounts  of  both  experimental
sound  and  experimental  exhibition.  I'm  going  to  argue  that  the  model  of
experimental interaction offers only a very limited account of how relations are
made between science and culture,  and risks 'black-boxing' the multiplicity of
actors, practices and settings that participate in electronic music experiments.
To  draw  out  this  distinction  between  the  interactive  experiment  and  the
mediated experiment it's useful  to turn to a contrast made in actor-network
theory (ANT) between two genres of actor: “mediators” and “intermediaries”
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(Latour,  1993a).  ANT  describes  experimental  actors  as  mediators  that
transform,  distort  and  modify  settings  and  technologies  in  the  process  of
creating relations with other actors. The work of experimental action in ANT is
the work of mediating an object (see discussion in Chapters Two and Three).
In  contrast,  intermediaries  present  themselves  as  neutral  or  at  least
unremarkable  transporters  of  objects,  or  information,  unchanged  from  one
group  to  another;  intermediaries  may  claim  neutrality  with  respect  to  the
different actors participating in an experiment.  However, in ANT there is no
such thing as a neutral  actor because all  action is a work of mediating the
interests of other  actors.  ANT argues therefore that the distinction between
mediators and intermediaries is not a distinction between two different types of
actors  but  rather  between actors  and 'false'  actors.  On one hand,  if  those
claiming to be intermediaries are de facto actors, then they are mediators and
the claim to being an intermediary is simply a disguise: these intermediaries
are particular kinds of mediators the actions of which are “black-boxed” and
this  way  the  work  of  translation  that  takes  place  in  mediation  is  rendered
invisible. On the other hand, if intermediaries really are neutral with respect to
action – if they really don't translate or mediate an object – then they are not
actors at all. In interactive experiments the experimental apparatus is proposed
as a mere intermediary through which interaction between science, technology
and  culture  occurs.  By  focusing  on  the  individual  body  as  the  site  of
experimental interaction, the material apparatus of the interactive exhibition is
rendered  neutral  with  respect  to  the  experiment.  However,  from  the
perspective  of  ANT,  such  a  sharp  distinction  between  the  experimental
apparatus and the experimental interaction it affords is a false distinction. In
ANT, then, the interactive experiment's claims to be neutral with respect the
experimental  interactions between science,  technology  and culture  is  more
obviously an apparatus that “black-boxes” the a more expansive account of
experimental action. On the basis of this distinction in ANT, I suggest, we can
describe the ways in  which the focus on auditory  experience in  interactive
sound exhibitions “black-boxes” the experimental mediations of sound. 
An empirical description of an experimental sound-art exhibition can help make
clear the different accounts of the experiment that we find in media-specific
and auditory-centric approaches. Called Sho-zyg146, the exhibition took place a
146The exhibition's title Sho-zyg is a name derived from a family of instruments invented by 
the composer Hugh Davies, who founded the Goldsmiths electronic music studio in 1967. 
The shozyg instruments invented by Davies comprised found scrap metal and were built 
inside “unusual containers”. As a musical instrument, the significance of the shozyg is 
principally derived from its materials and the practices of its construction rather than its 
auditory distinctiveness; and in this sense, it underlines the limitations of audition-centric 
185
year after  the opening of  Oramics.  Principally an exhibition of experimental
sound art  created by researchers at  Goldsmiths,  University  of  London,  the
exhibition also featured displays about Daphne Oram curated by researchers
from the Daphne Oram archive. The principal format of display in the exhibition
were installation pieces in which audio played from loud-speakers. The gallery
displays of Sho-zyg present a highly varied presentation of experimental sound
works  including,  for  example,  audio-visual  installations  using  screens  and
computers,  multi-channel  compositions  with  multiple  speakers  arranged  in
particular spatial configurations, and installations that use specific media such
as radio. Sho-zyg is an experimental sound exhibition that stages the 'artifices'
of sound art; in the exhibition we find sound mediated in many very different
ways involving many different kinds of materials, techniques and knowledges.
This  is  particularly  evident,  I  suggest,  in  the  displays  about  Daphne Oram
which  illustrate  the  varied  forms  of  labour  required  of  the  producer  of
experimental  sound. In  Sho-zyg  the  material  production of sound is not an
ontologically separate concern to the public consumption and interaction with
sound. 
From audition-centric perspectives, Sho-zyg and Oramics appear very different
as experimental exhibitions. Sho-zyg featured the works of over 50 artists and
held live performances, lectures and discussions every evening that it was on.
Indeed, the curators' introduction to the exhibition makes clear the centrality of
audition, and sensory experience of visitors, to the experimental exhibition: 
“Experimental sound practice and sound art are comparatively new
and thriving fields, operating within a historically visually dominated
art world. It is our hope that through this showcase we can allow the
audience a space to listen: a platform for auditory exploration and
new aesthetic experiences” 
The aural experiences of visitors to Sho-zyg are, its curators suggest, integral
to this  experimental  sound exhibition.  As an auditory display, the exhibition
aims  to  enable  audiences  to  have  “exploratory”  and  “new  aesthetic”
experiences.  Through  listening  practices,  the  curators  aim to  facilitate  new
forms of  interaction with  visitors to  the exhibition.  In common with auditory
culture  approaches,  the  curators  emphasise  the  importance  of  auditory
interaction in experimental sound exhibition. And yet, though there are many
accounts of experimental sound practice. Further information about the exhibition can be 
found at: http://sho-zyg.com/ (accessed 19th February 2014)
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more and varied audio displays in  Sho-zyg  than there are in  Oramics,  the
exhibitions are in other ways very similar as displays of experimental sound. 
The curatorial  organisation  of  the  gallery  space in  Sho-zyg  is  designed to
reflect broad differences in experimental practice: for example, the gallery has
separate  rooms  for  audio-visual  compositions,  soundscape  works,  and
disklavier performances. In this sense, the staging of the exhibition is designed
to draw attention to the differences in the materials and techniques used, the
spatial arrangements in the galleries and the technologies are used to amplify
the  audio  the  installations.  It  is  a  display  of  experimental  sound  art  that
emphasises  artifice.  Indeed,  we  see  this  most  clearly  in  cases  where  this
curatorial logic is subverted. One installation called Technotronic147 appears to
ironically subvert the practical rather than auditory focus of Sho-zyg's curators,
a  curatorial  logic  which  is  in  many ways typical  of  experimental  sound art
exhibitions more generally. Technotronic is an installation comprised of a small
box with one speaker and two LEDs, and is displayed, spotlit, at the end of an
entirely  empty,  blacked  out,  room  with  no  textual  information148.  Rhythmic
sounds are made by the box, to which the LEDs flash in sync, but the practical
process – the digital and analogue electronics mediating the rhythmic sound –
through  which  the  audio  is  produced  is  rendered  opaque.  Indeed,  the
presentation of Technotronic appears to omit almost everything that would be
extra-sensorial in audition-centric models and in this sense might, ironically, be
described as an attempt to contrive a purely interactive display. In its opaque
staging, Technotronic is a work of art that is effectively black-boxed (ironically,
perhaps,  the  box is  painted white).  The minimal  staging  of  Technotronic,  I
suggest, draws our attention to all of the  material complexity that has to be
removed, or black-boxed, in order to contrive a purely auditory or sensation-
centric account of interaction with experimental sound art. 
The dualist account of sound in PUS models of experimental sound sets up an
ontological  divide  between  the  producer  and  the  consumer  of  audio.  An
alternative account of the interconnections between producer and consumer of
audio is given by Hennion (1989) who has described the experimental music
producer as a networker who translates between the interests of the different
147Technotronic was built by the sonic artist Tom Richards. The name references the 1980s 
house-music act whose famous chart hit was the track “Pump up the Jam”. A 
demonstration of Richard's Technotronic installation can be found at: 
http://vimeo.com/61549256 (accessed 11th February 2014)
148The exhibition's programme offers a minimal description of Technotronic: “Electronic sound 
sculpture. Pre-fabricated electronics with hand made analogue and digital electronics”.
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groups concerned by a musical-auditory object, the process of which creates a
consuming public for the music. As Hennion points out, at no point in the cycle
of  musical  production  is  there  a  moment  when  the  producer  abandons  all
techniques and releases their audio to a public of consumers. Rather, producer
and  consumer  of  music  are  linked  through  many  intermediaries  who  are
enrolled in the music studio: the studio, Hennion argues, is a laboratory for the
production of cultural objects. We can apply Hennion's description to Sho-zyg's
displays  of  materials  from  the  Daphne  Oram  archive  at  Goldsmiths.  The
archival displays are principally texts written by Oram (there are also two audio
installations  that  present  some  of  Oram's  recently  digitized  compositions)
mostly in the  form of letters and correspondence; the exhibition is a display
that stages Oram's personality and private life. The exhibition puts on display
documents detailing the composers Oram corresponded with about her work,
the grants she applied for to fund the development of the Oramics Machine,
the plans and the logs of errors generated while working on the Machine, and
the notes and drafts that informed her published work  An Individual Note. In
their introduction the curators describe the scope of the display: 
“The  selected  documents  chronicle  Oram's  definitive  public
performances, and also illustrate some of her technical, aesthetic
and  interpersonal  trials  and  tribulations;  how  she  evaluated
competitors,  dealt  with technical problems and kept her research
going with an unpredictable and modest income” 
The displays about Oram foreground the private (domestic149) labour involved
in  supporting  the  experimental  sound  production that  took place in  Oram's
studio in the converted oast house,  Tower Folly, where she also lived.  The
emphasis of the display, the curators make clear, is both an account of Oram's
public  successes but  also a  'behind the scenes'  look into the troubles and
uncertainties  with  which  an experimental  sound  producer  contends.  In  this
respect,  Oram's  public  recognition  as  an  experimental  sound  producer is
staged, in this display, as an accomplishment that entailed many different and
varied  forms of labour.  The art of the experimental sound producer is,  in the
Daphne  Oram  displays, shown  to  incorporate  the  coordination  of  many
different spheres of activity and to mediate between competing concerns.  As
the displays of the “trials and tribulations” experienced by Oram demonstrate,
like the scientist in the laboratory, the experimental sound producer's attempts
to  isolate  and  manipulate  aspects  of  the  auditory  world  in  their  studio  are
149For the discussion of the relation between Oram's work and domesticity see Chapter Five.
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highly  contingent  and  often  unsuccessful.  Like  the  laboratory  scientist,  the
producer  is  an inventor  who mobilises  heterogeneous networks  in  order  to
domesticate their invention in the common world. Oram's public success was
not  realised  simply  by  releasing audio into the world hoping that it would be
received  by  listening  consumers,  but  rather,  as  the  displays  show,  was
accomplished through attempts (not always very successful) to enrol the allies
needed to demonstrate her work in public. 
The Sho-zyg displays of Oram's “trials and tribulations” make clear, then, that
we cannot adequately account for the sound experiments that took place in
Oram's  Tower  Folly  studio  only  through  auditory  engagement  or  simply  by
through formalist descriptions of her inventions, like the Oramics Machine. The
interactive  model  of  the  experimental  sound  exhibition  can  only  offer  an
account of the displays from Oram's archive as 'extra-auditory' content. But as
extra-auditory content, the displays of Oram's archive are reduced to little more
than a 'historical context' in which to situate the contemporary sound displays;
they might aid the visitor's auditory appreciation of contemporary sound works
but formulated as extra-auditory exhibition content, the archival displays are
discontinuous  with  the  experimental  sound  practice  showcased  in  the
installations. There are two problems that arise from such discontinuity. First, in
the  black-boxing  of  the  artifice  of  sound  production,  experimental  practice
becomes  centred  on  the  consuming  public  ear  as  the  locus  of  invention.
Second,  audition-centric  approaches  leave  us  unable  to  account  for
developments in the experimental practices of sound, which include the rise of
curating and archival research as thriving practices within the field of sound art.
The interactive model of the experimental sound exhibition therefore not only
places considerable conditions on what can be considered to participate in the
sound  experiment (those things that  are aurally  perceived),  but  on its  own
gives  only  a very  limited account  of  those practices for which  sound  is an
object. 
This brief excursion to Sho-zyg, I suggest, illustrates what we gain from media-
specific  approaches to the sound experiment and the limitations of audition-
centric  approaches.  Media-specific  approaches  give  us  an  account  of  the
material complexity of experimental sound; the very different actors, practices
and settings that participate in the electronic music experiment. Media-specific
accounts enable us to appreciate that the relations between the participants in
the experiment are 'mediated';  that is,  they are relations that are reordered
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through processes of material modification or translation. In the media-specific
approach,  the  curated  displays  of  Oram's  archive  are  equally  modes  of
experimental sound practice alongside soundscape composition, computing,
electronics, video and so on. Indeed, as the displays of Oram's archive make
clear, the media-specific  approach enables us to appreciate the work of the
experimental  sound  producer  not  as  an  actor  radically  divorced  from
consumers (as in interactive models) but rather as an actor who in the work of
sound  production  has  to  experimentally  to  create  relations  with  other  very
different  actors  in  order  to  interest  and enrol  them.  As the  displays  of  the
Oram's archive make clear, Oram often struggled to enrol  even those who
should have been close allies.  All  of  the material  complexity of sound, just
described,  risks  being  black-boxed  and  excluded  from  the  experiment  in
audition-centric  approaches.  In  audition-centric  approaches  to  the
experimental  sound  exhibition,  the  consumer  of  audio  is  the  experimental
subject.  In  this  sense,  auditory  approaches  alone risk  assuming  sound  as
unmediated, 'object-less', leaving its materiality demarcated as the concern of
technical  production.  Audition  without  mediation  demarcates  sound  as  an
aesthetic  concern  while  mediation  with  audition  demarcates  sound  as  a
technical concern.  If experimental sound exhibitions  are both interactive and
heavily  mediated  displays  then  in  order  to  appreciate  sound  as  an
experimental medium we cannot simply demarcate as separate the aesthetics
and technologies of sound. 
Conclusion
In this chapter I have  explored some of the ways in which electronic music
experiments can be said to mediate relations between musical and electro-
mechanical practices.  In the analysis, I  have foregrounded  the collaboration
between  Daphne  Oram  and  Graham  Wrench  in  attempting  to  pursue  the
former's aim to compose using graphical  techniques, “drawn-sound”. In the
Oramics Machine, the vehicle through which Oram attempted to create “drawn-
sound”,  I  have  suggested  we  find  material  traces  of  the  work  involved  in
mediating between musical and electro-mechanical practices:  the  Machine is
assembled  from  cheap  and  thriftily  sourced  materials,  the  electronics  are
idiosyncratic in design, and traces of the home-studio setting are evident. But,
Oram's experiments in developing a Machine that could realise “drawn-sound”
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were  clearly  not  entirely  successful.  The  Oramics  Machine  was  never
demonstrated as an artistic or technological innovation in Oram's lifetime and
effectively never left the home-studio in which Oram and Wrench collaborated.
And, as we see in the later discussion of the Shozyg exhibition, the process of
developing  the  Oramics  Machine  was  long  and  often  frustrating.  In  other
words, mediating relations between music and electro-mechanics  in building
the Oramics Machine  was clearly not a simple task and involved much work
and personal sacrifice on the part of Oram.
In the analysis I have attempted to describe  some of the ways in which  the
exhibition  of  the  Oramics  Machine,  as  the  material  instantiation  of  Oram's
drawn-sound experiments, might be appreciated as an experiment in relations
between  science  and culture.  There  have  been  two  parts  to  this  line  of
argument. First, I  have identified some of the particular registers of science
that  are  staged  in  the  exhibition  of  the  Oramics  Machine,  namely  electro-
mechanics and programming. I have shown how, in the display of the Oramics
Machine,  programming  and  electro-mechanics  appear  far  from
straightforwardly  scientific  but  instead  appear  “multivalent”.  In  this  sense,  I
have suggested why the display of the Oramics Machine might be said to be
experimental as a display of science.  Second, I have compared the Oramics
exhibition with other exhibitions of music and sound that we find in the Science
Museum.  To this end,  I  have drawn a contrast  between  two approaches –
media-specific  and audition-centric  – to experimental  sound exhibition.  As I
have described them here, each approach proposes a different account of the
ontology  of  sound  (multiple  vs.  dualist),  its  materiality  (object-centred  vs.
object-less),  and  the  experimental  apparatus  (mediation  vs.  interactivity).  I
have highlighted problems with both approaches: auditory-centric models risk
black-boxing the material complexity of sound while approaches that focus on
the mediation of sound risk objectifying sound. To this end, I have attempted to
elaborate some of the different ways in which the exhibition of experimental
electronic  music  –  in  the  Oramics  Machine  and  other  displays  we  find  in
Oramics – might be said to be an experiment in the relations between science,
culture and the public. In appreciating the different ways in which exhibition of
the Oramics Machine might be said to be experimental, I have argued that we
gain  a  greater  appreciation  of  why  the  Oramics  exhibition  can  be  said  to




In  this  thesis  I  have applied  the  concept  of  the  “public  experiment”  to  the
Oramics  exhibition  in  an  attempt  to  understand  better  what  it  is  that
experimental exhibitions 'do'. In this thesis I've distinguished the exhibition as
public  experiment  from  two  other  versions  of  the  experimental  exhibition:
exhibitions  that  publicise experimental  facts  and  artefacts,  and the
experimental display. As a public experiment, I've suggested that the exhibition
is more than  simply  a  neutral intermediary between science and society that
only diffuses the findings of experimental processes or enables novel artefacts
to  circulate  beyond  the  laboratory  setting  where  they  are  fabricated.
Experimental exhibitions of course do these things too. But in this thesis, I've
argued that experimental exhibitions like Oramics also participate in the 'doing'
of  experiments  and  can  be  considered as  formats that  are  themselves
inventive  in particular ways.  By using a vocabulary of “practices”, “relations”
and  “actors”  to  talk  about  the  exhibition  studied  here,  Oramics,  I  have
attempted to describe the exhibition as a lively and complex empirical object.
More  than  a  static  surface  for  representing  experimental  practice,  the
exhibition, I've suggested, is something that intervenes in the material world
and a format that has the capacity to fabricate novelty. 
Staged in the Science Museum, I have advanced the proposition in this thesis
that  we  can  understand  the Oramics  exhibition  as  an  experiment  in  the
relations between science, culture and the public; relations which in this setting
have often been highly ordered. In  Oramics  we find very different styles of
experiment  assembled  together  in  an  exhibition:  the  exhibition  foregrounds
collaborations between musical and electro-mechanical practices and  stages
the  electronic  music  experiment  as  a  complex  process  involving
heterogeneous  knowledges,  people,  instruments  and  techniques; the
experimental  curatorial  process  involves  many  different  kinds  of  participant
demonstrating that the knowledge about the history of science and technology
is not only the preserve of professional historians; and, the exhibition's public
displays  about invention of electronic music include many of the people and
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things conventionally 'excluded' from scientific accounts of invention including
amateurs, artistic practices, genre styles, women, and so on. If Oramics is an
experimental  science  exhibition,  it  is  one  considerably  that  is  considerably
'impure'  and removed from the concerns of professional  science.  Departing
from the conventions exhibitions that promote technical pedagogy, interactive
science and cultural literacy, in this study I have sought to explore what other
kind  of  relations  between  science,  culture  and  the  public  might  be  being
produced in the experimental Oramics exhibition. 
In introducing this study,  I began in  the  Oramics  gallery  describing how its
displays of  experimental  electronic  music  related to,  or  rather  were distinct
from, other  Science  Museum  exhibitions.  To visitors  who  have  navigated
displays of technological progress, demonstrations of universal truths and who
engaged  their  own  agency  through  interactive  displays,  the  exhibition  of
experimental electronic music in the  Oramics gallery raises many questions.
Why is the Science Museum hosting an exhibition about musical invention, in
which the studio rather than the laboratory is the setting of experiment, and in
which  amateur  knowledges  and  practices  are  foregrounded  over  those  of
professionals?  From the displays about Daphne Oram's “early life”  in music,
her “drawn-sound” method  and Oramics  philosophy,  to the “women writers'”
monologues and the images of acid-house artists there are many features of
the  Oramics  gallery that  might  well  appear  more at home in an art museum
than the Science Museum. Unlike others exhibitions in the Science Museum,
Oramics  puts  its  curators into the displays of the gallery  where we find  the
Museum's curator Tim Boon describing the experimental “co-curation” process
of the exhibition,  we find listings of the various “co-curators” of the exhibits,
and in  a film we see some of  them  (and myself)  in  workshops and giving
interviews about the exhibition.  And, unlike other experimental exhibitions  in
the Science Museum – in which experimental instruments materialise abstract
principals and interactive displays facilitate diffusion of knowledge from expert
science to lay public – in  Oramics  we find that  the  scientific  experiment is
conspicuous by its absence and the problem of the relations between science
and  culture  explicitly problematised in the gallery displays.  When compared
with  experimental  exhibitions  promoting  technical  pedagogy  and  public
engagement  with  science,  Oramics appears  almost  carnival-like  in  the
multiplicity of  experimental  traditions and styles we find in the exhibition. An
exhibition about electronic music studios in which engineers and musicians
collaborated to invent new sounds,  Oramics invites us to take seriously the
proposition  that  the  experiment  has  a  life  beyond  the  laboratory  and  in
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practices that do not fall under the rubric of professional science. 
I have attempted to show how applying the concept of the “public experiment”
to Oramics enables us to both account for the co-existence of multiple modes
of experiment that we find in  Oramics and give a materialist account of their
assemblage in the exhibition. In Oramics there appear three relatively distinct
modes of experiment: first, the curatorial experiment in which different groups
participate  in  “co-curating”  the  displays;  second,  the  electronic  music
experiment  which  concerns  the  invention  of  new  sounds;  and  third,  the
experimental gallery display which is distinguished as “a new kind of exhibition”
and  therefore  different  to  other  formats  of  experimental  exhibition  in  the
Science Museum. I have attempted to organise the analysis in the empirical
chapters  around  these  three  versions  of  experiment,  describing  the
particularities of each mode of experiment. In this analysis I have attempted to
show that  assembling these different  modes of experiment in  Oramics is not
only an abstract  operation but also a messy material practice.  I have argued
that  the  Oramics exhibition  produces  relations  between  these  modes of
experiment  through  processes  of  public  participation  (Chapter  Four),  in
different formats of public display (Chapter Five) and in the media of exhibition
(Chapter Six). In this final chapter I am going to revisit the central arguments
made in the thesis.  I  first,  trace  the  arguments made in the  three empirical
chapters  (4,5  and  6)  and  highlight  how  the  analysis  presented  in  each
contributes  to  the  question  about  how  the  Oramics  exhibition  can  be
understood as an experiment in the relations between science, culture and the
public. I, then, restate the central proposition of the thesis – that  as a public
experiment  we can understand the  experimental  exhibition as  an inventive
format  – and explore some of the broader implications for  social  studies  of
experiment and invention. Finally, I revisit the Science Museum with the reader
to ask how we might approach this setting differently after spending so much
time in the Oramics exhibition.
Summary of empirical analysis
In the empirical chapters I have attempted to  focus on the central  modes in
which Oramics can be said to be an experiment: curating,  public  display and
electronic music. Since these are considerably distinct versions of experiment
which might seemingly have little to do with one another, I attempted to use the
concept of the public experiment to bring them together analytically and to give
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a materialist  analysis  of  their  assembly  together  in  the  Oramics  exhibition.
Applying  the  concept  of  the  public  experiment  was  not  simply  a means to
explain  away  the  complexity  of  Oramics, as  if  complexity  we  simply  the
ontological  condition of  an experimental exhibition. Rather, in the analysis I
have  attempted  to  show  how valuing  particular  kinds  of  experimental
complexity enables  us  to  appreciate  better  what  the  Oramics  exhibition  is
'doing'  in  the  Science  Museum.  The  themes  used  for  the  analysis  were
participation  (Chapter  Four),  exclusion  (Chapter  Five)  and  media  (Chapter
Six). In the analysis I have attempted to show the ways in which these themes
at  once  raise  both  theoretical  questions  and  practical  concerns  about  the
assemblage  of  the  Oramics  exhibition.  This  thematic  organisation  of  the
analysis was designed to demonstrate  the different kinds of work involved in
assembling the Oramics exhibition, and in doing to offer an explanation for why
the  Museum's  curators  are  attempting  to  develop  new  public  participation
procedures, why the exhibition's displays 'includes' the work of groups like the
women writers, and why electronic music is a medium excites such interest in
a  museum  dedicated  to  industrial  history  and  contemporary  science.  This
thematic analysis is not an attempt to organise the empirical material only to
confirm  the utility of applying the concept of the public experiment to make
sense of Oramics as an experimental exhibition. Instead, the thematic analysis
is an attempt to specify some of the different and distributed kinds of material
practice go into assembling an experimental exhibition like Oramics. 
In  Chapter  Four  I  examined  the  curatorial  experiment.  In  the  Science
Museum's curators' accounts, the curatorial experiment is a public participation
initiative to involve of different groups in curating a gallery display about the
history of electronic music. The curatorial experiment is largely concerned with
creating  new  procedures  through  which  new  people  and  knowledges  can
participate  in  curating  science  and  technology  exhibitions. Examining  a
disagreement between one of the Science Museum's curators, Tim Boon, and
a  group  of  Audience  Researchers  over  questions  of  public  participation  in
Oramics we see some of the different ways in which the curatorial experiment
problematises  the  relations  between  science  and  culture.  What  public
participation means to each side of this disagreement  is  framed by particular
issues concerning the relations between science and culture: for Boon these
issues concern historical epistemology and the “cultural offer” of the Museum's
object  collection  while  for  the  Audience  Researchers  these  problematics
concern social inequalities and the Museum's development of a “multi-cultural”
audience. By applying the concept of the public experiment to the study of the
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curatorial  experiment, I  attempted to  show how  public  participation can be
described not only in terms of procedures but is also through particular issues
concerning the relations between science and culture.
The analysis of Chapter Five addressed the theme of exclusion, a problematic
which is registered in the Oramics exhibition's experimental gallery displays in
various  ways  including  publicising  gender  as  an  issue,  foregrounding  the
participation of 'vulnerable' and marginal groups, and in staging inventions that
don't  feature readily in the history of technology.  In this chapter I centred the
analysis  on  gender  because  in  my  ethnographic  fieldwork  this  seemed  in
various ways (described in the chapter) to be among the most controversial of
exclusions in the gallery displays of the exhibition. Where some versions of the
experimental  exhibition, discussed in Chapter Two's literature review, would
attempt to 'solve'  the problem of  the  exclusion  of  women  from science (for
example, through communication, interactivity and inclusion),  in this chapter I
suggest that Oramics is interesting precisely because the exclusion of women
is staged in the gallery displays as a much more complex issue. The chapter
also highlighted the tensions inherent in attempts to 'dissolve' the problem of
exclusion.  In  the  analysis  I  foregrounded  debates  within  feminist  science
studies between “standpoint” and “post-gender” approaches to the question of
the exclusion of women from science. Through this debate,  I  sought to show
how by  valuing experimental complexity in  the  gallery  displays we are better
able  to  appreciate  how  the  exclusion  of  women  is  linked  with  broader
problematics. For example, we see how the exclusion of women from science
is related to the exclusion of  subjectivity,  style and artistry  from experimental
exhibitions, as the antithesis of objectivity, rationality and technology. Applying
the concept of the public experiment, then, enables us to see how problem of
the  exclusion  of  women  is  posed  in  the  experimental  gallery  displays  of
Oramics as  a  more complex problem of the relations between science and
culture. 
Chapter Six's analysis focused on the subject matter of Oramics, experimental
electronic music,  taking  the Oramics Machine  as  its empirical focus.  As the
chapter  highlighted,  in  many  ways  music  is  not  a  new  medium  for  the
experimental exhibition: music has often been used in experimental exhibitions
for  its  affective  capacities  to  assemble  a  public  for  science.  But,  in
experimental  science exhibitions  distinctions between sound-science and art-
music are  often staged as  absolute. By contrast, in  Oramics  we find much
more  porous  relations  between  sound  and  music: the  exhibition  staging
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electronic music as the invention of new sounds and  Daphne Oram  as both
sonic inventor  (specifically,  of “drawn-sound”)  and  a composer of music.  The
analysis of the chapter attempted to show how applying  the  concept of the
public  experiment  to  Oramics allows  us  to  take  seriously  the  notion  that
experimental music is not only the  'content' that is communicated  but  is  also
the  experimental  'medium' of  the  exhibition.  As  the  analysis  made  clear,
Daphne  Oram was a highly unconventional composer, spending many years
working to develop drawn-sound techniques through the Oramics Machine and
so too the electro-mechanical design  of  the Machine is highly idiosyncratic,
comprised of many repurposed and sourced components.  In  the  analysis of
the Oramics Machine I attempted to describe some of the ways in which this
“drawn-sound”  instrument  not  only  constituted  exhibition  content  to  be
aesthetically appreciated and technically understood, but how it also materially
mediates relations  between music  and  electro-mechanics  in  very  particular
ways.   Applying  the  concept  of  the  public  experiment  to  subject  matter  of
Oramics,  I argued, therefore enables us to be attentive to the ways in which
the  electronic music  experiments can be said to  mediate relations between
science, culture and the public not only communicatively but materially.  
In the  empirical  analysis I have  attempted to  show how  these three themes
(participation, exclusion and media) enable us to appreciate some of the forms
of  work  and  practice  through  which  the  different  modes of  experiment  as
assembled together in Oramics. Allowing for experimental complexity, applying
the  concept  of  the  public  experiment,  I've  argued,  enables  us  to  see  that
bringing  together  these  different  modes of  experiment  in  exhibition  is  not
simply an abstract operation but also material practice. In other words, it draws
our attention to the fact that relations between science, culture and the public
do not simply already exist but rather these relations have to be made. Had I
focused only on differentiating and purifying the modes of experiment that we
find in Oramics – as opposed to exploring their connections – we would be left
no  clearer  as  to  how  and  to  what  ends  they  are  brought  together  in  the
exhibition.  From the  thematic  analysis  we  might  summarise  some  findings
about the how relations between science, culture and the public are produced:
we find that public participation in science initiatives are not only inventive as
procedures but also  in the  material form  they give  to  issues concerning  the
relations  between  knowledge,  politics  and  social  identities; exclusion  is  not
simply a social issue for science to 'solve' but a complex material problematic
that  raises questions about  the reality of  rationality,  objectivity and expertise;
and, the media of experiments – here, electronic music – are not only neutral
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intermediaries  or  communication  vehicles  (e.g.  music  as  an  auditory
phenomenon) but are materially complex and assembled through experimental
processes, in the case  of electronic music in the  collaborations  between  the
practices of  musical  composition  and  electronic-engineering.  One  reason for
describing the  material  complexity of these themes is  to  appreciate  the  work
involved in assembling the different modes of experiment through the practice
of  exhibition.  This  also enables  us  to describe the exhibition as a material
practice without falling into unhelpful distinctions between subjects vs. objects,
agents  vs.  structures,  humans  vs.  non-humans  or  practices  vs.  materials.
Dispensing  with  such  analytical  distinctions,  I've  argued,  enables  us  to
recognise the significance of the Oramics Machine to the curatorial experiment
(as the engaging object), the experimental  public  display (as, for instance, a
'home  made'  artefact  invented  by  a  woman)  and  the  electronic  music
experiment  (as  Oram's  “drawn-sound”  invention)  and thereby  to  appreciate
why we find  it as  the  centre-piece of the  Oramics  exhibition.  Describing the
experimental complexity of these themes  is not  therefore  to suggest that the
Oramics  exhibition  fails  to  make  coherent  and  strong  relations  between
science, culture and the public. Rather, I have argued it is only when we look
closely at the experimental complexity of Oramics that we start to see how new
kinds of relations between seemingly different and heterogeneous things can
materialise. In short, experimental exhibition is not only a process of abstractly
representing experimental facts and artefacts but is also a materialist practice
concerned with the 'doing' experiment. 
The exhibition as an inventive format?
By applying the concept of the public experiment to Oramics I've attempted to
investigate  whether and in what ways  this  experimental exhibition might be
said to be inventive. In this study I've attempted to show both the experimental
exhibition  is  not  absolutely divorced from  the 'doing' of experiment  and that
experiments are not  only  scientific  genres of practice.  As highlighted in the
literature  review,  many  approaches  to  the  study  of  invention,  such  as  the
science and society tradition, have told us that exhibitions are the antithesis of
experiments. In these studies, experiments take place at the beginning of a
trajectory of invention, exhibitions come at the tail  end as the experimental
artefact  becomes  domesticated  in  society.  From  the  perspective  of  such
studies applying the concept of the public experiment to an exhibition seems a
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confusion  of  categories  which  conflates the  well  rehearsed  experimental
demonstration with an experiment conducted in public. Such a conflation, they
claim,  risks  naively  accepting  the  naturalistic  and  idealised  accounts  of
experiments  given  by  natural scientists  and  philosophers.  To  adequately
account  for  the social  reality  of  invention,  these studies argue,  sociologists
need to maintain analytical distinctions between experiments and exhibitions:
public experiments when they happen should appear nothing like the museum
exhibition. By applying the concept of the public experiment to an exhibition in
the Science Museum I have therefore risked unsettling the ground on which to
distinguish  the  social  account  of  invention from  the  'idealised'  accounts  of
scientists  and  philosophers  and  in  doing  so  could  be  accused  of  over-
complicating an event that is in fact quite simple. 
By  applying  the  concept  of  the  public  experiment to  an  exhibition  at  the
Science  Museum  I  have  been  making  the  claim,  contra  the  science  and
society tradition, that experimental exhibitions are not simply events that occur
in  the  later  stages  of  a  trajectory  of  invention;  as  the  well  rehearsed  and
controlled  representations  of  experimental  results  that  occur  after  the
experiment has ended. In applying the concept of the public experiment I am
claiming  that  exhibitions  are  more  than  mere  intermediaries  that  simply
communicate or diffuse experiments. As a public experiment, I have argued for
a less instrumental approach to the  experimental  exhibition, one that would
allow  us  to  appreciate  the  particular  kinds  of  work  that  are  performed  by
exhibitions. 
I  have used many different  concepts throughout this  thesis  to describe the
different  kinds  of  work  that  the Oramics exhibition  performs,  including:
mediating, translating, assembling, negotiating and problematising. These are
quite distinct kinds of work and my use of these concepts in this thesis might
appear sometimes as if  they were interchangeable. There is  perhaps some
truth to this  criticism, since  I  draw  such concepts  largely  from  science and
technology studies which have attempted to describe invention without falling
back into positive and nomological  explanations of  invention as 'discovery'.  If
such concepts appear interchangeable it is because they propose, in different
ways,  that  the  creation  of  novelty  does  not  arrive  from  nothing  –  as,  for
instance, a 'spark of inspiration' or 'touch of genius' – but is rather a material
process that unsettles, manipulates and reconfigures relations between things.
In the case of the concept of mediation, for instance, I have attempted to use
this concept in a particular way to show how  experimental electronic music
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does more  than  simply  communicate  sonic  experiment  for  aesthetic
appreciation or technical understanding. Instead, electronic music provides the
medium through which relations can be made between very different kinds of
genres  of  inventive  practice,  such as  pop culture,  amateur  electronics  and
media arts.  In describing the work that the  Oramics  exhibition performs as a
material  process  I  have  therefore  also  attempted  to  demonstrate  that
exhibitions are not so simply the mundane material  procedures that accounts
of  exhibition  as  representation  would  have  us  believe.  Assembling  an
exhibition in a science museum around an artefact (the Oramics Machine) that
has never  been demonstrated an innovation and which was invented by a
female musician in her home-studio, I have argued, involves multiple forms of
experimental practice. Experimental exhibitions, I have argued, cannot simply
be  considered  as  events  that  occur  in  the  late  stages in  trajectories  of
invention, after the experiment has ended. 
The 'rediscovered' Oramics Machine is  the  material object that is the centre-
piece of  the  Oramics  exhibition.  The concept of rediscovery would purport to
tell  us that  its object  is  uncontroversial  as a discovery; it  is  a concept that
suggests we already knew the significance of the rediscovered thing but that
perhaps we had forgotten about it or overlooked it. But, the rediscovery of the
Oramics Machine is clearly not  the recovery of a  forgotten but demonstrably
important  material artefact:  little is known of its history, its electro-mechanical
design  is  opaque,  it  no  longer  functions  as  a  musical  instrument  and its
designer Daphne Oram is not an established inventor.  As I observed in the
research  for  this  study musicians  are  largely  unfamiliar  with  the  drawn
composition techniques Oram developed it  for, electronic engineers are still
mapping  its  circuitry  and  little  is  known  about  the  different  stages  of  the
Machine's  development  and use during  the  1960s or  indeed  its  relation to
innovations like the synthesiser. It is fair to say that little is known about exactly
what has been 'discovered' in the rediscovery of the Oramics Machine. 
And yet, one of the  dominant narratives  of  the  'rediscovery' of the Oramics
Machine that I  encountered during this study was  as a form of enlightened
atonement. This tragic narrative about the Oramics Machine was told to me by
many of the people I encountered during this study: the time and work Oram
put into building  the experimental  instrument  were to no avail,  the Oramics
Machine was overtaken by other inventions and Oram ended her life in relative
obscurity and poverty. To many of the people I've met, Oram's lack of success
in her own lifetime cannot simply be attributed to her own decisions –  although
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many acknowledge her highly individualistic and belligerent mentality – but is
symptomatic of conservative and  blinkered  cultural  institutions that  failed to
support her inventive practice. To some, the discovery of the Oramics Machine
is  a  vindication  of  Oram's  perseverance  in  the  face  of  extreme  personal
hardship  and  a  hostile  culture  that  refused  to  recognise  the  value  of  her
electronic music experiments.  In this narrative,  Oram's tragic fate is a wrong
which is rectified through the exhibition of the Oramics Machine in the Science
Museum. The recent revival and celebration of Oram's work – not least at the
BBC,  the  corporation  that  couldn't  support  Oram's  electronic  music
experiments leading to her 'going solo' and setting up the Oramics studio – in
this narrative, reflects a general change in cultural  attitude. It is a narrative in
which  the  Oramics  exhibition  in  the  Science  Museum  demonstrates  our
enlightened recognition of the inventive significance of Oram's experiments. It
presents 'rediscovery' as an effect of our progressive enlightenment:  science
can  atone the  past  mistakes of  culture.  Though this account of the Oramics
Machine's  'rediscovery'  is  perhaps  compelling  to  a  certain  kind  of  moral
sentiment it also obscures many of the questions and problematics that I have
raised in this thesis about the Oramics Machine as an invention. 
In  this  thesis  I  have  attempted  to  argue  that  the  Oramics  Machine  is
sociologically  interesting  as  a  'rediscovery'  precisely  because  very  little  is
known about this artefact that would confirm its importance as an invention.
The reason I use inverted commas around the term 'rediscovery' is to highlight
that the exhibition of the Oramics Machine is not the bringing to light of an
artefact whose capacities are known but which has simply been overlooked. At
the current time of writing, three years after its first exhibition, there is still little
clarity about the extent to  which the Oramics Machine can be said to be a
technological  or  artistic  innovation. The  narrative  of  rediscovery  that
accompanies its exhibition, I have argued in this thesis, tells us that if there is
something innovative about this artefact it is not yet something we can name.
Rather,  the  exhibition  of  the  'rediscovered'  Oramics  Machine  would  more
obviously seem to reveal something about our the limits of our existing ideas of
invention. The big question mark over exactly what has been discovered in the
'rediscovery' of the Oramics Machine, I have argued in this thesis,  proposes
invention  itself  as  the  concern  to  be  addressed.  As  we  have  seen,  the
unknown  quantities  clearly  does  not  make  the  Oramics  Machine  any  less
interesting to the musicians, artists, engineers and Science Museum staff that
we have encountered in this thesis. In their actions – organising events, putting
on concerts, exhibitions, blogging, and so on – we see  clearly demonstrated
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that there is something inventive about the Oramics Machine even if it cannot
be precisely identified and named. It is for this reason that I have favoured the
concept  of  experiment  over  that  of  discovery  in  this  thesis.  The  Oramics
Machine  seems  to  me  an  artefact  with  some  very  different  experimental
capacities:  in  the  analysis  I  have  attempted  to  show how in  the  Machine
appears  quite  differently  as  the  object  at  the  centre  of  the  curatorial
experiment, the instrument used for musical experiment and the centre-piece
of the experimental display.
In this thesis I have described how the staging of the Oramics Machine in the
Oramics exhibition might be considered inventive insofar as it is also a process
of  assembling  multiple  modes  of  experiment.  The  concept  of  the  public
experiment has enabled me to provide an analysis of the work of exhibiting the
Oramics Machine through which  these relations  are made.  Subsequently, I
have given an account of two empirical objects, the Oramics Machine and the
exhibition,  which are not easily separated out  from one another: how can we
describe the Oramics Machine as an  important invention independent of its
display in the Science Museum? How can we discuss the Oramics exhibition
independent  of  its  centre-piece  object? Applying  the  concept  of  the  public
experiment  I have  suggested that in the experimental complexity of  Oramics
we find that the exhibition is a format that is simply the tail end of processes of
invention as the antithesis of experimental practices. Instead, I have attempted
to  specify  some  of  the  ways  in  which  experimental  exhibitions  might  be
consider inventive formats in their own right.
Reassembling the Science Museum as a setting of experiment 
The  opening  journey  through the Science Museum  to  the  Oramics  gallery,
described in the introduction, was highly selective. The purpose of this journey
was to introduce, via a series of exaggerated contrasts, the problematic of the
relations  between  science,  culture  and  the  public  that  the  thesis  would
consider.  Through  displays of reason's triumphs, celebrated industrial history
and cutting-edge technoscience I introduced the Science Museum as a setting
where science is promoted as the method creating universal truths, as driving
technological  developments,  and  as  the  guarantor  of  our  progressive
Enlightenment.  In this introduction, science appeared as a special sphere of
culture defined in its opposition not just to forms of falsehood, irrationality and
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mysticism but also to spheres of cultural practice such as art and politics. Next
to  displays  of  steam  engines  and  space  rockets,  the  Oramics  exhibition
appeared  a  considerable  contrast:  using  these  exhibitions  (quite
instrumentally)  to stage the relations between science and culture in the way
just described, I introduced Oramics as an exhibition that messes up this cosy
settlement,  as a radical intervention that tells us that the former exhibitions
have  taken  too  much  for  granted. My  introduction,  however,  somewhat
overstated the case. It was not dishonest, the problematic it introduced is very
real  in  this  setting,  but  as  a portrait  of  the  Science Museum it  was highly
selective. Now, after having specified the ways in which the Oramics exhibition
can be considered experimental we are perhaps in a better position to return to
the Science Museum to ask what  kind  of  setting this  is,  and what  kind  of
relations between science and culture do we find there.
Oramics  is not exceptional in the Science Museum simply because it  is an
experimental exhibition  removed from the concerns of  pure and  professional
science.  There are in  fact  many other  galleries  in  the Science Museum in
which the concerns of professional science make only a minor appearance or
are absent all  together. I  could, for  instance, have taken the visitor  via the
permanent  media-art  installation  called  Listening  Post150 which  stages  an
experimental  sound  display  composed  from  real-time  internet  data.  The
Listening Post  occupies an entire darkened room,  one wall of  which  is filled
with  small  screens and speakers scrolling live  text-data from  internet  chat-
rooms  which  is  played through  computer-synthesised voices  that  read and
sing  the text.  The visitor could have passed the  Toaster Project151, a toaster
built from scratch by the artist Thomas Thwaites who mined and processed all
the raw materials himself; the final piece costing 300 times more than a mass-
produced  toaster. Or,  since  the  opening  of  Oramics,  we  could  also  have
stopped at the temporary Hexen 2.0152 exhibition by the artist Suzanne Treister
which  investigates  the  development  of  cybernetics  and the  interdisciplinary
Macy conferences  of the 1940s  through imagery of the alchemical and the
occult.  Alchemy was also the theme of  another  temporary  exhibition called
150Further information about The Listening Post can be found at: 
http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/smap/collection_index/mark_hansen_ben_rubin_listeni
ng_post.aspx (accessed 9th September 2013)
151For more information about the Toaster Project see: 
http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/smap/collection_index/thomas_thwaites_the_toaster_pr
oject.aspx (accessed 12 April 2014)
152Further information about Hexen 2.0 can be found at: 
http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/smap/collection_index/suzanne_treister_hexen_2_0.as
px (accessed 12 April 2014)
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Signs, Symbols, Secrets: an illustrated guide to alchemy153 that for two years
occupied the gallery opposite  Oramics. In  Signs, Symbols, Secrets we find a
host of very old texts and scrolls that document  medieval  alchemy practices,
which were superseded and displaced to the realm of pseudo-science with the
rise  of  professional chemistry;  the  exhibition  foregrounding the  quest  of
alchemists for the “philosopher's stone” and the use of imagery to document
alchemical  practices. Indeed, it is notable that  two years after the opening of
Oramics, the adjoining gallery was radically redeveloped as a photography and
art  gallery named  Media Space154.  The first  exhibition in this gallery  was a
display  of  photography  from the  1960s  and  70s called  Only  in  England155
focused around the work of  the artists Martin Parr and Tony Ray-Jones.  Had
the visitor taken a detour through these various displays of art, social critique,
the occult, pseudo-science and media, Oramics might not have seemed quite
so unsettling as an experimental exhibition. 
My  reason  for  making  reference  to this  range  of  the  Science  Museum
exhibitions that depart from the concerns of professional science at this point
in the  conclusion  is not to water down the distinctiveness of  Oramics.  If the
distinctiveness of Oramics in the Science Museum were only that it addressed
concerns removed from professional science then I would not have chosen it
for this empirical study. Highlighting the broader landscape of exhibitions within
which Oramics is situated is rather a way to repose the question of what kind
of setting the Science Museum is. In the chapters of this thesis I have argued
that the Science Museum is a setting in which relations between science and
culture are produced in the material practice of exhibition. Though many of the
exhibitions I have just described display  small signs  explaining  that they are
“art”  projects,  many  exhibit  material  that nonetheless  enacts  many  of  the
registers of  the “science” exhibitions from which they are distinguished  (and
vice  versa):  in  the  Museum's  “art”  exhibitions  we  find  knowledge,  data,
technology,  philosophy,  invention just  as  in  its  “science”  exhibitions  we
increasingly find visual culture, music, literary references and so on. In other
words,  when  we  look  close  up we  find  that  there  is  considerable  traffic
between the  different  kinds of  exhibitions  we find in  the Science Museum.
153For more information about Signs, Symbols, Secrets see: 
http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/Home/visitmuseum/Plan_your_visit/exhibitions/alchemy.
aspx (accessed 12 April 2014)
154For more information about Media Space see: 
http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/visitmuseum/media_space.aspx (accessed 12 April 
2014)
155For more information about Only in England see: 
http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/visitmuseum/plan_your_visit/exhibitions/only_in_englan
d.aspx (accessed 12 April 2014)
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Such traffic underscores the inadequacy of demarcationist theories of science
to account for what we find in Science Museum exhibitions. Situating Oramics
in this broader landscape of exhibitions, the exhibition may not appear quite as
'different' but it also makes clear that the Science Museum is not a setting in
which the relations betweens science and culture are premised on a series of
oppositions such as rational/irrational, technical/aesthetic, truth/power (and so
on)  that would mark science out as distinct and special,  on a priori grounds,
in comparison to politics or art (etc). 
In this study I have focused on the concept of the experiment to describe such
traffic:  in  Oramics we  find  the  experiment  not  demarcated as  a  properly
scientific  format  but  rather  a  reference  that  circulates  across very  different
modes of practice.  The centrality of experimental  registers in  Oramics  brings
the exhibition into relations with others that we find in the Science Museum –
such  as  the  pedagogical  exhibitions  of  experimental  instruments,  and  the
interactive displays that communicate 'pure' science to the public – and, hence,
by foregrounding the experiment in my analysis I have attempted to highlights
why  science  is  an  issue  that  is  at  stake  in  the  exhibition.  I  am  not  here
advancing  an  argument  that  attempts  to  'scientise'  Oramics but  rather  an
argument that this exhibition intervenes in concerns about science, despite the
absence  of  professional  science from  its  displays.  By  focusing  on  the
experiment  I have therefore attempted to  make clear why we cannot simply
settle with classifying Oramics as an art exhibition in a science museum, and
thus why we should take seriously that this exhibition can tell us something
about  the  relations  between science  and  the  public.  It  is  on  this  basis,  I
suggest,  that  we can generalise from an analysis  of  Oramics to a broader
account  of  the  Science  Museum  as  an  inventive  setting.  In  the  Science
Museum  we  are  afforded  the  opportunity  to  make  associations  between
heterogeneous  things  via  references,  such  as  experiment, that  circulate
between  them.  Science  is  therefore  not  only  a  category  that  unifies  or
separates out the exhibitions we find in the Science Museum. In this sense, we
might say that the Science Museum could be considered an inventive setting
to the extent that in the material practice of exhibition we find new associations
made  between  heterogeneous  things  and  thus  a  science  that  is  also
continually  unsettled and reordered.  In experimental exhibitions like  Oramics
we are perhaps better able to appreciate not only what an unlikely assemblage
of heterogeneous things make up a science museum but also the impressive
work that goes into maintaining a museum dedicated to an entity, science, that
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is being continually changed and refashioned.
Opening up the culture problem 
The one question I have left largely unaddressed in this conclusion is the role
of  culture  as an analytic category used  in this study. This is in part  due to
pragmatic considerations in how the analysis of this thesis developed: culture
only made an appearance late in the research process and therefore did not
shape  the  direction  of  empirical  study  in  the  same  way  that  the  analytic
categories of  science and the public  did.  Though the concept  of  culture  in
many ways seems entirely necessary to appreciating what Oramics is 'doing' in
the Science Museum, this analytic of culture entered into the study after much
of the empirical research was complete and as the analysis was developing. In
some sense, then, this empirical study has not sufficiently developed the basis
on which to  conclude the question  of  in  what  ways the  Oramics  exhibition
makes  relations  between  science  and  culture.  What  I  introduced  as  “the
culture question in the Science Museum” is also to some extent a question for
this thesis.
Though I have attempted to articulate the conceptual problematic of Oramics –
the public experiment – in relation to a very particular tradition in social studies
of science, literatures from very different traditions such as critical theory and
cultural studies has nonetheless proven useful  for  empirically  describing  how
the experimental  complexity  of  Oramics is  translated  in  different  ways  into
concerns about  the  relations  between science and culture.  In  other  words,
though I have attempted to maintain a closed circuit of reference to formulate
the  conceptual  problem of  the  public  experiment,  the  different  modes of
experiment  that  we find in  Oramics and the  problems  in  many ways have
forced these circuits of reference to be broken open to some extent.  In the
empirical  chapters  I  have  described  several  problematics  – participation,
exclusion, media – in which the relations between science and the public also
appear significant  as relations between science and  culture.  So too,  in  the
empirical chapters I have drawn from a range of literatures in which these tri-
part relations  are  said  to  be  significant  including:  actor-network  theory,
governmentality, social  constructivism, cultural  studies and critical  theory.  In
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some cases the use of this literature has been quite instrumental: for instance,
my uses of  critical  theory  were  more as  a means to  illustrate an empirical
problem – the Science Museum as a participant in the cultural  industries –
rather than on the basis of its conceptual contribution to the central argument
of the thesis.  Nonetheless, my use of such literatures has not been entirely
instrumental.  And,  indeed  one  reason  I  drew  on  these  broader  range  of
literatures is because I'm not convinced that  the relations between science,
culture  and  the  public  has  been  sufficiently  addressed in  social  studies  of
science. 
In the study of the relations between science and the public, the dominant lens
in social studies of science traditions is political. When we look at the relations
between science and the public, scientific  practice appears not dissimilar to
political  practice  (for  instance,  in  its  modes  of  representation  and
demonstration).  The strength of traditions that developed around this issue in
social  studies of science,  for instance  actor-network theory, is that they  not
only  revealed  something  important  about  how  science  works  but  also
addressed directly the epistemological problem of a materialist social science:
ideas do not simply float from science and to the public (or society) but instead
the  processes  of  demonstrating  ideas  and  putting  them  into  practice  is  a
material  process of making relations between very different kinds of actors,
and as such is amenable to social description.  These traditions have argued
that  to offer a materialist account of  the creation of new ideas in science we
cannot simply  reductively assume we already know where and in what their
materiality  resides.  Social  studies  of  science  therefore invites us  to  take
serious that new ideas are not just imposed by the mind onto an unchanging
material  substrate  or  simply  'internal'  representations  caused  by  'external'
public  events.  Actor-network  theory,  for  instance,  makes  an  ontological
argument about invention as a process that reorders the material composition
of the  public  world.  To invent, ANT tell us, scientists have to translate public
interests,  enrol  them and force them to confront  material  problems  through
demonstrations.  In  the  relations  between  science  and  the  public,  for  ANT,
science  can  be  described,  symmetrically,  as  a  practice  that  is  not  unlike
politics. 
However, when we add culture into the mix of relations between science and
the public we can no longer straightforwardly apply theories like ANT that tell
us  science  is  like  politics.  This  is  in  part,  I  suggest,  because  theories
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developed in social studies of science tend to offer us a theory of culture that is
totalising;  these  traditions  often simply  affirm  an anthropological  account  of
culture as the entirety of connected elements in a way of life.  The critique of
science made by social studies of science is, in this respect, closely linked with
another  critique  of  a  liberal  humanist  view of  culture – which,  in  Matthew
Arnold's phrase, can be described as  “the best  which has been  thought and
said in the world”. To caricature we could say that in social studies of science,
science is culture as long as culture is totalising, ontologically complex but also
un-extraordinary to social description. In other words, though social studies of
science might accept that there can only ever be partial descriptions of culture
when they are given they are nonetheless  assumed to be socially mundane.
To be sure, such accounts of the relations between science and culture have
served the social  study of science well: once science looses its aura as a
special form of cultural practice that is opaque to social description we can see
how it is in fact not so extraordinary and even not so different to those spheres
of culture that  social scientists have long studied, like politics.  And yet,  as I
have suggested in this study, in a setting like the Science Museum such a
settlement  between  science  and  culture,  in  which  the  latter  provides  the
repository in which to dissolve the problems of sociologically accounting for the
former, seems deeply unsatisfying. In short, in the Science Museum we cannot
simply describe science 'as culture' because this is a setting in which culture,
just like science, is a construct that is not only complex conceptually but also
materially and practically.
If I am going to leave open the culture question in this study, then, I am also
querying the extent to  which social studies of science has solved its cultural
problems.  I suggest there are two  implications  that follow from this. First, it
suggests that in considering the relations between science and the public we
cannot simply assume culture as either irrelevant or as a totalising concept into
which we can dissolve these relations. Second, and perhaps more ambitiously,
it suggests a need to revisit the shared circuits of reference in social studies of
science that would  purport to hold in common a  critique  of  the treatment of
science and culture in  traditions  such as  critical theory or cultural studies. In
this latter sense, the culture question is not only about social studies of science
but rather about the relations between the different traditions of social science.
In  other  words,  once we accept  that  science  is  not  so  amenable  to  being
studied 'as culture', as social studies of science has often presented it, then we
are also invited to ask questions of  the  traditions  of social science,  and the
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relations we presuppose between them, which have claimed to hold the keys
to the social  description of science. For social studies of science, then, the
question  is  perhaps  reposed  as  to  whether  and  in  what  ways  we  have
assumed  cultural as a resource for the social description of  science. This  is
clearly  beyond the remit  of  this  study  but,  I  suggest,  it  nonetheless  seems
significant  if  social  studies of science is to develop an adequate materialist
account of science. 
In this study I have used the concept of the experiment as the vehicle through
which to examine the relations between science and culture.  Once we  focus
on experiments that take place beyond the laboratory setting we inevitably ask
what made us think that  laboratory practice was more magical or  materially
forceful than the other social practices that call themselves experimental. The
multiple modes of experiment that we find in Oramics highlights how complex
experiments are when they take place in public.  The exhibition shows how
experiment might  well  appear  less serious  once  it is dislocated from a pure
and professionalised science: we cannot, for instance, the element of 'play' we
come across in the experiments of electronic musicians who, after all, work
extremely hard in order to play their music (this observation is of course not
new to social descriptions of experiments). But, this should not be taken as a
damning  critique  of  the  laboratory  experiment.  Instead,  as  many  in  social
studies of  science have  argued,  the task when we encounter  experimental
complexity is to recompose our  social description of experiment as material
practice.  In other words, the experimental practices of the sciences are not
problematised  by  the  Oramics  exhibition,  only  those  efforts  to  unify  and
demarcate them as identical under the name of Science. The experiment, as
we know, is much more heterogeneous in practice than such epistemological
approaches would allow.  The  proliferation of  experimental practices  that we
find in the Science Museum, and the traffic  we can trace between seemingly
unrelated or functionally differentiated spheres of social practice, highlights the
importance of  the  concept of the public  experiment  for  appreciating  both  the
complexity and  dynamism  of the  experiment  and  the  relations  between
science, culture and the public. Such experimental complexity, I have argued,
enables us to appreciate how material practices like exhibition, that have often
been passed over as socially mundane and epistemologically unremarkable,
can be valued as inventive and significant for social analysis.
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